
Book ' W SJ 

issr 






CHRISTIANITY 



CONTRASTED WITH 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY, 



CHRISTIANITY 



CONTRASTED WITH 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY: 

AN ESSAY, 

IN FIVE BOOKS, 

SANSKRIT AND ENGLISH: 

WITH PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS TENDERED TO 

THE MISSIONARY AMONG THE HINDUS. 



JAMES R. BALLANTYNE, LL.D., 

PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. AND PRINCIPAL OF THE GOVERNMENT COLLEGE AT BENARES. 



LONDON: 
JAMES MADDEN, LEADENHALL STREET. 






9 61b 3 

'05 

ff^9ER eOLLECT/OH. 

STEPHEN AUSTIN, 







PRINTER, TIEKTFORD. 



Sfo the Pernors 



JOHN RUSSELL. COLVIN, 

LATE LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR OF THE NORTH-WEST PROVINCES OF INDIA, 

TO WHOSE CORDIAL APPRECIATION OE HIS EDUCATIONAL AIMS 

THE WRITER OWED IT 

THAT THE DEATH OF THE LAMENTED THOMASON 

DID NOT CRIPPLE THE RESOURCES OE THE BENARES COLLEGE. 

THIS ESSAY IS INSCRIBED, 

AYITH SORROWING GRATITUDE, 



JAMES ROBERT BALLANTYNE. 



SYNOPTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



PAGE 

ADVERTISEMENT i 

PREFACE iii 

INTRODUCTION vii 

Interference in matters of Religion requires Delicacy and 

Address ib. 

The importance of the End derogates not from the import- 
ance of the Means ib. 

Rude attacks on False Religions, why unadvisable viii 

The Propagation of Christianity, how to be Hoped from the 

Dissemination of Knowledge ib. 

Desirableness of Converting the Learned ix 

How it is Reasonable to suppose that Christianity should be 

Propagated otherwise now than at its First Introduction ib. 

Evidence of the Truth of the Christian Religion furnished by 
the Contrariety between the First and the Subsequent 
Order of its Propagation x 

How St. Paul dealt with the Learned ib. 

Hindu Philosophy to be mastered not merely for itself; and 

why xi 

The Subject, notwithstanding the Depth of the Interests 
Involved, why to be treated here with Scientific Unim- 
passionedness ib. 

We can most safely venture on Conciliation, where we best 
know the Errors which we must Avoid seeming to 
Countenance xii 

Prejudices not Needlessly to be Awakened ib. 

The Confutation of Hinduism not the Primary indispensable xiii 

An example of Lord Bacon' s to be followed ib. 

P>acon's example not to be Misinterpreted ib. 



vi CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

GENERAL VIEW OF THE HINDU SYSTEMS OE 

PHILOSOPHY xv 

The Hindu Systems of Philosophy ib. 

Fundamental Agreement of the Three Great Systems ib. 

Howthey Differ xvi 

The Nyaya Stand-point xvii 

The Sankhya Stand-point ib. 

Precise Difference between the Nyaya and the Sankhya 

Stand-point ib. 

The Vedanta Stand-point ib. 

Respective Subordination of the Systems xviii 

Corresponding Distribution of the Present Work ib. 

Summary of the Nyaya Philosophy xix 

General Character of the Nyaya System ib. 

Meaning of the Name ib. 

The Nyaya Text-book , ib. 

Summary of the Topics xx 

Beatitude the Result of Knowledge ib. 

The Means of Right Knowledge xxi 

A Caution to the Missionary xxii 

Objects regarding which we are to have Right Knowledge xxiii 

Soul xxiv 

Mind ib. 

Activity xxv 

What the Nyaya reckons a Fault xxvi 

Transmigration ib. 

Pain and Final Emancipation xxvii 

Summary of the Sankhya Philosophy ib. 

General Character of the System ib. 

Meaning of the Name xxviii 

The Sankhya Text-book , ib. 

The Chief End of Man ib. 

Nature, What xxix 

Liberation, What and When xxx 

Annihilation not Sought ib. 

Summary of the Vedanta System xxxi 

Its Great Tenet ■ ib. 



CONTENTS. vn 



TAGE 



The One Reality, how Designated xxxi 

Possible Course of the Vedantin's Speculations ib. 

Why " Ignorance" must be Admitted xxxii 

How " Ignorance" may have got its Various Synonymes... xxxiii 

' ' Ignorance, ' ' how defined in the Vedanta xxxiv 

Why " Ignorance" is held to Consist of Three Qualities... xxxv 

The Operation of the Qualities Illustrated xxxvi 

Means of Emancipation according to the Vedanta xxxvii 

CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED with HINDU PHILOSOPHY 1 

Book I. — A Partial Exposition of Christian Doctrine ib. 

The Enquiry What 2 

Man's Chief End ib. 

The Rule for Man's Direction to his Chief End 5 

What the Scriptures Principally Teach 9 

What we are to Believe concerning God ib. 

The Unity of God 13 

The Trinity in Unity 14 

Creation 15 

Book II. — The Evidences of Christianity 20 

Miracles the Credentials of a Religion 21 

The Christian Miracles worthy of Credit 22 

Sufferings of the First Christian Martyrs 26 

Unlikeliness that a Story so Attested should be False 28 

No Evidence of the Veracity of the Veda producible 29 

The Veda, how the result of Speculation, not of Revelation 33 
The Vedantic Tenet does not justify the Vedantic In- 
ference - 38 

The Eternity of Human Souls, of What Kind 52 

Evidence of Christianity furnished by Prophecy 54 

That the Prophecies were really such 55 

Book III. — Natural Theology 60 

Evidence of a Designer ib. 

The Sankhya Theory of Unintelligent Design redargued ... 61 

The Criterion of the Intelligent ,. 65 

The Self-contradictory not Receivable on any Authority ... 66 

The Argument from Design Illustrated 68 



viii CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

Book IV. — Of the Mysterious Points in Christianity 72 

Mystery of the Trinity in Unity ib. 

The rule of " Excluded Middle" 75 

Mystery Explicable were no Mystery 78 

Mystery of the Incarnation 79 

Mystery of the Atonement * 80 

The Freedom of the Will 83 

Abortive Attempt of Hinduism to clear up the Mystery of 

Evil 86 

Mystery not Distinctive of Christianity 91 

Book V. — The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and 

Course of Nature 92 

Origen's Statement of the Argument , ib. 

Analogy Described 94 

Practical Value of Analogy 96 

In default of Certainty, Probability not to be Despised 98 

Belief may be the Reward of Obedience 100 

Belief may have Degrees of Assurance 101 

What the Divine Government of both Worlds implies, 

according to the Christian Doctrine 103 

Concluding Advice to the Inquirer , 112 



APPENDIX OE NOTES AND DISSERTATIONS 113 

A. — On the term " Matter" and its possible correspondents 

in the Hindu Dialects (a Dialogue) 114 

B. — On the Hindu employment of the terms "Soul" and 

"Mind" 138 

C. — On " Logic" and " Rhetoric" as regarded by the Hindus 
(being a Remonstrance to Sir William Hamilton on 

his Injustice to the Hindu Logic) 140 

D.— On the "Vedas" 161 

E. — On " the Eternity of Sound " (a Dogma of the Mimansa) 1 76 
F. — On "Translation into the Languages of India" * 195 



ADVEETISEMENT. 



m -n— „ ^i^^-u+i^ ^-.^/Kfi^q aiiKoectupjillTz; was submitted 

The reader is requested to make the following corrections with his pen. 
Page xxvi., line 8 of note 1, for « adverting it to," read « adverting to." 
,i 26, „ 28, for "that they were established," read "that tney were so is 

established." 
» 31, „ 8, dele the b. 
» 47, „ 31, «tf, as a note, i « Without eyes he sees." -Mahab/msh^a, p. 1. 

127, „ 18,/or"Colebrook's," read "Colebrooke's." 
,, 145, „ 25, for « affirmation or negation," raw* « assent or dissent." 
>, 156, „ 14, f r " the inductive," raw* " an induction." 
»' 16f) > » 3 and 6, /or « odor," rwtf " odour." 

in the (Sanskrit language, treating oi tnose systems ; lugemer 
with a demonstration (supported by such, arguments, and con- 
veyed in such a form and manner as may be most likely 
to prove convincing to learned Hindus imbued with those 
errors), of the following fundamental principles of Christian 
Theism, viz. : — 

" First. — Of the real, and not merely apparent or illusory, 
distinctness of God from all other spirits, and from matter ; 
and of the creation (in the proper sense) of all other spirits, 
and of matter, by God, in opposition to the Yedanta. 



viii CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

Book IV. — Of the Mysterious Points in Christianity 72 

Mystery of the Trinity in Unity ib. 

The rule of " Excluded Middle " 75 

Mystery Explicable were no Mystery 78 

Mystery of the Incarnation 79 

Mystery of the Atonement 80 

The Freedom of the Will 83 

Abortive Attempt of Hinduism to clear up the Mystery of 

Evil 86 

Mystery not Distinctive of Christianity 91 

Book V. — The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and 



JllXiiilXUXl. V^JL J.IUX. 



A. — On the term " Matter" and its possible correspondents 

in the Hindu Dialects (a Dialogue) 114 

B. — On the Hindu employment of the terms "Soul" and 

"Mind" 138 

C. — On " Logic" and " Rhetoric" as regarded by the Hindus 
(being a Remonstrance to Sir William Hamilton on 

his Injustice to the Hindu Logic) 1 40 

D.— On the "Vedas" 161 

E. — On " the Eternity of Sound" (a Dogma of the Mimansa) 176 
F. — On "Translation into the Languages of India" » 195 



ADVERTISEMENT. 



This Essay, slightly modified subsequently, was submitted 
in competition for a prize of £300, offered by a member of 
the Bengal Civil Service. The prize was divided, and a 
moiety was adjudged to this Essay, the judges being gentle- 
men appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury and the 
Bishops of London and Oxford. In the terms of the pros- 
pectus, the prize was offered "for the best statement and 
refutation, in English, of the fundamental errors (opposed 
to Christian Theism) of the Yedanta, Nyaya, and Sankhya 
Philosophies, as set forth in the standard native authorities, 
in the Sanskrit language, treating of those systems; together 
with a demonstration (supported by such arguments, and con- 
veyed in such a form and manner as may be most likely 
to prove convincing to learned Hindus imbued with those 
errors), of the following fundamental principles of Christian 
Theism, viz. :— 

" First. — Of the real, and not merely apparent or illusory, 
distinctness of God from all other spirits, and from matter ; 
and of the creation (in the proper sense) of all other spirits, 
and of matter, by God, in opposition to the Yedanta. 



ii ADVERTISEMENT. 

" Second. — Of the non-eternity of separate souls, and their 
creation by God, in opposition to the Nyaya and Sankhya. 

" Third. — Of the creation of matter, in opposition to the 
tenet of its eternity in the shape of atoms (as maintained in 
the Nyaya and Yaiseshika Schools), or in the shape of Prakriti 
(as maintained by the Sankhya). 

" Fourth. — Of the moral character and moral government 
of Grod ; and of the reality and perpetuity of the difference 
between moral good and evil with reference to such dogmas 
of the above systems as are opposed to these doctrines." 



PREFACE. 



This Essay, in its present shape, is but an imper- 
fect sketch of what the writer would wish to offer as 
a help to the missionary among the learned Hindus. 
Many topics, which might advantageously receive full 
treatment, are here scarcely more than indicated. With 
life and health, the writer will continuously prosecute 
his task towards its completion. 

The five books " On Christianity as contrasted with 
Hindu Philosophy,' ' which form the kernel of the fol- 
lowing Essay, are given also in Sanskrit, with the 
omission of such incidental discussions as have reference 
exclusively to the missionary, and not to those whom 
the missionary has to teach. 

There are some Sanskrit works, yet untranslated, 
which the writer must study before deciding upon his 
theological terminology for India. Among these works 
is the Aphorisms of Sandilya. Sandilya rejects the 
Hindu (gnostic) theory that knowledge is the one thing 
needful, and contends that knowledge is only the hand- 



iv PREFACE. 

maid of faith. Hence, however defective his views 
may be in other respects, his work seems to promise 
phraseology of which a Christian missionary may ad- 
vantageously avail himself. This remark might form 
the text for an extended dissertation on the Chris- 
tian's right to the theological language and the theo- 
logical conceptions of his opponents. 

If the present work were completed to the writer's 
mind, he would next desire to be enabled to devote 
himself to the translation and commentation of the 
Bible in Sanskrit; taking book by book, not perhaps 
in the order of the canon — for the completion of such 
a work as is here intended is not to be looked for 
in a lifetime — but in the order in which it might 
seem most advisable to solicit the attention of inquirers, 
from whom it would scarcely be advisable to with- 
hold the New Testament till they should have threaded 
all the historical details of the Old. An occasional 
watchword of Protestants, and a good one in its proper 
place, is " The Bible without note or comment." This 
is right, when the design is to exclude such notes 
and comments as those of the Douay version, and to 
make appeal to the unbiassed judgment of Europeans, 
as to the Eomish and the reformed interpretations of 
Scripture language. But when, as in the case of the 
Hindu inquirer, the question is not, which (of two or 



PREFACE. v 

more) is the meaning, but simply what is the mean- 
ing, — notes and comments become the helps or the 
substitutes of a Hying teacher. English clergymen have 
commentaries to refer to, and if we may ever look 
forward to an efficient native Christian clergy, these 
native clergymen also ought to be similarly supplied. 

In speaking of a translation of the Bible in Sans- 
krit as a desideratum, the writer is very far indeed 
from ignoring the Sanskrit version of the Baptist mis- 
sionaries; but his own investigations have shown him 
that this version — valuable as, in many respects, it is 
— was made at a time when Sanskrit literature had 
not been sufficiently examined to make a correct ver- 
sion possible. The mere mastery of the Grammar and 
the Dictionary does not give one the command of a 
language. As well might it be expected that the 
study of a mineral ogical cabinet should make a geolo- 
gist. "Words, as well as rocks, to be rightly compre- 
hended, must be studied in situ, A single example 
of our meaning will suffice, and we need go no further 
for it than the first verse of the first chapter of the 
.Book of Genesis in the Sanskrit version of the Bap- 
tist missionaries. The Hindu is there told that, in 
the beginning, God created akasa l and prithivl. 2 Now 
in the dictionary, akasa will, no doubt, be found oppo- 
1 WSfiTO! II 2 Tjfvft II 



vi PREFACE. 

site the word " heaven," and prithivl opposite the word 
" earth;" but if the books of the Nyaya philosophy 
be looked into, it will be found that akasa is to be 
regarded as one of the five elements (the five hypo- 
thetical substrata of the five diverse qualities cognised 
by the five senses severally), and that prithivl is another 
of the five. Consequently, when the next verse pro- 
ceeds to speak of the waters — a third one among the 
five — the learned Hindu reader is staggered by the 
doubt whether it is to be understood that the waters 
were uncreated, or whether the sacred penman had 
made an oversight. A Pandit once propounded this 
dilemma, in great triumph, to myself; and he was 
much surprised at finding that the perplexity could 
be cleared up. But it is obvious what powers of mis- 
chief we may place in the hands of unscrupulous oppo- 
nents, by leaving our versions of Scripture thus need- 
lessly open to cavil. 



INTRODUCTION, 



I cannot better prepare the reader to apprehend the 
design of this work than by submitting for his considera- 
tion the following remarks of the Eev. John Penrose, in 
his Bampton Lecture of the year 1808 : — 1 

" There is nothing which demands not only interference in 
so much delicacy and address, but also so iust So "requires 

" jo delicacy and 

and liberal a. knowledge of human nature, as address - 
interference in matters of religion. It is manifest, how- 
ever, from past history, and I know not that the 
experience of present times tends in any degree to 
invalidate the observation, that those persons who devote 
themselves to the missionary office, though often men of 
the most heroic disinterestedness, and sometimes of an 
acute and active genius, yet are rarely possessed of an 
enlarged and comprehensive intellect. In the immediate 
obiect which they are desirous of attaining — an The import- 

fi *f c anceoftheend 

object, indeed, of the highest worth and great- S^tiS im- 

- , , . , portance of the 

ness — they appear somewhat too exclusively means. 
to concentrate all the faculties of their minds ; and, from 
want of an extended contemplation of human nature, to 
mistake the means by which that very object may be best 

1 Entitled, — "An attempt to prove the truth of Christianity from the wisdom 
displayed in its original establishment, and from the history of false and corrupted 
systems of religion." 



viii INTRODUCTION. 

attained. Eager to multiply conversions, they seem 
naturally to fall into those imprudences which attend an 
unenlightened spirit of proselytism. In some cases 
\e.g n that of the Jesuits], as we have seen, they accom- 
modate Christianity to the idolatries of those to whom 
they preach. In others, they forget that the same causes 
on^Msf^eS which make religion necessary to mankind, 
adviskbie. attach men to the religion in which they have 
been bred, and that every rude attack serves only to 
bind them to it more closely. These errors seem not to 
imply any particular imputation of blame to individual 
missionaries, but naturally to result from the constitu- 
tional imperfection of mankind. Throughout India, and 
other unconverted countries, they probably will extend 
to all teachers of Christianity, whether of native or 
European extraction. We rarely can find accuracy of 
judgment united with that warmth of character which 
is necessary to induce men to undertake the difficult and 
dangerous office of promulgating Christianity to idolaters; 
however useful they may esteem that office to be, how- 
ever sublime. Those varied studies which discipline and 
correct the mind lessen the intensity of its application to 
any one pursuit. To improve reason has a tendency to 
diminish zeal. I speak only of what usually is the tend- 
ency of such improvement, without examining whether 
it is capable of being, or ought to be, counteracted. 
Thepropaga- " Should these observations be admitted, 
wK-howto they probably may lead us to infer that it is 

be hoped from J x J J 

tio c n d oTTnowI n °t so much to the exertions of missionaries 

that we must look for the future propagation 

of Christianity, as to the general dissemination of know- 



INTRODUCTION. ix 

ledge. The indiscretions which it can scarcely, perhaps, 
be hoped that missionaries will be able to avoid, im- 
pede the end which they propose ; but when those per- 
sons to whom our religion is offered shall be enabled to 
determine for themselves, concerning its records and 
evidences, they will learn to admit its truth on rational 
principles. When they shall add to the possession of 
our Scriptures, the sagacity to understand their mean- 
ing, and the judgment to appreciate their value, they 
will believe the doctrines which are taught in them. 
This belief, we may expect, will naturally Desirableness 
descend from the more intelligent to the com- iLSSu 11 * 
paratively ignorant. Sound learning and just argument 
will triumph over fanaticism or error ; will first con- 
vince the reason of the wise, and, by this means, will, 
in due time, overcome the prejudices of the vulgar ; 
and thus Christianity will eventually be established by 
a progress contrary, indeed, to that which it experienced 
at its origin, but probably not less aptly suited to the 
altered circumstances of mankind. 

" If this, in truth, be likely to be the case, how it is 

reasonable to 

so extraordinary a revolution in the manner of cE°tianity hat 

. . , . . ■, . sbould be pro- 

propagatmg our religion deserves serious con- pagated other- 

x x ° u i - } wise now tban 

sideration. It is an historical fact, entirely SoiucloS in " 
independent of the miraculous means by which it is said 
to have been effected, that Christianity was introduced 
into the world by low and uneducated men, and that 
men of rank and learning were afterwards, by degrees, 
converted to it. This fact appears, manifestly, to be an 
inversion in the ordinary progress of opinions, which 
are usually communicated from the wise to the ignorant, 



x INTRODUCTION. 

instead of being adopted from the ignorant by the wise. 
It accordingly has been considered by Christians as an 
important argument for the belief of a Divine interfer- 
ence in the original establishment of the Church. And 
Evidence of if it appears that things have now reverted to 

the truth of the ., . . n , . n -, . 

christian reii- their natural order, even in the advancement 

gion furnished ' 

S4 he betwe r en of that very religion, in the foundation of 
the subsequent which this order was interrupted; if it is to 

order of its •*■ ' 

propagation, abilities and learning that we must now look 
for the extension and support of a religion which was 
first propagated by a few unlettered fishermen of Galilee ; 
we have the stronger reason to admire the peculiarity 
of its origin, and to conclude that none but God could 
ever have enabled 'the foolish things of the world to 
confound the wise, and the weak things of the world to 
confound the things which are mighty.' " 
Howst.paui In another place Mr. Penrose says: — 

dealt with the *■ J 

learned. u o nce? a £ i eas t 7 in the course of his ministry, 

St. Paul addressed himself to a learned, to an Athenian 
tribunal. He wisely adapted to local circumstances the 
mode in which he declared the existence of the Supreme. 
He alluded to a received theology : he quoted a philo- 
sophical poet." 

I borrow these passages from Mr. Penrose instead 
of attempting to convey the same sentiments in my own 
words, the more readily, because the testimony thus 
borne to the importance of certain branches of learning, 
as subservient to the spread of Christianity, is not so 
liable as my own testimony, in respect of Hindu philo- 
sophy, might perhaps seem, to the suspicion of a bias 
received from a favourite pursuit. It is not on the 



INTRODUCTION. xi 

ground of its intrinsic value (though I may Hindu p mio- 
have my own private opinion of its value), SiyioiMt- 
that I recommend the Hindu philosophy to 
the missionary among the Hindus, as a thing to be 
mastered, not merely to be dipped into. It is in order 
that he may be under no temptation splenetically to 
turn his back upon the learned of the land, and to act 
as if only the uneducated had souls to be saved. I 
should wish that when the Missionary has occasion to 
address the learned of India, he should, like St. Paul, 
be able " wisely to adapt to local circumstances'' the 
mode in which he declares his message. I should wish 
that here his " allusions to a received theology" should 
be such as tend to facilitate apprehension rather than 
such as are calculated to offend prejudice without alter- 
ing conviction. I should wish his quotations from the 
philosophers to be more frequently, like St. Paul's, the 
winning advances of conciliation. 

If the reader should glance at random over any 
part of the following work, it may perhaps seem to 
him that my practice differs from my precepts ; for, 
instead of showing always how to conciliate, I have 
done my best to expose the errors of Hinduism, and, 
moreover, I have dealt with these in the dry dispas- 
sionate manner of a writer on Pathology. Let us 
attend first to the latter branch of this remark. The 
feelingless character appropriate to a patho- nJE&taffif 
logical treatise is not proposed as a model S^^toSS 

,,.... . . involved, why 

to the physician m his practice ; and just {^VtKi- 
as little is it intended that the soul-slaying r asSLX"S" 
errors, here treated barely as if matters of scientific 



xii INTRODUCTION. 

examination, are to be regarded by the missionary in 
the calm spirit of speculation when he comes to deal 
with practical cases. In the fashioning and the tem- 
pering of a sword-blade, military ardour is not called 
for ; nor even when we are studying the way to wield 
the weapon. But as nobody would suppose that we 
undervalued military ardour in the field of battle, be- 
cause we employed caution and calmness in the pre- 
vious tempering and exercising of our weapon, so 
nobody who reflects will probably fail to see that the 
consistent exclusion of passionate declamation through- 
out the following work implies no disparagement of 
passionate declamation in its proper place. Then, again, 
we can most as to my having applied myself to the ex- 

safely venture f , . 

wherewfbest P osm g the errors of Hinduism, while at the 

wSwrSuS same time I urge the missionary more par- 
avoid seeming v 

to countenance, ticularly to cast about for points of agree- 
ment, with a view to conciliation, there is here no 
real inconsistency ; because he that best understands 
both the errors of his opponent and the means of 
refuting them, is the man who can most safely ven- 
ture on making advances in the way of conciliation. 
I would have the missionary know well the errors of 
Hinduism, and also the means of their refutation, and 
yet I would have him reserve this knowledge till it 
is unmistakeably called for ; lest, by provoking a con- 
prcjudiccsnot test on ground where he flatters himself he 
be awakened. i s certain of a victory, he should only need- 
lessly awaken prejudices which had better, where pos- 
sible, be left sleeping till they die. 

There appears to be a growing conviction — in our 



INTRODUCTION. xiii 

opinion a right one — that the confutation of T heconfuta- 
Hinduism is not the first step, nor even the ism not the 

* ' pnmary lndis- 

necessary preliminary, to the Christianization p ensable - 
of India. This impression is akin to that nnder which 
Lord Bacon wrote the 35th aphorism of his Novum 
Organum, where, through a historical allusion to the 
expedition of Charles the Eighth into Italy, he ex- 
plains how he seeks not contention, but a friendly 
hearing. " Borgia said, regarding the expe- An example 

& & J & & r ofLordB acon's 

dition of the French into Italy, that they to De Miowed. 
came with chalk in their hands, that they might mark 
the inns, not with arms to break through. Such, in 
like manner, is our plan, that our doctrine may enter 
into fit and capacious minds ; for there is no use of 
confutations when we differ about principles and notions 
themselves, and even about the forms of proof." But 
some of those who entertain this just impression, are 
apt to draw a wrong conclusion by coupling it with 
another premiss, which is by no means equally just. 
Bacon, as his readers are aware, did not ignore J^ 011 ^. 6 *;; 
the opinions of those who differed from him. pretedT smter " 
He was thoroughly versed in the opinions of those 
others ; and this, while it enabled him, in pursuance 
of the conciliatory line of operations here adverted to, 
to avoid contention where contention would have been 
unprofitable, enabled him also to appropriate to the 
service of sound philosophy all the recognised truth 
which was not the less truth for having been embedded 
among the errors of an imperfect philosophy. The 
fact of Hinduism's not calling for confutation, does 
not imply that it may be safely neglected. Though 



xiv INTRODUCTION. 

not called upon to volunteer the confutation of Hindu 
errors, the missionary will do well to prepare himself 
to accomplish that task effectively when occasion im- 
poses it upon him. The following work aspires to 
aid him in this preparation. 

As invited by the suggester of this essay, we aim 
at refuting " the fundamental errors (opposed to Chris- 
tian theism) of the Yedanta, Nyaya, and Sankhya 
philosophies, as set forth in the standard native autho- 
rities in the Sanskrit language," etc. Let us com- 
mence with a general view of these Hindu systems 
of philosophy. 



A GENEKAL VIEW OF THE HINDU SYSTEMS 
OF PHILOSOPHY. 



The Hindus have six systems of philo- The Hindu 

^ * systems of phi- 

sophy, named the Nydya, Vaiseshika, Sdnkhya, loso ^y- 
Yoga, Veddnta, and Mimdnsd. 1 The Vaiseshika being 
in some sort supplementary to the Nydya, the two 
are familiarly spoken of as one collective system, under 
the name of the Nydya ; and as the case is somewhat 
similar with the two other pairs, it is customary to 
speak of Hindu philosophy as being divisible into the 
Nydya, the Sdnkhya, and the Veddnta. 

These three systems, if we follow the com- Fundamental 

" ' agreement of 

mentators, differ more in appearance than in sj4ems. egreat 
reality ; and hence they are, each in its degree, viewed 
with a certain amount of favour by orthodox Hindus. 
The partisans of one system may and do impugn the 
dogmas of another ; but, although every one in such 
a contest nerves his arm to the uttermost, and fights 
as if his character were staked upon the issue, yet 
the lances are lances of courtesy, and the blows are 
loving ones. It is a very different affair when the 
denier of the Vedas is dealt with. With the Buddhist, 



xvi . A GENERAL VIEW OF THE 

for example— though his notion of the chief end of 
man differs in no respect from" that of the others — 
the battle is a Voutrance. The common bond of the 
others is their implicit acceptance of the Yedas, which 
they explain differently. According to the epigrammatic 
remark, that theological dislikes are inversely as the 
amount of disagreement, some might expect that these 
dissentient accepters of the Yeda should be more bitter 
against one another than against the common enemy. 
But epigrams are not always to be trusted. As Domi- 
nican and Franciscan are brothers in asserting the in- 
fallibility of Eome ; so are the Nyaya, the Sankhya, 
and the Vedanta, in asserting the infallibility of the 
Yeda against the Buddhist. 

how they differ. Assuming, each of them implicitly, the 
truth of the Yedas, and proceeding to give, on that 
foundation, a comprehensive view of the totality of 
things, the three systems differ in their point of view. 
To illustrate this, suppose that three men in succession 
take up a cylindrical ruler : the one, viewing it with 
its end towards his eye, sees a circle ; the second, 
viewing it upright before his eye, sees a parallelo- 
gram; the third, viewing it in a direction slanting 
away in front of his eye, sees a frustum of a cone. 
These three views are different, but nowise irrecon- 
cilable. So far are they from being irreconcileable, 
that it might be argued that all of them must be 
accepted in succession, before any adequate concep- 
tion of the form of the ruler can be arrived at. Now, 
in somewhat such a way the three Hindu systems 
differ mainly in their severally regarding the universe 






HINDU SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. xvii 

from different points of view, — viz., as it stands in 
relation severally to sensation, emotion, and intellection. 

The Naiyayilca, founding on the fact that The N 
we have various sensations, enquires what and stand ~ pomt - 
how many are the channels through which such varied 
knowledge flows in. Finding that there are five very 
different channels, he imagines five different externals 
adapted to these. Hence his theory of the five elements, 
the aggregate of what the Nyaya regards as the causes 
of affliction. 

The SanMya, struck with the fact that we s X_g5* ya 
have emotions, — with an eye to the question whence our 
impressions come, — enquires their quality. Are they 
pleasing, displeasing, or indifferent ? These three quali- 
ties constitute, for him, the external ; and to their aggre- 
gate he gives the name of Nature. With the Naiydyika 
he agrees in wishing that he were well rid of all three ; 
holding that things pleasing, and things indifferent, are 
not less incompatible with man's chief end than things 
positively displeasing. 

Thus while the Nyaya allows to the ex- Precise distinc- 
tion between 

ternal a substantial existence, the SdnJchya the N> s a £Tkh5 
admits its existence only as an aggregate of stan " pomt * 
qualities; while both allow that it really (eternally and 
necessarily) exists. 

The Veddntin, rising above the question as sta T nd e - P ^t nta 
to what is pleasing, displeasing, or indifferent, asks 
simply, what is, and what is not. The categories are 
here reduced to two — the Eeal and the Unreal. The 
categories of the Nyaya and the Sdnkkya were merely 
scaffolding for reaching this pinnacle of philosophy. The 



xviii A GENERAL VIEW OF THE 

implied foundation was everywhere the same, — viz., the 
Veda ; and this, therefore, we shall find is the field on 
which the battle with Hindu philosophy must ultimately 
be fought. 
Respective The Nyaya, it may be gathered from what 

subordination ° ° ' J ° 

of the systems, j^g k eeil sa ^ ? { g conveniently introductory to the 
SanMya, and the Sanhhya to the Vedanta. Accordingly 
in Hindu schools, where all three are taught, it is in 
this order that the learner, who learns all three, takes 
them up. The Nyaya is the exoteric doctrine, the 
Sanlchya a step nearer what is held as the truth, and the 
Vedanta the esoteric doctrine, or the naked truth. 
correspond- This view of the matter suggests the distri- 

ing distribu- "^ 

pr e n sent of work! e bution of the following work. A separate 
account of each of the three systems is first given ; and 
then a summary of Christian doctrine is propounded, in 
the shape of aphorisms, after the fashion of the Hindu 
philosophers, with a commentary, on each aphorism, com- 
bating whatever in any of the three Hindu systems is 
opposed to the reception of the Christian doctrine 
therein propounded. A systematic exposition of the 
dogmas of Christianity seems to furnish the likeliest 
means of inviting the discussion of the essential points 
of difference, — any points of difference in philosophy 
that do not emerge in the course of such an exposition 
being, we may reasonably assume, comparatively unim- 
portant to the Christian argument. 



HINDU SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. x ix 



SUMMAEY OF THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHY. 

The Nyaya. as already remarked, offers the General cha- 

J u 7 J ; racter of the 

sensational aspect of Hindu philosophy. In Nya ya system. 
saying this, it is not meant that the Nyaya confines 
itself to sensation, excluding emotion and intellection ; 
nor, that the other two systems ignore the fact of sen- 
sation ; but that the arrangement of this system of 
philosophy has a more pointed regard to the fact of the 
five senses than either of the others has, and treats the 
external more frankly as a solid reality. 

The word Nyaya means " propriety or fit- th^SSf of 
ness." The system undertakes to declare the proper 
method of arriving at that knowledge of the truth, the 
fruit of which, it promises, is the chief end of man. 
The name is also used, in a more limited application, 
to denominate the proper method of setting forth an 
argument. This has led to the practice of calling the 
Nyaya the " Hindu Logic," — a name which suggests 
a very inadequate conception of the scope of the 
system. 

The Nyaya system was delivered by Gau- t eSbook Nyaya 
tama in a set of aphorisms so very concise that they 
must from the first have been accompanied by a com- 
mentary, oral or written. The aphorisms of the several 
Hindu systems, in fact, appear designed not so much 
to communicate the doctrine of the particular schools as 
to aid, by the briefest possible suggestions, the memory 
of him to whom the doctrine shall have been already 
communicated. To this end they are in general admi- 



xx A GENERAL VIEW OF THE 

rably adapted. The sixty aphorisms, for example, which 
constitute the first of Gautama's Five Lectures, present 
a methodical summary of the whole system ; while the 
first aphorism, again, of the sixty, presents a summary 
summar of °^ these sixty. The first aphorism is as fol- 
the topics. i ows: _« From knowledge of the truth in 

regard to evidence, the ascertainable, doubt, motive, 
example, dogma, confutation, ascertainment, * disquisi- 
tion, controversy, cavil, fallacy, perversion, futility, 
and occasion for rebuke, there is the attainment of 
the summum bonum." 1 
Beatitudethe In the next aphorism it is declared how 

result of know- 

ledge. knowledge operates mediately in producing 

this result. " Pain, birth, activity, fault, false notions, 
— since on the successive departure of these in turn 
there is the departure of the antecedent one, there is 
Beatitude." 2 That is to say, — when knowledge of the 
truth is attained to, false notions depart; on their 
departure, the fault of concerning one's-self about any 
external object ceases ; thereupon the enlightened sage 
ceases to act ; then, there being no actions that call for 
either reward or punishment, there is no occasion, after 
his death, for his being born again to receive reward or 
punishment; then, not being born again, so as to be 
liable to pain, there is no room for pain; — and the 
absence of pain is the Nydya conception of the summum 
bonum. 

^r* h * ii 



HINDU SYSTEMS OF I'HILOSOPHY. xxi 

Well, have we instruments adapted to the acquisition 
of a knowledge of the truth ? He tells us : — The means 

° of right know- 

" Proofs [i.e., instruments of right knowledge], Iedge * 
are the senses, the recognition of signs, the recognition 
of likeness, and speech [or testimony]." l As the present 
work is concerned with those errors only which are 
opposed to Christian Theism, it would be irrelevant here 
to discuss, at any length, the question whether the 
Nyaya is justified in asserting, or the other systems 
in denying, that the determining of something by "the 
recognition of a likeness," is specifically different from 
the determining of something by the recognition of a 
sign ; but it may be worth while to explain the nature 
of the dispute, because it suggests a caution which is 
practically important. Let the example be the stock one 
of the Nyaya books. " Some one unacquainted with the 
meaning of the term Bos Gavaens is told by a forester 
that the Bos Gavaeus is an animal like a cow. Going 
thereafter to the forest, and remembering the purport of 
what he has been told, he sees an animal like a cow. 
Thereupon arises the c cognition from likeness ' that this 
is what is meant by the term Bos Gavaeus." 2 Now it 
has been asked, what is there here different from the 
recognition of a sign ? What is here recognised, is the 
likeness to a cow, and this is the sign by means of which 
we infer that the animal is the Bos Gavaeus. The Naiya- 
yika replies, that there is the following difference. In the 



xxii A GENERAL VIEW OF THE 

case of knowledge arrived at by means of a sign, we 
must, he contends, have inductively ascertained that 
so and so is a sign ; and in the present instance there 
has been no induction. So much for this disputed 
a caution to P ^ > an d we advert to it in order to caution 
the missionary. ^ Q missionary not to attribute too great im- 
portance to this and similar real or seeming discrepancies 
between the several systems, when he meets with any 
such mutually conflicting views. The dispute is fre- 
quently verbal only, as in the present instance, where 
the dispute turns on the question whether an indicated 
" likeness" is or is not entitled to be called by the name 
of sign. And even where the difference is real, the 
Hindus have long ago reconciled all the discrepancies to 
their own entire satisfaction, so that he who warmly in- 
sists upon the existence of the discrepancy gains credit 
only for being ignorant of the recognised means of har- 
monious reconcilement. He is regarded very much as the 
confident supporter of some stale sceptical objection to 
Christianity is regarded in a company of orthodox Chris- 
tians. Whether the founders of the Hindu systems 
attributed no more importance to their mutual discre- 
pancies than is attributed to them by their modern 
followers, may be open to question ; but the practical 
caution here suggested is not the less worthy of atten- 
tion. Opportunities, no doubt, may occur, where the 
discrepancies between the several systems may be urged 
with effect ; and here the missionary must use his dis- 
cretion, always bearing in mind the general caution not 
to lay too much stress on what will in most cases prac- 
tically go for nothing as an argument. 



HINDU SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. xxiii 

To return to Gautama : if we have instruments for 
the obtaining of right knowledge, what are the objects 
in regard to which we have to obtain right knowledge 
by means of the appropriate instruments? These he 
enumerates as follows: — "Soul, body, sense, objects re- 
sense-object, knowledge, the mind, activity, we^may^have 
fault, transmigration, fruit, pain, and beati- ledge# 
tude, — are that regarding which we are to have right 
knowledge." 1 Here it is to be carefully observed that 
the soul (atman) is spoken of as an entirely different 
entity from the mind (inana-s). The neglect of this 
distinction may bring a debate with a Hindu into inex- 
tricable confusion. The English reader who is accus- 
tomed to hear the words soul and mind (anima and mens 
— ^ V XV and <f>pv v ) employed interchangeably, must not 
carry this laxness of phraseology into any Indian dialect, 
if he desires to be understood, and if he desires to avoid 
such misconceptions as that of Kitter, who makes the 
Naiyayika call the soul an atom, whereas the Naiyayika 
calls the soul all-pervading, and the mind an atom, 2 — -or 
that of Cousin, who makes out the Sdnkhya to be a 
materialist, as if he derived soul from Nature, whereas 
the Sdnkhya only derives the soul's organs — external 
and internal — from something other than soul. 3 In the 

1 -*! I <H ^ <f"£ M I *§ff^^:Tn|f^fa ff"(i| *FRWg :^Tff3*TTf 

2 Of the Soul it is declared — (see our version of the TarJca-sangraha, §§ 20, 21) — 
that it is "different in each hody — all-pervading and eternal" — W^\ >i(rtUlO ^ 
mfj l T^TpTcSPeT — J while of the Mind it is declared that "it is in the form of an 
atom, and eternal"— mXUlT^t f^irtl^ II Sitter (at p. 376, vol. iv. of his 
History of Ancient Philosophy, as rendered hy Mr. Morrison,) assumes that it is a 
" principle of the Nyaya, that the soul is an atom." 

3 M. Cousin (Cours tie Vllist. de la Philosophic, vol. ii., p. 125), speaking- of the 
"principles" of the Sanlchya, says correctly, "II y en vingt-cinq." These he 



xxiv A GENEKAL VIEW OF THE 

Hindu systems, the soul is the self, and the mind is the 
organ or faculty, which, standing between the self and 
the deliverances of sense, prevents those deliverances 
from crowding in pell-mell ; just as a minister stands 
between the monarch and the thousand simultaneous 
claims upon his attention, and hands up for his con- 
sideration one thing at a time. We offer here no 
opinion on this theory of the Hindus ; we only put the 
reader on his guard in respect of an established phrase- 
ology, the misconception of which has so egregiously 
misled Eitter and Cousin. "What Gautama under- 

soui. ' stands by soul, he tells us as follows : — 
" Desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain, and know- 
ledge, are that whereby we recognise soul (dtman)" 1 

Mind. Of the mind he speaks as follows: — "The 
sign [whereby we infer the existence] of the mind 
(manas) is the not arising of cognitions [in the soul] 
simultaneously." 2 Grant that our cognitions are con- 
secutive and not simultaneous. To account for this, 

enumerates in a note, giving, as the Sankhya philosophers do, " 1' intelligence, 
bouddhi," as the second in the list; "manas, mens" as the eleventh; and soul, 
" l'ame," as the twenty-fifth. All of these three, unlike the Sankhya philosophers, he 
derives from one and the same source; for he says, "voici quel est le principe premier 
des choses, duquel derivent tous les autres principes : c'est prakriti on moula prakriti, 
la nature, ' la matiere eternelle sans formes, sans parties, la cause materielle, univer- 
selle, qu'on peut induire de ses effets, qui produit et n'est pas produite.'" Now of 
this radical Nature, " l'intelligence, bouddhi," as well as the soul's internal organ, 
" manas, mens," is reckoned by the Sankhya to be a product ; but the notion that the 
soul is either identical with, or anywise akin to, this or any other product, is positively 
the one notion which the Sankhya labours to eradicate. In the words of the 
third of the Sankhya Karikas, " Soul is neither a production nor productive," — 
«T Hlrf?rS ftfffin ms^* ll That liberation is held by the Sankhya to ensue 
solely on the discriminating of Soul from Nature and the products of Nature, see 
Aphorism 105, quoted infra, p. xxx. 

1 ^rrefaM 4|(f| ^ <sl QM -sfH HI I <*J «ft f^T^l II ^0 II 

2 yrc ^ Hi,jc Mr Tf4$« t4 ft f^rpi: h ^ » 






HINDU SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. xxv 

Dugald Stewart tells us that the mind can attend to 
only one thought at a time. Gautama, recognising the 
same fact, but speaking of the knower invariably as 
soul, accounts for the fact in question by assuming that 
there is an instrument, or internal organ, termed the 
mind, through which alone can knowledge reach the 
soul, and which, as it gives admission to only one 
thought at a time, the Naiyayika infers must be no 
larger than an atom. The conception of such an atomic 
inlet to the soul may be illustrated by the case of the 
eye ; inasmuch as while the whole body is presented 
to the rays reflected from external objects, it is only 
through a special channel, the organ of vision, that these 
find entrance so as to cause knowledge. The soul, then, 
may be practically regarded as corresponding to the 
thinking principle, and the mind (manas) to the faculty 
of attending to one, and only one, thing at a time; it 
being further to be kept in remembrance, in case of 
accidents, that the Naiyayika reckons the mind to be 
a substance and not a faculty. 1 

In the list of the objects, regarding which Activity. 
right knowledge is to be obtained, the next after mind 
is activity (pravritti). This is defined as " that which 
originates the [utterances of the] voice, the [cognitions 
of the] understanding, and the [gestures of the] body." 2 
This " activity," we have seen under Aph. 2nd, Gau- 

1 To quote the Tarha-sangraha : — 

" The substances (dravya) are just nine, — earth (prithivT), water (ap), light 
(tejas), air (vayu), ether (okas' a), time (kala), place (dis'), soul (atman), and mind 
(manas) ." 

2 MjPr^HjRiaiOiK'ff : II <^ H 



xxvi A GENERAL VIEW OF THE 

tama regards with an evil eye, as the cause of birth, 
which is the cause of pain, which it is the summum 
honum to get permanently rid of. 
what the Gautama holds that it is through our own 

Nyaya reckons ° 

a fault. "fault" {dosha) that we are active; and he 

tells us that " faults [or failings] have this character- 
istic, that they cause activity." 1 These faults are classed 
under the heads of affection {raga\ aversion (dwesha\ 
and stolidity (moha) 7 each of which he regards as a fault 
or defect, inasmuch as it leads to actions, the recom- 
pense of which, whether good or evil, must be received 
in some birth, or state of mundane existence, to the 
postponement of the great end of entire emancipation. 
The immediate obstacle to emancipation, styled " Trans- 
migration " (pretyabhdva), he next defines. 
Transmi ra- " Transmigration means the arising again 
[and again]." 2 According to the commentator, 
the word here rendered " transmigration," viz., pretya- 
bhdva, is formed out of prety 'a, " having died," and bhdva, 

1 H *{ Tl 11 <sl ^ *U [ ^t^TTt || ^"C || Mr. Colebrooke appears to have viewed 
the term which we have rendered causer of activity, as if it had signified caused by- 
activity; for, with reference to Gautama's definition of "fault" (dosha), he says (see 
his Essays, vol. i., p. 289), " From acts proceed faults {dosha), including under this 
designation, passion," etc. It would seem as if Mr. Colebrooke, when giving to his 
essay a final revision, after having laid it aside for a time, had been struck with the 
oddness of the expression that " from faults proceed acts," and had reversed it with- 
out adverting it to the technical definition of "faults," in the same sentence, as the 
passions which give rise to action. Gautama, the votary of quietism, gives to the 
passions the name of " faults" with a significance akin to that which the word bore 
in the remark of Talleyrand on the murder of the Due D'Enghien, — " ce n'etait pas 
une crime, e'etait vmefaute:" — it was a positive blunder. The wise man, according 
to Gautama, is he who avoids the three blunders of having a liking for a thing and 
acting accordingly ; or of having a dislike for a thing, and acting accordingly ; or 
of being stupidly indifferent, and thereupon acting ; instead of being intelligently 
indifferent, and not acting at all. 

2 yivMfrr: 5(5wnr 11 <^e 11 



HINDU SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. xxvii 

" the becoming [born into the world again]." " As, by 
the expression ' again/ here habitualness is meant to 
be implied, — there is first a birth, then death, then a 
birth ; thus transmigration, commencing with a birth, 
ends [only] with [final] emancipation." 1 

After defining pain (du'Jcha) as " that Painandfmai 

, . , . , , ■ t i • 55 9-ut emancipation. 

which is characterised by uneasiness, z he de- 
clares that " absolute deliverance therefrom is emanci- 
pation (aparvarga)" 3 

Such is, in brief, Gautama's theory of the summum 
bonum and the means of its attainment. His summum 
bonum is absolute deliverance from pain ; and this de- 
liverance is to be attained by an abnegation of all action, 
good or bad. We proceed to review the SanJchya theory. 



SUMMAET OF THE SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY. 

The SanJchya. as already observed, makes General cha- 

° ' J 7 racter of the 

a step in advance of the Nyaya, towards the system - 
ultimate simplification aimed at in the Vedanta, by re- 
ducing the external from the category of substance to 
that of quality. Souls alone are, in the SanJchya, re- 
garded as substances ; whatever affects the soul being 

1 irai *j^t *rr^t src^f 5}<3f*n^: i cr y^Rcti^Miuii^ch^Hi^ 

Hence Mr. Colebrooke's definition of pretyabhava as the "condition of the soul after 
death" (see his Essays, vol. i., p. 290), while it is literally correct, niay mislead the 
reader if he does not bear in mind that this, according to Hindu notions, is the condi- 
tion of every man noiv alive ; for as we are all supposed to have lived and died, one 
knows not how often, Ave are each of us always in the condition " after death." 



«umM^m^^n ^ ii 

^it: k ^ ii 



xxviii A GENERAL VIEW OF THE 

ranged under the head of a quality, — 1 , pleasing ; 2, 
displeasing; or, 3, indifferent. This mode of viewing 
the universe we have designated the emotional view of 
things. 

The word Sdnkhya means " numeral, rational, or 

Meamn of discriminative." The system promises beati- 
tude as the reward of that discrimination which 
rightly distinguishes between soul and nature. What is 
here meant by " nature " will be explained presently. 

Thesankh a ^ ne Sdnkhya system was delivered by 

Kapila in a set of aphorisms no less concise 

than those of the Nydya. Kapila begins by defining the 

The chief end cn i ei> en d °f man. His first aphorism is as fol- 
lows : — "Well, the complete cessation of pain, 
of three kinds, is the complete end of man." x By the 
three kinds of pain are meant — 1, diseases and griefs, 
etc., which are intrinsic, or inherent in the sufferer ; 2, 
injuries from ordinary external things ; and, 3, injuries 
from things supernatural or meteorological. In his 19 th 
aphorism he declares that the bondage (bandha) under 
which the soul (purusha) groans, is due to its conjunction 
with nature (prakriti) ; and this bondage is merely seem- 
ing, because soul is " ever essentially a pure and free 
intelligence." His words are, — " But not without the 
conjunction thereof [i.e. of nature] is there the connec- 
tion of that [i.e. of pain] with that [viz. with the soul] 
which is ever essentially a pure and free intelligence." 2 
In his 59th aphorism, he says again, of the soul's 

1 ^rer f^f^rf:^fT(*i«df i ii^rTi<^«T(a^m^: ii <* a 



HINDU SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. 



xxix 



bondage, — " It is merely verbal, and not a reality, since it 
resides in [the soul's organ] the mind [and not in the soul 
or self]," 1 on which the commentator observes, — " That 
is to say, since bondage, etc., resides only in the mind 
(chitta), all this, as far as concerns the soul (purusha), is 
merely verbal, — i.e., it is 'vox et praeterea nihil,' be- 
cause it is merely a reflection, like the redness of [pel- 
lucid] crystal [when a China rose is near it], but not a 
reality, with no false imputation, like the redness of the 
China rose itself." 2 

Of nature, which, by its so-much-to-be- Nature, what. 
deprecated conjunction, makes the soul seem to be in 
bondage when it really is not, he gives in his 62nd 
aphorism the following account : — " Nature (prakriti) is 
the state of equipoise of goodness (sattwa), passion (rajas), 
and darkness (tamas)',- — from nature [proceeds] intel- 
lect (mahat), from intellect self-consciousness (ahankara), 
from self-consciousness the five subtile elements (tan- 
matra) and both sets [external and internal] of organs 
(indriya), and from the subtile elements the gross ele- 
ments (sthula-bhuta) ; [then besides there is] soul (puru- 
sha) ; — such is the class of twenty-five." 3 

It might be interesting to probe the precise philoso- 
phic import of the successive development alleged in 

1 ^TfjT^fg^mt^rf^m: 11 mq.ii 
x^fW^w h §\ II 



xxx A GENERAL VIEW OF THE 

the foregoing aphorism ; but the special aim of the 

present treatise (or of this treatise in its present shape) 

forbids whatever excursion can be safely dispensed with. 

Liberation, "We shall here, therefore, only add, that we 

what and , . 

when. are told, in aphorism 105, that " experience 

[whether of pleasure or pain, liberation from both of 
which is desiderated], ends with [the discrimination of] 
thought [i.e. soul, as contradistinguished from nature]"; 1 
that a plurality of souls, in opposition to the Veddnta, is 
asserted in aphorism 150, " From the diverse allotment 
of birth, etc., the plurality of souls [is to be inferred] "; 2 
and that the paradoxical conception of the soul in bond- 
age, whilst not really in bondage, may be illustrated by 
Don Quixote hanging in the dark from the ledge of a 
supposed enormous precipice, and bound to hold on for 
his life till daybreak, from not knowing that his toes 
were within six inches of the ground. 

Annihilation Jt ma y be P ro P er to observe that the 

SdnTchya explicitly repudiates the charge of 

craving annihilation. In aphorism 47 we are told that, 

"In neither way [whether as a means or as an end] is 

this [viz., annihilation] the souPs aim." 3 

We next advance to a survey of the Veddnta theory. 

1 'fa^«mMV*ftT. II ^OM II That the word "thought" {chit) here means 
" soul" (atman) we are told by the commentator — PH<^lGHl II 

2 »t«*nf<<=qci^H ; ip*m***HU W II 

3 ^^m*M*jH*it»n ii 8^> ii 



HINDU SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. 



SIDOIABY OF THE VEDANTA SYSTEM. 

The Yedanta theory arrives at the limit of its great tenet. 
simplification, by deciding that nothing really exists 
besides one, and that this one real being is absolutely 
simple. This one simple being, according to the Vedanta, 
is Jcnoivledge (jnana\ — not the knowledge of anything, 
for this would imply a contradiction to the dogma that 
nothing exists except knowledge simply. This concep- 
tion, of the possible nature of knowledge, is quite at 
variance with the European view, which regards know- 
ledge as the synthesis of subject and object. According 
to the Vedanta there is no object, and hence it follows 
that the term subject is not strictly applicable, any more 
than is the term substance, 1 to the one reality. Both of 
these terms, being indicative of a relation, are inapplicable 
under a theory which, denying duality, does not admit the 
conditions of a relation. Soul, the one reality, Theonereai- 

' v ' ity, howdesig- 

is accordingly spoken of in the Vedanta, not as nated - 
a substance (dravya) as it is reckoned in the Nyaya, but 
as the thing, or, literally, "that which abides'' (vastu). 
Let us enquire how this conception may have been 
arrived at, consistently with the seeming existence of 
the world. 

Suppose that God — omnipresent, omnis- 

x x Possible course 

cient, and omnipotent — exists. Suppose, &f\J££ 
further, that, at some time or other, God 

1 At the opening of the Vedanta- Sara , indeed, the one is spoken of as the sub- 
stratum of all {akhiladhara) ; but the existence of aught else being subsequently denied, 
it remains ultimately the substratum of nothing, or no wi-stratum at all. 



xxxii A GENERAL VIEW OF THE 

exists and nothing else does. Suppose, in the next 
place, as held long in Europe and still in India, that 
nothing is made out of nothing {ex nihilo nihil fit)) and 
suppose, finally, that God wills to make a world. Being 
omnipotent, He can make it. The dogma " ex nihilo 
nihil fit " "being, by the hypothesis, an axiom, it follows 
that God, being able to make a world, can make it 
without making it out of nothing. The world so made 
must then consist of what previously existed, — i.e. of 
God. Now what do we understand by a world ? Let 
it be an aggregate of souls with limited capacities — 
and of what these souls (rightly or wrongly) regard 
as objects — the special or intermediate causes of various 
modes of consciousness. Taking this to be what is 
meant by a world, how is God to form it out of Him- 
self ? God is omniscient, — and, in virtue of his omni- 
presence, his omniscience is everywhere. "Where is the 
room for a limited intelligence ? Viewing the matter 
(if that were strictly possible) a priori, one would in- 
cline to say " nowhere." But the Yedantin, before he 
had got this length, was too painfully affected by the 
why igno- conviction, forced upon him, as on the rest of 

rancc must be . , • 

admitted. us? by a consciousness which will take no 
denial, that there are limited intelligences. "I am 
ignorant," he says ; and if he is wrong in saying so, 
then (as a Pandit once remarked to me) his ignorance 
is established just as well as if he were right in saying 
so. Holding, then, that the soul is God, and confronted 
with the inevitable fact that the soul does not spon- 
taneously recognize itself as God, there was nothing for 
it but to make the fact itself do duty as its own cause, 






HINDI' SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. xxxiii 

to say that the soul does not know itself to be God, just 
because it does not know it, — i.e. because it is ignorant, 
— i.e. because it is obstructed by ignorance (ajndna). 1 

At this point let us suppose that our speculator 
stopped, but that a disciple took up the matter and 
tried to make something more palpably definite out of 
the indefinite term ignorance, Were it not, he . 
argues, for this ajndna, of which my teacher jjXiKS 
speaks, the soul would know itself to be God, 
— there would be nothing but God, — there would be 
no world. It is this ajndna, then, that makes the world ; 
and, this being the case, it ought to have a name sug- 
gestive of the fact. Let it be called prakriti, the name 
by which the Sankhyas speak of their unconscious maker 
of worlds'. 2 Good, says another ; but recollect that this 
prakritij or " energy,' 7 can be nothing else than the 
power of the All-powerful, for we can admit the inde- 
pendent existence of God alone; so that the ajndna 
which you have shown to be entitled to the name of 
prakriti, will be even more accurately denoted by the 
word kakti* God's " power," by an exertion of which 
power alone the fact can be accounted for, that souls 
which are God do not know that they are so. The 
reasoning is accepted, and the term sakti is enrolled 
among the synonymes of ajndna. Lastly comes the my- 
thologist. You declare, says he, that this world would 

1 ^WRII 

a See the Sankhya Aphorism, B. I. § 127 — R jjUj N fHg=H f< ^fr mR^II 

" Of both [nature, or ' the radical energy,' and her products] the fact that they 
consist of the three qualities, and that they are unthinking, etc. [is the common 
property]." 

3 TTfiffH 



xxxiv A GENERAL VIEW OF THE 

not even appear to be real, were it not for ignorance. 
Its apparent reality, then, is an illusion ; and for the word 
ajndna you had better substitute the more expressive 
term mdyd, ] " deceit, illusion, jugglery." The addition 
of this to the list of synonymes being acquiesced in, 
the mythologist furnishes his mdyd with all the requi- 
sites of a goddess, and she takes her seat in his pan- 
theon as the wife of Brahma the Creator. 
ignorance, The definition of " ignorance," in the 

now defined in ° * 

thevedanta. Veddnta^ requires notice. Ignorance, we are 
informed, is " a somewhat that is not to be called posi- 
tively either real or unreal, — [not a mere negation, 
but] in the shape of an entity, the opponent of know- 
ledge, — consisting of the three fetters." 2 According to 
the Naiydyikas, ajndna is merely the privation (abhdva) 
oijndna. To exclude such a meaning here it is asserted 
to be "in the shape of an entity" (bhdva-rupa). The 
description of it as something " not to be called posi- 
tively either real or unreal" corresponds with Plato's 
6v icai firj bv, as distinguished from the ovtcd? 6v, z The dis- 
tinction is that of the phenomenal and the real. The 
universe being held to be the joint result of soul and 
ignorance, and soul being the only substance, or " sub- 
stratum of all," it follows that ignorance is equivalent 
to and identical with the sum total of qualities. These, 
as in the Sdnkhya system, are held to be three ; so that 
ignorance, as we have just seen, is spoken of as " con- 

3 See Sir Wm. Hamilton's note on Reid's works, p. 262. 



HINDU SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. xxxv 

sisting of the three qualities" (trigunatniaJca), or, as it 
may be also rendered, " consisting of the three fetter s^ 
the word for " quality" (viz., guna), meaning originally 
a "fetter,'' and these two senses, in Hindu philosophy, 
being closely related. 1 Let us see what can have led to 
the division of quality into three. 

The one reality — the universal substratum — being 
veiled by the garb of the phenomenal world, J£g£ffZ 
certain marked distinctions of character among quaiiSe°s! three 
the phenomena present themselves. We have pheno- 
mena of pure cognition, of lively emotion, and, finally, 
of inertness, or, in Shakspere's phrase, " cold obstruc- 
tion." To one or other of these three heads every 
phenomenon may, with a little ingenuity, be referred. 
The three heads are named respectively, in Sanskrit, 
sattwa, rajas, and tamas. 2 According to the com- 
mentators, the first of the qualities, whilst endlessly 
subdivisible into calmness, complacency, patience, re- 
joicing, etc., consists summarily of happiness. The 
second, on the other hand, consists summarily of pain. 
To these categories belong almost all the sensations and 
thoughts of thinking beings ; — scarcely any feeling, 
viewed strictly, being one of sheer indifference. This 
indifference, the third of the qualities, is exemplified in 

1 See the SanJchya Pravachana Bhashya on Aphorism 62, Bk I., viz. : — ■ 

<*4^<lf4<^5jfa4lcJ<5U^ U4j**lfi II "In this [#m£Ay«] system, and in 
Scripture, etc., the word ' quality' {guna) is employed [as the name of the three things 
under discussion], "because they are subservient to soul [and hold a secondary rank 
in the scale of being], and because they form the cords [which the word guna also 
signifies], viz.. understanding, etc., which consist of the three [so-called] qualities, 
and which bind, as if it were a [cow or other] brute, the soul." 

2 STrsnTSTCU cnreu 



xxxvi A GENERAL VIEW OF THE 

its highest potency in such things as stocks and stones, 
where soul, the substratum of these as of all else, is 
altogether " immersed in matter," or obfuscated by the 
quality of darkness, as the word tamos, the name of the 
quality, literally signifies. In its lower potencies this third 
of the qualities exemplifies itself in sloth, drowsiness, etc. 
These three qualities, separately or commingled, more 
or less obscure the soul, which is held to be simple know- 
ledge — jnano ; and as the aggregate of them is the oppo- 
site of soul, or, in other words, wotf-soul, the aggregate, 
as we have seen, takes the name of a-jndna, i.e. not- 
knowledge, or " ignorance" The soul is often spoken 
Theopcration of as a light. Now, suppose a lamp to be 

of the qualities 

illustrated. enclosed in a lamp-shade ; the glass may be 
either so pure that the light passes through scarcely 
diminished ; or it may be stained, so that the light is 
tinged and partly dimmed; or the lamp-shade may 
be of opaque materials, so that the light within is alto- 
gether obstructed. These three cases may perhaps illus- 
trate the supposed operation of the three qualities, as 
well as account for the names by which they are spoken 
of as " purity," "foulness," and "darkness" {sattwa, 
rajas, and tamos). 

" Ignorance," according to the Vedanta, has two 
powers ; that by which it envelopes soul, giving rise to 
the conceit of personality or conscious individuality, and 
that by which it projects the phantasmagoria of a world 
which the individual regards as external to himself. 1 
Soul thus invested is what the universe consists of. 

1 4|^l^|H^N<U!^^M-fl^ch UlfiM[iWfid II 



HINDU* SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. xxxvii 

The supposed root of all evil — the belief that aught 
besides the " one " exists — is to be got rid of, ema ^j o ;[ 
we are told, by a right understanding of the the°^fnta t0 
great sentence, " That art thou," i.e., " Thou — whoso- 
ever thou art — art the one." When this dictum has 
been rightly understood and accepted, the accepter of 
it, changing the "thou" to the first person, reflects 
thus — "Jam the one." This is so far well; but he 
must finally get rid of the habit of making even himself 
an object of thought. There must be no object. What 
was previously the subject must now remain alone, — 
an entity, a thought, a joy; but these three being one 
only — the existent joy-thought. 1 

Let us now contrast the scheme of Christian revela- 
tion with these three Hindu theories of man and of the 
universe. 



1 See our " Lecture ou the Vedanta, embracing the text of the Vedanta Sara' 
(Allahabad, 1851), §§ 95-152. 



CHRISTIANITY 



CONTRASTED WITH 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 



BOOK I. 



A PARTIAL EXPOSITION OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE. 



May God, the giver of all ^ 
good, the Saviour of those who ^^^^ , ^^ m 
believe on Him, accept this .^ * 

my humhle effort in His ser- ^ "^^^ " 
vice ; and may the hearers of ^TffT^^TH W^TnTOT- 
itj those skilled in the Veddnta, ^^T^f^lTT^TJ I tp^fa- 
the SanJchya, and the Nyaya, ^^ f^f^UT fa" 

with discriminating judgment * 

examine it candidly. 1 *W\T« II 

In the first place the writer rj^T^V fa^fff*! rf^f V&t- 
states the subject of the pro- fewwTire 
posed work. 



1 As an argument can be satisfactorily addressed only to one whose sentiments 
are definitely known, what follows in Sanskrit is addressed, we may remark, to the 
Vedantin who knows and values the Nyaya and the Sankhya as introductory to the 
Vedanta. The question here is not what do those need to be told who know nothing, 
but what do those need to be told who know just what Hinduism can tell. 



CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 



APHOEISM I. 



Jhe inquiry ^ QW the i nqu i ry <^ HT^PJW^TTgpT" 

regards the means of the at- ^fejfroj || <> || 
tainment of the chief end of 



man. 

(1) Next he states the den- I ^ I TO ^TTO^TW 
nition of the chief end of ^f^x^nf I 
man. 

APHOEISM II. 

e Man's chief Man > s chief end t^^T^S^N^^ U" 
is to glorify God, and enjoy ^{^^^^ -^ ^ 
Him for ever. ♦ c 

(1) What is God, will be l\l ^3 *T3W trg- 
stated in the fifth Aphorism. J{lgy( W^fTf I «T«T ^TIT- 
If it be said that it is impos- ^^^ ^ „^ ^- 
sible to glorify God because ^ ^ .. 

man cannot add in the slight- *^"* TO> 5t ^« 
est degree to the glory of g^<N fWT<5*nHSmTf^"- 
God, we reply :— Not so,— f?j ^i=j | TremiTSl^W 
becanse by glorifying God ^^j^.^. 
we mean the acknowledging ^ ^ 

His perfections, and behaving ^ T ^^^^^T^ ^T^T^- 
suitably to them, by trusting, ^T^TWfaft ^^J^TcM 
loving, and obeying Him. 

(2) To enjoy God [to expe- 
rience the joy of His pre- I ^ I rT^Tf^WTW- 



HINDU" philosophy. 3 

sence] is to be the object of ^*f%^T^Tf%^ ^ft^ f%fl[- 

His special favour here and ^-^^^^ ( 
hereafter. 

(3) But the Nyaya [Bk. L, I ^ 1 11 ^tWT^Tff^r- 
§ 22] says that the chief end ^^^^^j^. ^ 

of man is the absolute cessa- ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 

tion of pain ; and the Sankhya ^* 

[Bk. L, § 1] says that it is ^HZJITg^mf Tfl 1TW 

entire liberation from all the ^srn?: f%f*Tffif fT^H fl- 

three kinds of pain: why, ^^.^ ^ -^ 

abandoning that simpler view, ^ ^ ^ s .. ^ 

is this new definition made ? ^ n ^ 7*1*7*" ft 

If you say this, then take this TT*PJW^: 5rcp«r YpQT- 

in reply : — Since such a sum- g-^jTW^^T^ *TOTVT[Tfv- 

mum honurn, implying nothing ^p^^,^. 

more than a state of nonenity, ^ ^ ^ 

and unconnected with any sort ™ «W^WT^ VJpK 

of moral action, might satisfy "StW^TJ TT^Tfafa ^ff - 

beasts indeed [such as tortoises ^^^^ ^T^^^T^^T^^ 1JT- 

or dormice], but not men, ^^ ^ ( 
therefore ought a different 
definition of the chief end of 
man, e.g. as above laid down, 
to be accepted. 

(4) But then, it may be said, ^ * c 

the Yedantins say that, all **TT^ I^^Wlft 
pain having surceased on the ^[\QM ^ffi Tfc( ^^f^TTT*f- 
final intuition of deity, the -^{^^ -^{^ -^^ 
chief end of man consists in the * c^ r %- 

soul's then spontaneous mani- * ^ 

testation of the joy which is its 3^flT I^ITf^" ^ 11 



4 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

own essence, and in its mer- ^"i&jz fgm7\ xfff %nT 3^ 
gence in deity. Why then, ^ T ^^^ UT*WJt3 

disregarding this, need any- ^ 

thing higher than this be ^iTTW^^^: Un- 
sought? If you say this, ^W^T? TgWG I ^jf^T 
then hearken : — Since there is ^Tf^rnRrT f^fffaT^TC- 
no eyidence that there is such ^^^ t^fW I 
a chief end of man as is ima- 
gined by the Vedantins, the 
chief end of man had to be 
enquired after, and it is that 
which was stated before. 
Moreover, the opinion of the 
Vedantins shall be subjected 
to examination in the con- 
cluding section of Book II. 

(5) But then, it may be I ^ I 1 «T ^TOPS TrK?<q§f- 
asked, where is the evidence ^cf^ fJ^T^SJ^fT^rr- 
of this, too, which vou have «n -s * 
asserted, viz., that man s chief ^ % * 

end is to glorify God and en- * *V* ^ T ^ ^ IHlfa- 
joy Him for ever? We reply: f^ ^Nr rf^TTWr^re "5PRT- 
Say not so ; because the evi- w?n7 j jmfa ^ ^^ 
dence of this is the plain * J^ * ~ ^ ' 

argument that, u there is an 

omnipotent Euler of all, then ^f% *f$ TO WH^TO- 
the supposition that man's ^^ tj^fx^f ^*T*P^TO- 
chief end can be irrespective f^^^^J^ 
of His favour, would be incon- ^ ^ 
gruous. * Tf ^ ' 

(6) Well, granting that I 4 I TO ^tfiWTT *pf- 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 5 

there is an omnipotent Buler, 7[fl?f^T*T3f^TOTft di- 
still what evidence is there ^ ^^^^^^ 
that there exist any means of *v ^ ^ ^ 

obtaining His favour? With ** * *™fw*TlfT- 
an eye to this, we declare as ^TOTf I 
follows : — 

APHOEISM III. 



The rule for 
Man's direc- 

SSfiS his which is contained 



The word of God, ^#f TTT*ifal"^P3Tf% $- 
chfefend. wnich is contained TO mtjjgm $^j rT^TT" 
in the Scriptures of the Old ^_^ * ^^^^ 
and New Testament, is the ^ ^ 

only rule to direct us how we ^T^T^^frf^Tpsi - 
may glorify and enjoy Him. cTpfftWrf*T II ^ II 

(1) If it be asked how the \\\ 1«l ^fhfl^S^f- 
sentences which stand in the sgp^rRt 3TWRt ^hnii* 
Scriptures of the Old and New ^^^^^^^ 
Testament are the word 01 ^ N ^ ^ 

God, we reply that they are WTT WflTOVn^Hra- 
so because they were com- «TTrTJ <T^ ^^f^^T 1 ^- 
posed by the makers of the ^ VJ -^j^ ^ T f^- ^. 
books under the influence of ^ ^ - ^ 
God's power. And, in respect * °^ 

of this, the operation of God's *ranfi^I I ^Tf^TO* 
power is in three ways: to ifa *rg f^f^^T^TT^^^ 
explain,-l, God sometimes -^^-^ . , ^f^ 
suggested to the writers the ^ * ^ -s 

words as well as the matter; -5 

2, and sometimes the matter TOlfaft fa^RTWTf^*- 



6 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

only, which was put into ^ f%«^WT TITW^fY- 

language by the writers ac- f^-f^ » 

cording to their own genius ; 

3, and at other times He 

guarded the writers from 

errors of memory, etc., to 

which they might have been 

liable in narrating a matter 

with which they had been 

previously acquainted. . ^ 

(2) If it be asked how a ' V 1 *3 ^Wftw- 
communication could be made , *fW^sr wf'^^FW I «J^"3T- 

without words, then hearken : ^fff^T^ftotriJT^TO: V- 

We do not now undertake to ;*_; ^ wmT - _* -s 

explam this; but that there ^ * 

actually are means of revela- t?T ^ T: ^^ TTWSSRniT- 
tion such as it is impossible to *fTf%<T**ft S**TW "Rf^TOT^- 
explain to others who are de- fc^^^^^^^ 

barred from knowing through * . * 

such means, we cite an exam- 
ple to show. Our illustration ^f%^ ^ *4 T& ^- 
is as follows: — In a certain ^T ^^tt^T ^fT^J W^ 
village, the whole of the inha- ^f^ %vhTOT*UT^ 
bitants were blind from their ~ ^ 

birth, and one of them obtained T^t WRrm I WOTf- 
his sight by means of a surgi- *^ sfa *UVm*nqt <*j- 
cal operation. His companions ^rTTjif ^TR^ 3^«? ^'^ ^r^ 
having learned that he was ^^ Stqf^W- 
able to describe what was going t 

on at a great distance even WfWm*fq *T*TOf 
better than they themselves ^N ^fff^T TIsRl'iftfW 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 7 

could tell what was going on ^t^t rTO ^T^T: ^^ff- 
close beside them, desired him ^ ^^ ^ ^_ 
to say by what means it was ^ c 

that this knowledge reached ft^^WilT?:i 
him. He endeavoured to de- ^ ^rf WWTTO 1TTO- 
clare it to them, but he found ^ 4$JHq<gti ' 4y 'Sf^lT'TO'^rr 
his endeavours useless. They ^ ^^^ ^ 
could not m any way under- 
stand how a knowledge of the TOUrnTTOTTO W^ fir- 
shape of objects not within T^T^TRTT^F^ ^TT^rf 
reach of his hand could enter ^-f^ 'ift'zt 7f 3fOTTfr7 *\TW 
by the front of his head ; but -s ^ 

that sueh knowledge Really VM^WPprfviT: 
did belong to the man, those ^^TCRfaravra TO fa- 
who candidly investigated the ^T^C^fTW^^ <TT|73i WT«T 
truth of his words became ?rf ^ ^ ,^. ^ 
assured. The application of ^ ^^ ^ ^ ^ 

the illustration to the matter Tf * f ^ T TOftlfin 
illustrated is obvious. ^^^ T^^rT^ ^T¥Tf^li 

(3) If it be asked : But what I ^ I ^ ^pfrr^ftlf **" 
proof is there that the words ^j^j ^^ ^^^^ 
contained in the Old and New -s ^ . r C ^ 
Testament declare the truth ? * » 

—then listen. The evidence ftft** ft ?T^ *T*T ^T^- 
of it is of two kinds, external »rP*j*rK"irf^r I <^ "R^J^t 
and internal. First, the truth- w , ^^^ -^ 
fulness of the Old Testament <, ^ ^ . - ^ 

is proved by the testimony of ^^f^ 1^^" 
Jesus Christ, the Son of God, ^T3<?tW^rgW ^cfT^r- 



8 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

incarnate in human form, and fa^l "Jfl^I 3RTT<T S fa- 
one with God. That Jesus ^ , ^^^^^ 
Christ possessed the character 

just stated, is proved by the ^F^ ^" 
words of the New Testament, fa I ^TTTWfr^W *TOT- 
That the New Testament de- ^jTfSrer^ <4 ^"TOTO^fi- 
clares what is true, is proved £ ^^^ ^^ m 
by the testimony of the dis- ^ 

ciples of Jesus, who could not ^ W^fa^T W. 
have been mistaken, and who fa^TJ "H^ fa^^Tf fw~ 
could have had no reason for ^ fafffaTSIT^r fasfafa- 
asserting what was not true. ^ fenta} ^reiT unf "=rT- 
This point will be discussed t, 

more fully in Book II. The T^faF^W^f *TOT- 
second [the internal evidence] Tn"^^g*fT^JffW<^*?W*n"- 
is the tendency of the Scrip- ^^^^^-^ ^. 
tures of the Old and New Tes- .-s ^ •. «s 

tament to the glorifying of ^ 
God and to the promoting the fa" I T^Rfa ^^VT WVWf 
happiness of mortals, — the fa^*qfa^ffi I 
mutual consistency of all their 
parts, etc. This also there 
will be frequent occasion to 
advert to. - ^ .^ 

(4) If it be said: But, ■«■ ^ *****»*- 
though the Scriptures of the *WR^Ti|f ^WTTfafT- 
Old and New Testament be § $fa^faTHrr^3 rT^TT- 
not inconsistent among them- ^^^-^ ^ ^uprcftfa 
selves, yet they cannot declare ^ ^ 

the truth, inasmuch as they ^ ' *^ T ™ **"" 
are inconsistent with the Veda, ^TfWT^rafa^Y Tff^Tt- 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 9 

we reply: Not so; because, ^T^ 4<Mtil«t T?T*TTOT- 
their truthfulness having been f^-£. • «t^ <^ T f^_ T 
established by the foregoing ^ _ _ 

reasoning, it is of the Vedas ^"^f^IT- 
themselves, in consequence of "SJI^ pf^TTl^^^T I 
this inconsistency, that the 
authoritativeness is disproved. 
The nugatory pretension to 
authority on the part of the 
Veda will be disposed of in 
Book II. 

(5) Next we state what | ^ j ^ ^^—j^f^r. 

matters are principally de- .„_„• . ^ «s, T 

clared in the Scriptures ot the ^ t 
Old and New Testament. faWTOmnj I 

APHOEISM IY. 

1S25SE& The Scri P tures *nri tro ^ *rafa 

principally teach ^^-^^^^ 
what man is to believe con- ^ _ g ^ ^.^ ^ 

cerning God, and what duty ™™ *Tmfw ^ S*- 
God requires of man. ^ ^W l^ffV&fw%- 

^TT ^fa^jf?T || 8 || 

I \ I TO TTS7T ^RT 



(1) We now state what is 
declared in Scripture concern- 
ing the nature of God. 

APHOEISM Y. 



What we are God is a Spirit 

to oelieve con- * 

ceming God. j- a certa i n non-mate- 
rial substance], infinite, eter- faf^TT: *Trn5TT«nifiR- 



^TT TT^T^Tf^f^^^V 



10 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

nal, and unchangeable in His tftft^^f^reTOcTOcZn- 
being, wisdom, power, holi- ^p^^J^ . 
ness, justice, goodness, and A ^ J ^ 

truth. inr»ftipr ii * n 

(1) But then, if it be argued __ *s _ -\ 

that such is the nature of God, J ^ "2 *WTOT 
why say that it is by the Scrip- T^ ^tTOtWffi Tffif 
tures of the Old and New Tes- fiffTrefrr^mn? tj^frpr;- 
tament that such a character ^^^^fA ^ 
of God is made known, seeing . ^ % 

that God is declared by the **" *f^m T fr **- 
Yeda also to be a spirit, from *T T^^T^frTTft^TTW^- 
everlasting to everlasting, and ^ ^j§ 3TfcTOT^TTf^f?r 

unchangeable ? To this we ^^ .~— ~ , ^^ ,. t^_ 

reply: True. Whether it be \ s * n \^*3 
that this which is declared in ^^ ^^T^^JW- 
the Vedas was derived from ^T^fRTTTO^^T ^tfa ??- 
primitive tradition, or from afar^ ^$ faffrTT^T 
the power of conscience placed ^ ^ ^-s «n .* 

by God m the human heart, ^ 

either way we welcome it. ^^HTO^^wfa^ 
But where are God's justice, fTTONn"f3^n , Tf% I m^r{ 
goodness, and truth, declared ^^ £^ -^jf^^^ 
in the Yedas? Nay, rather ~ ^ J* 

these characteristics are in the ^^^f^^^qT^T- 
Veda denied to be possible in ^ *f^ I *<$? ^ W ^ 
God. For example, to whom "RfMw^T: I rf^JT^^T^ff- 
should the God (Brahm) of j^ ^ -^ ^^ ^ 
the Veddnta, if just, be just, ^ _ v 

since there is none besides ™ *nft *T*JSTftftlS- 
himself? For the same reason, ^ 'SWWmfT.J ^Jrf Tfcj 



HINDtf PHILOSOPHY. 11 

to whom should he be good or ?T<TJST*J ^<35J"^ 3T 3T JfffiT 

true? Nay, rather, since he ^^j^^^^^-^ 

is the sole being in existence, . 1, J* _ 

it must be himself whem he * *** ^T^^f^ T - 

deludes by the phantasmagoria TWTTTHm^nFra <T?f v I 
of a false creation. 

(2) That God is infinite, I ^ I ?re TTCPTOFPffT- 
eternal, and unchangeable, it j^f^-^f ^^ ^- T _ 
is unnecessary to demonstrate -, . •. 

to the VedanL As for the *™ 3*fc ™TOJ 
assertion by the author of the *TtJ*TWT^t4 t^TTf%^- 
Sdnkhya [in his Aph. 93 of f^T^ W <fTfCpsf rf^cf 
Bk. L], that the fact of there jfi,^^^ ^. 
being a " Lord" (Iswara) is r^^r^L^ *\ 

unproved— the import of this VWW^api'l ^T" 
is explained by the commen- PlfWt SfWTfT ^T^TWT- 
tators to be, that it is not fq^f%^f^^^r^r^T^:^T* 
intended by the expression f^^ f^hiqftv- 
"ior a Lord is unproved, to 

deny a Lord, but that the ****** «W ^(T N ^ 
author of the Sankhya denies T ^TW^fH rTT^frr^ rTf%^T- 
that he is bound to show the 
consistency of certain of his 
own statements with other 
statements which, he says, are 
* ' unproved, " — and so, until his 
opponent shall have proved 
them, he is under no obliga- 
tion to take them into con- 
sideration. 

(3) Again, as for what the \\\ ^yn *T^T^T 






12 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

SdnMyas say, that if there be ^: ^ff^r ^^RirRfFSrT 
any primal energy, competent ^p^fa. ^fa ^ ^ff 
to produce the world, then let ^ ~ ^ ^ 

it be called Nature, or the W: TOftftft WT^fll- 
chief one ; but, in that case, ft ^T *pnmc: fo*mt *?- 
the supposition of an all-direct- ^iff rf^T *?ft ^4f%^TT*W- 
ing Lord is superfluous. We ^^^ ^^ ^ ( 
reply : Not so ; because there ? 

is a plain contradiction in hold- ^ ^ **W i TOTTO* nreT - 
ing that a primal energy, com- ^TCPR: ^^TW^frTOfa- 
petent to the production of w ^j ^^rTT^T^r ^tftnsh 
the world, labours for soul's ^^ ^ ^^ ( 
end, and is at the same time ^ ^ * 
unintelligent, — inasmuch as "^^^falf ^TcT s I ^ch 
the working towards an end ^ ¥f?fa S^STR? f%^RW 
is proof of intelligence. This 
shall be set forth diffusively 
in Book III. 

(4) The followers of the | b I %^Tft^r^R^- 
Nyaya [seethe SiddhdntaMuJt- 
tdvali, p. 2], in demonstration 
of the being of a God, say that 
"such productions as a water- Wf[TTf^r<Rfa I ^ <V&R- 
jar are produced by a maker, ^ w ^ T ^j^^^.. 
and so also are the vegetable ^_^^ ^ - ^ ^ ^ 
sprouts and the earth, etc.; ^ 

and to make these is not pos- 
sible for such as we are ; hence 
the existence of the Lord, as 
the Maker of these, is demon- 
strated." 



^ffl 






HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 13 

(5) But, it may be objected, | ^ I «f*Rftffar3ptffiifr- 

that the assertion that God is ^ ^ -. ^ WWf?f 

a spiritual substance cannot be .. ^ 

true; because what is spiritual wl^^S^I^- 

is without parts, whereas in ^TrT N ^ff TTT^I^r^- 

the Scriptures of the Old and -^ ^^"^T^TTfirsr^tTT 

New Testament there is men- , MTrirT «^ T fc.ft , -,_, , 
tion 01 God's eyes, hands, and 

other bodily parts. But we *"^ 

reply: Not so; because there <^T?T V I <T2ITf% ^: ^ 

the expressions, "eyes," vnnhn^ W^T ^fil- 



^HrT$<STTfc I 



etc., are figurative, the word 
"eyes" signifying knowledge, 
"hands" signifying power, 
and so on. 

(6) It being thus settled, , ^ , ^f^ ^^ f^-^- 
then, that God exists, we -\ . ^^ ^ 
deny that there are more gods > 
than one. For — 

APHOEISM VI. 

G The unity of There ig but Qne J^. ^^ ^ ^ ^ 

God, the living and true God. ^ 

(1) We say " living," in j ^ \ ^r\^ nWNt *TT- 
order to exclude idols; and ^^^^^^^ 
"true," in order to exclude 
imaginary gods. 






(2) If it be said that there 
is no proof that there is but ^TplSTO ^*5*W 1 fir 



14 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

one such God as is here de- ffpJTRfrjf?! ^^ *3R*TT- 
signated "the Lord," we re- ^^^ WwTcTJ 
ply : Not so ; because both ^ '^ 

reasonmg and Scripture fur- ^ ^ 

nish proof of this. The reason- ^"g-Rt *fwf v^T^i idl- 
ing is this, that God is one, ^TfiW^4^Tf^n"firf?r I 
because a unity of design runs 
through all created things. 

(3) Now, in order to ob- \ ^ | «T«TTr^fic^£r ^j: 
viate the doubt how we ___ ^-^ -tt^^».«-^ 
are justified in saying that ^ ^ 

only one God is declared in ^ T ^ ^T^ T^ TCT 
Scripture, when, in the New ^3 ^TT*TW "Rfrro^rT TfH 
Testament, three persons are -gr^f f^Tf%(jraTW I 
spoken of under the name of 
God, we declare as follows : — 

APHOEISM VII. 



*%£"* There are three per- ^ ^ jfa^ftfo ^ 
sons in the Godhead, the Fa- -s -s Vn^ ^ 

ther, and the Son, and the Hely * ^«^ ^™ 
Ghost, and these three are one «TOT«lftftTnifa*ITWT " 
God, the same in substance, f^qrn ^f^rf II ^> II 
equal in power and glory. 

(1) This dogma will be dis- ,^, ^ ft^^iratf 
cussed in the Fourth Book. j^'^^ , 

(2) Having thus far de- , ^ , ^^ ^^p^.. 

scribed the nature of God, we 
proceed to describe the nature 



TO ^TOTO rift rf T^T' 



of what is other than He. W^tf fTOTOfft I 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. \:> 



APHOKISM VIII. 

creation. God made all things 
of nothing, by his mere word, 
in the space of six days, and 



all very good. *m s 7n1*R *Hhn *TV^ 

11^ II 

(1) But how is it possible , ^ , ^ ^ ^^ 
that God " made all things of c * 

nothing?" We retort: How **^ ^^^ ****' 
should it not be possible ? iftfr 1 1 ^ *^^f?T I *f T 
To explain,— We ask you in ^j T f% <^g TTfrPrgsr: g>- 
turn, how does fire bum fuel ? ^^.^^ ^ ^ 
If- you answer, from the na- ^ 

tureof things,— then we rejoin ^ ! W ^ ^V*" 
that it is the same in the case Iffi Spf cf§W I f^%3 
before us [—God makes things rr^fq^T^T^R3rTTW - 
out of nothing « from the na- ^^ ^ ,p™- T ^ 
ture of things"]. If you ask, ^ ^^ 

how can this or that thing be **f^ftf?t ^ s S^WT 
produced without the aggre- *2nfT ^f% ^R^^cF^^- 
gate of its concurrent causes ? ^ -jj^j ♦ ^j-^ ^f& ™ 
we reply, that the doubt would ^ _ v , ^s. 

be a fitting one if we were * * ^ ^ 

speaking of men's works ; for *2fwTO<lwfi^f ^H^T- 
we do not assert that a potter ^r*TT^^T3?^?"Rf?fqT^TT- 
can make a jar without a lump ^. | ^^ ^-^^ 
of clay, or a weaver a web * _ ^ ^ ^ 

without yarn, and so on: but *™Wf%f% <T^T * 
this doubt is inapplicable to *WT IJ^T *mr I *Tf^iTW- 



16 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

the case in question, of the ^Tf^r^^T^T^T^TW^T - 
Supreme Lord possessed of ____— g_ T _ <=k 
power beyond that of all crea- <, t , ^ 

tures. And if we suppose, WWTiW^ *«m *" 
from the example of the like ff VT^T*Crera*T*l*rr- 
of us, that God's power of ^pri cjT^r f ¥T^^TT^T^ 
creation also is dependent on ^ ^^ wg . 

an aggregate 01 concurrent ^ c 

causes, then we ought to sup- ^Wim^ftft^PRTiTO - 
pose, from the example of the ^t^ ^f^ffi I 
child's walking with the sup- 
port of the nurse's finger [see 
the Raghuvansa, canto iii,, v. 
25], that your power also of 
walking [ — grown-up person 
as you are — ] is dependent on 
the support of a nurse's finger. 

(2) And if you say that the , ^ , ^^ ^ j^jq- 
world could not have arisen ^ * ^ ^ 

from nothing, because what ^ * 

exists must have been without V^ <T^TT^Rf?T *TT*<fT 
beginning, on the rule that ^^rqfrRT^ Tf^T ^N I 
nothing comes of nothing ^^nf^ f^£ WfTW" 
["" ex nihilo nihil fit "1, — then ^-^ -^ 

we reply : Not so ; tor there is N 
no proof that there is any such I^<P^ *TWR HTTC- 
absolute rule, and an unsup- ^TtTZF^rTcTJ ^ffq^cf ^frf i?- 
ported allegation deserves to 
be met only by an unsupported 
[or blank] negative. More- 






over, were the case as you say, fT^Tfri: ^TrT s I *fT«rf t 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 17 

then the feeling, whether of ^W^fT^TOTlt^rFT^Tlr- 
pleasure or of pain, which at ^f^^ s f^j jr^T- 

any moment arises in the mind ^ ^ 

of a man, must have existed && ^ f^™™cf s *I- 

from eternity, and as snch f^" fli^fe ti ^ wni*N<1r 

must be imperishable. If it q T ^ rqf^f^sra f%*RTl!F 
be rejoined that what we assert _3* 
is the arising not merely of 
real changes of the mind, but 
the arising also of substances, 
we reply : Say not so ; for 
that makes no difference : — if 
you yourself admit that men- 
tal states, not previously ex- 
isting, do arise, how should 
this be wrong in the case of 
substances ? 

(3) But still, it may be said, | a | cf «j r\^jfq i^Tfw 
it is impossible that God should ___„„_ ^^v,.-r^fv^ — 
have made all things out of 

nothing, because the souls of ^^^ ^Tm^TWTtJ- 
men, etc., are without begin- <RTf^frT ^Nf I fHITf% I ^f- 
ing. To this we reply: JSTotso. ^f t^^; cfff^TT^T^- 
To explain:— That the ground ^^ ^^^ ^ 
of all is the One Self-existent 

we are both agreed. Such ^ : * ^ ^ WT^fitft- 
being the case, there remains W^l 3P^ITf<J ^1 3?W^T- 
the consideration — whence has _—f^fi- fe— j T ^™^ j 

come the existence of anv- *n . * -s -v 

a- *. * tt- o , fJWT^^T^W Wa- 

rning apart from Him ? — and ^ . 

this is entirely hidden with ^T^W^T^lf^- 



18 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

God, and can be explained by fr{ *TR?: I T^prf ^TTTOT- 
the Self-existent alone, and by ^^^.-^ ^-^ 
none other. But this is agreed, * d ^ 

alike by those who accept the ^™WW^W^ 
authority of the Yedas and by ?5^W3 ^fwsfTr *m x ^- 
those who accept the authority ?$m TTTfflr ^\*m tTT^T T~ 
of the Bible, that there is so ^ ^-^ ^psfa^f ^ 
much of difference between the ^ s ^ ^ 

existence of the Self-existent ™ TOW^WTHTin- 
and the existence of the ^T 3<? rf xfrf\ ^*TOT f% f^i 
human soul, that rules are ijf^f^f 3T ^ff TPC^ftsa^n"- 
required for the guidance of ^ ^^ ( ^ 
men, — otherwise what need of - ^ ^ 

the Vedas ? what need of the tW^TO* ^^ W[ *" 
Bible ? In the Bible there is ^WTT f^T^H f3r*g r?*TT- 
no discussion as to how the ^ j^f^^, ^ T? ^. 
human soul is numerically dif- ~. ^ p ^ ^ f- 

ferent from God; but rules are _ 

laid down for human guidance, <3 ^f^^f^^ratft 1 ^- 
clearly on the understanding TP!?tfT«=f ^tlfanf'T fTTHlt 
that the difference is a fact. ^^^.^ ^^^^. 
If, therefore, the Bible be ac- ~ ~ -^ ^^^ 

knowledged to be the Word of ^ * T ^ **TTOT*- 
God, to say that the human W^f *fa ^Sk* ^TrfJ 
soul is not numerically dif- «f^[ ^sp^^fi'Sf^ff TITf^f- 
ferent from the Lord would be ^ ^ mf ^. ^ ^ M 
to make God a liar. And it ^ s 

must not be said that the dif- **r*ft*« »nft«?irqt- 
ference between God and the TTT^m I 
soul is illusory and not real, 
because such illusoriness is in- 



HINDtT PHILOSOPHY. 19 

consistent with the facts of 
consciousness. 

So much, in our elucidation ^-f^ ^f^^^l^V^^T fa- 
of the Christian religion, for ^^.^f^^.^^^.^^v ^ T ^, 
the First Book, that devoted 
to the exposition of the dogmas 
about which we wish to speak. 



TT*n?r s-srre: ii 



20 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 



BOOK II. 



THE EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY. 



Now we commence a second ^j^j o^rsiT^ S'iffcni^f 
Book in order to establish f^ftfi^ qqfatfft*- 

what was treated under the ^ ^ ^ ^ 

3rd Aphorism of the pre- ^WfcfbWTOT^- 
ceding Book as if already es- ^ facftaraTTOTTH^ I <T" 
tablished, that the Scriptures ^fr Tf^fir a wq ^| *g fffi^re- 

of the Old and New Testa- -s .,-s,,i c-.- , *. 

ment are the word of God. * 

It was there stated [Aph. III. VB^^^S flf^WW 
3] that the authority of the ^WT?T JTTOTO f%lj rffafa- 
eontents of the Old Testament f^ ^^- ^srfjf^rf%3rr«T- 
is established by force of the •*.^r^ 

declarations ol Christ con- ^ * ^ 

veyed in the New Testament, l* 1 * ^*fw*N&TTW3T??T- 
and that the authority of the WfT^fsR^lf^TT^n ^f- 
declarations of Christ is esta- -g^^ T;f?fTr^?fT^TrT 
blished by the testimony of -s ^ 

His disciples. And all this ^^WTT^f^- 
is founded on historical infer- ^ T: *Tfw ^W^ S^R- 
ence, so that by those can it T$*Q 7fT ^lp(WT*T I 
be clearly understood who, by 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 21 



the appropriate culture of their 
mental faculties, have become 
skilled in discriminating the 
reality [from the semblance] 
of evidence. We therefore 
proceed to state what valid 
arguments, in respect of the 
fact that the Christian religion 
came from God, are derivable 
from the stores of history. 

APHOEISM I. 



Miracles the 
credentials of 
a religion. 



A religion attested ^rsrcmTgfT'^fwI'tHT'sJ 
by miracles is from -,^^^^-j ^^ 
God, and the Christian reli- ,^ ~ 

gion is attested by miracles, V^OTqWOT^- 
therefore it is from God. ^HW^MM^I * II 

(1) The miracles performed | ^ | ^r^TTjft/fr? SF^ - 
by Christ, in order to esta- ^ ^-„ ^ ^. 
blish the fact that he was ^ 

sent by God, are such as ^ W^lft ^ T f% 
these :— His giving, by a word ^^TRT^FT^frift ^T^R^T" 
merely, eyes to the blind and ^ *^"«ftr ^cR^T^T ^^1 
life to the dead; and His __„_« ^-^^ c^, r$ 
Himselt rising agarn alive on ^ 

the third day after he had f^^T^faaTT^tfa I 
been put to death. 

(2) But, it may be asked: * 
Granting that miracles dis- ! * ' ^^TnCTT^cf- 
played could be so only through ^f^Tfa ^^T^ft^inl^ 



22 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

the power of God,— still what ^f^R^fftara if^^f Tft L 

proof is there of this that ft ^ ^ T ^ ft 

such were performed by 

Christ ? To this question we ^WW^Tl I 

reply— 

APHOBISM II. 

^Thechristian Miracles attested ^IJlirFT^fT^f^fftwr^"- 
7 by such evidence as ^^^^^^ . 
exists in attestation of the ^ #-. -n 

Christian miracles, are to be ^I^TTf% *1*T- 
believed. ^ » ^ « 

(1) "Attested by evidence," | | ^j^^. | ^ 
etc. The import is this, that *vs 

the proof which should set at ^ R: ! T^*Hr?fw*Tf%- 
rest this question is this, TfI3? ?TR*rf% ^ ^f?: 

that many men, professing ^qTTORITjreWTTIFT- 
themselves to be original wit- rv ~ . ^ 

nesses of the miracles per- 

formed by Christ, voluntarily **^ : ***** YEVmifr- 
underwent, as long as they Tprraprra fT^TTT^f^^T- 
lived, toil and danger and ^^^^^ ._ 
suffering, in attestation of what ^ ^ ^ ^^ ~ 
they had witnessed, and solely ^ft^^"f^ tft I 
through belief in what they ^qprarfwm^ftm^ - 
reported. But no such suffer- f^iftj ?T^r^^R^Tf%rfT^RT- 
ings were ever undergone, in -^ ^^. ^| : ^ 
the case of any other supposed •. * . c 

miracles, by men alleging ™ W^Wp™ II, 
themselves to be original wit- f ^nrrf^TOT^ftWTW 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 23 

nesses thereof, in attestation T:?o[Tf% «f ^^T^ftWrfT^ 
of what they narrated, and f^^^^^, 
through belief in the narra- 
tive: this also is a proof 
which should set the question 
at rest. 

(2) But if the voluntary I s ? I *PJ ^ *iN^T 
undergoing of sufferings en- ^HoWTW^WT ^rWff 
titles persons to confidence, ^^ m ^^ - 
then whatever is asserted by -v ^ 

the Indian ascetics, who volun- *^ *n\rreqT*JT ^^re 
tarily undergo the sharpest <?t^FrT*?"R s inXTT s ^*?T- 
sufferings, ought also to be ^j^Rf^^ $fa ^<|- <^- 

accepted. If this be urged, <^ ^ ^ *r- r*^ 

we reply : .Not so ; tor we ^ ^ 

do not say that the mere ^^-CTlww^ 
voluntary undergoing of suf- WTT^'flT^ fsfalTSPsft"- 
ferings produces a title to con- ^^^ -^ ^^ 
fidence, but only that the en- r ^ > f r 

durance of suffering, inflicted ^ V 

by others, and endured with no W^OTfasf^ft?! T^li- 
view to any fruit beyond the Tfxft^T^lRifa rf^JT I W- 
establishing of a particular oc- ^^^^ *:*Tfll 
currence, does so. But the suf- . ^ 

ferings of the Indian ascetics * «? ^f%^ Vfffin- 
are self-inflicted, and are not ^TT^T^iTT^^^TITf^ rf- 
undergone in attestation of ^xt% ^ ^Tf^rtfiTOTf'r- 
any particular occurrence. ^ ^^^^^ • ; 
That is to say, these ascetics _^ * ^ 

undergo sufferings, seeking, in ^frC^WTTfar iT^TWt 
some cases, the gratification of *ffararf^R*UT5rarf?r - 



24 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

vanity, disregarding bodily ^prf: q^TTfTW ^RJT'rfT" 
ease and desiring more the ^^^^^ ^^ T - 
rapturous admiration of the ^ -. 

spectators; and, in other cases, ™™*>TTjr ^TifT 
hoping for supramundane glory ^♦WTrT ^•tT I rT^ T\^IW 
and enjoyment which they tj% ^cTTfrfr^: #T Sfa 
imagine is thus to be obtained ^ ^^ *T*lTftfN 
in another birth. In the first ^ ^ ^ ^ 

case no motive is established f^^WTffWnHTO 
besides vanity; and there ^T^W^WVTT^sfhJ^fa - 
needs no proof of this vanity, *rx*re^ TORTifTTt TJ- 
for the vanity of these is *_r. w . „jv_ ... .^ . ^. 
equally clear with that oi *•*.'■"•* ^ 

the silly women who under- ^ W^rf%¥ : I ft^t^^ 
go the pain of tattooing ^ 3rT?wf% <y^Tf*T W- 
and the boring of their f^^^^^^-^. 
noses for the reception of a ^ «s -s ' r 

nose-jewel. And m the se- * 
cond case there is established ** T ^ V^W^ ^<5 "ill^T" 
their belief merely in the as- ^IJcfrrft^Era'^TJTTW - 
surances of those who incul- mrjjfu i 
cate that present sufferings 
are the causes of future en- 
joyment, but not likewise the 
veracity of those who thus 
inculcate. 

(3) But the circumstances l^l'nT^rrth^f'gYPfi:^?- 
of the sufferings voluntarily -^^-^ ^^ 

undergone by the first be- * ^ ~ 

lievers in Christ were quite ^ ^ 
different from the foregoing. *fi[^*fa f^g ^f^?T s 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 25 

And if in the present day any Tfg^Tfi: ^TOrr^rfTTJnG^ 
believer in Christ, when called ^^ T *n;wTf^:?§Tf% 
upon to abjure his religion, «\ *** «s c ~ 

should prefer undergoing s ^ 

death or other sufferings, then ^W¥WffaT W f*TER- 
the sincerity of his profession ij£^ f%1ffff I ^Il3|4gfj*f- 
of Christianity is what would ^^^3^ ^ ^ 
be thereby proved : but suf- ^ 

ferings were undergone by ^*™T^T* ^T- 
the first believers in Christ, ^l«pg7TTf% ^^T^^T^T?T S 
in attestation of events which ^pj- ^jTra^ft^ ^jf^if^ 
they had themselves beheld, «n » ^ *s „ rv ^ m ,„ 
by their giving attestation g 

whereof the world was enraged ^^ ^^^fRT^IT- 
against them, and in respect ^T^wq^i^ffa<ffYiJT^'- 
of which they were under no «g<j i^ *fr^T3Cf*T5R v I 
delusion ; whilst, on the alter- -\ 
native of their being deceivers, c s 

► they could reap no fruit be- TT^ffiWr^T^^T^JfT^RR'- 
sides the anger of God for ^T^^f^^R^M ?3;wf 
having obstinately borne tes- f^ T ^fa^ , ftf ^ T 
timony to a wilful lie. And »r- r- ^ 
by merely refraining from 

bearing such testimony, they ^ T ^ *FWWWfa T"2 I" 
might have remained quietly, *?: I ^fsrwrcFiN fifflfq 
clear of the sufferings which ^^^ : | ^^f q ^ T ^ T _ 
they underwent. Would men * «v ^ 

in such circumstances assert d n» 

that they had seen what they ^^ * ^W WZ& ^~ 
never saw? would they de- ^rff ^T^^rTTf W^rTr 
clare what they had no know- ^^ ^nft T¥T m _ 



26 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

ledge of? and employ them- ^ V^^WWT«Tnroftl- 
selves in telling lies in order ^ ^u<£h| ^ W iT- 
to teach virtue? Further, * ^ 

not only having seen Christ WT^TW^^faTT 
to be an impostor, but having IkTTCT^T* 3TO ^' I TU3 
seen also the result of such ^^^f?f | 
imposture in his being put to 
death, how could they have 
persisted in bringing upon 
themselves, for nothing and 
with a full knowledge of the 
consequences, enmity, con- 
tumely, contempt, danger, and 
death, by obstinately carrying 
out such an imposture ? It is 
impossible. 

(4) Now, in regard to the | g | ^^JT%: Teufinr- 
doubt as to what proof there -^ ^f^ ^ T fr 
is that sufferings were under- - ^ #-. ^ 
gone, in the way just men- M m-i«*i 

tioned, by the first promoters *nffT1T*?r? I 
of Christianity, we observe — 



APHOEISM III. 

sufferings of That sufferings lf , glifTT'^fT^fT''T^Tf% - 
aaSSSr should be undergone f^.^^^^ 
by the attesters of the miracles ^ ^ *s 

of Christ was likely, and more- 
over that they were established ^^^T^TT^Uf^ II S H 
by cumulative evidence. 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 27 

(1) That is to say, it is \ \\ ?f^Tf% ^ ^:*I*R- 
likely that they underwent ^^ ^^^^J. 
sufferings, because they were ^ 
promulgators of a religion dis- c v ^ ^ 
tasteful both to the Jews and f^fa W*ft I^T^ffaT f% 
to the rest of the world. For 5j?fT: TT^f ^^^ ^ ^^ ej-^- 
the Jewish people, misconceiv- ^^j^ ^^ ^. 
ing the import of the Word of ^ 

God in the Old Testament, f^ T ^ WPWTVrarTn:- 
looked for a Redeemer from ^ 3rU*T "JTfft^fT'wf^T *T<S 
temporal bondage, and not qpiOTT^^f%*irwra x | 
from the spiritual bondage of *-*-*• 

sin ; while the Gentiles re- d * 

sented the Christian scheme fa*^ ^^WT^^rfT- 
©f salvation because of its re- WrRfT^T^f^r^'f^'g it- 
quiring the entire abandon- f^ , ^f^ T$-gV%: SirT 
ment of man's natural pride. 

Further, that the Christians y« ^*PWW W: 
did suffer, is established by the *nf%*«W*KWt TW 
testimony of profane writers of f%ljf?T 1 f^rfjfrf^WTOT- 
good authority. Again, the ^ ^^^^ ^. 
writings of the Christians them- c 

selves furnish evidence to the ™ ! ^P^ TTOTWTm 
same effect. And these argu- ^fTOTfir I ^MPi 
ments are mutually independ- ^:^rf% ^^T^t^fw- 
ent, as each separately goes to ^^^^^^^ m 
establish the probability of the 
one common conclusion that ^ ' 
the first followers of Christ 
underwent sufferings. 

(2) Now, to the question I ^ I ^T^rT^f^T^rR 



28 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

whether no other miracle has ^^^JTOTOf^nffacSTT"^ I 
been established by such evi- 
dence, we reply — 

APHOKISM IV. 



WfTTftfT^ ^ W^f?f II 8 II 



*«?££ xt is im P robable TOErw«TT&ifrraT- 

^uidbefat" that any false story 
should have been adopted by 
witnesses of this kind. 

(1) " Is improbable," etc. \\\ ^ SRJcffitfa I W 
For no fake story of miracles ^^^ ^^ 
ever has been adopted by wit- ^ 

nesses of this kind; and, fur- **™ : *TTftwfWT- 

ther, no other miraculous story ^^Tt^^ f" ¥ I^T^IT 

whatever has been seen to be gfTf^z'Tg'grT^f^cfcireiT j\- 

adopted by sucWitnesses. ^^^^ 

Such is the import. ^ * 

TTS^faWT- I 

(2) If you say, but were not 1^1^ W¥fi< : T'npT- 
the miracles of Krishna, such ^^f^vufiH S^SHTRT- 

as his lifting up the mountain ^ -v c •s ^ . 

of Govardhana, attested by 

witnesses such as attested the ^TT^*T^«f^ftrT*TO^ft- 

miracles of Christ ? We re- f?f "^^f | rf^f f% ^SJ^qif 

ply : Not so. For, even sup- ^ -j-^-^-^; ^_ 

posing them to be true, we re- ^ ^ ^ ^ 

quire you to tell us, by what * 

persons, professing to have TfaTffi'JCT ^TOTra^p^fT 

witnessed them, was even the ^j ^urajTT I 

slightest suffering undergone 



HINDt PHILOSOPHY. 29 

in testimony of their belief of 
them? 

(3) But, it may be said, 1^1 *TC ^T: ^T H* 
the Yedas are themselves proof •% TfTT^iff ^ipEf^TrT | ^srrf*[ 
[i.e. causal of right knowledge], ju .,. ,, xm ^ * ..^r^, „„ r 
lor they are divine ; and there- e 

fore there is no need of an- ^T^T^T '?&&* ft" 
other proof to corroborate their ^m^T^f^fJTTlT^t ^W~ 
authority, just as there is no ^. • 
need of a lamp in order to see 
the sun. We clear up this 
doubt as follows : — 

APHOEISM Y. 

producible. 6 a Yeda that it is sell- -^^^ .^^.^^ ^_ 
evidently an authority, it is ac- ~ 
knowledged in so many words ^ 

that no evidence of its being 
an authority is producible. 

(1) Be it so ;— but, it may W *T*HWJ ^^ *T- 
be said, it suffices to establish TJTO rr<ft^^?^^T5?f^^^- 
the authority of the Yeda that ^m ^x^^^T I *Ht?tTT*?- 
it is in harmony with all de- ^ •. ^_ ^ 

monstration. In the Bible, on ^ 

the other hand, we are told ^^ <T^ *^ T ^fa^" 
that the world was produced ^TWWfW ^?fe<TT f%- 
out of nothing; while great ^^ w: ^ w ^ 



L t> y 



sages among the moderns- 

such as Sir William Hamilton "'^^ *W^T*t- 

— seem to adhere to the tenet *iT¥T^3fr TlT^mfTTWTfa - 



30 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

laid down in the 118th Apho- ^r"^^f%"^TnT^T^t^s^t- 

rism of Book I. of the /Stew- &. -a-row \ 

Tthya ) viz. : " Because that 

which is possible is made out 

of that which is competent to 

the making of it." 

[For the convenience of the English reader, we 
cite here the remarks, above referred to, of Sir William 
Hamilton, at p. 585 of his Discussions. 

"When aware of a new appearance, we are unable 
to conceive that therein has originated any new exist- 
ence, and are, therefore, constrained to think that what 
now appears to us under a new form, had previously 
an existence under others. These others (for they are 
always plural) are called its cause ; and a cause (or 
more properly causes) we cannot but suppose, for a 
cause is simply everything without which the effect 
would not result, and all such concurring, the effect 
cannot but result. We are utterly unable to construe 
it in thought as possible, that the complement of exist- 
ence has been either increased or diminished. We 
cannot conceive either, on the one hand, nothing be- 
coming something, or, on the other, something becoming 
nothing. When God is said to create the universe out 
of nothing, we think this, by supposing, that He evolves 
the universe out of Himself; and, in like manner, we 
conceive annihilation only by conceiving the Creator 
to withdraw his creation from actuality into power. 

" ' Nil posse creari 
De Nihilo, neque quod genitu 'st ad Nil revocari.' 

" < Gigni 

De Nihilo Nihil, in Nihilum Nil posse reverti.' 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 31 

" these lines of Lucretius and Persius enounce 

a physical axiom of antiquity, which, when interpreted 
by the doctrine of the conditioned, is itself at once 
recalled to harmony with revealed truth, and expressing 
in its purest form the conditions of human thought, 
expresses also implicitly the whole intellectual pheno- 
menon of causality. 

" b. The mind is thus compelled to recognize an 
absolute identity of existence in the effect and in the 
complement of its causes, between the causatum and 
the causa. We think the causes to contain all that 
is contained in the effect, the effect to contain nothing 
but what is contained in the causes. Each is the sum 
of the other. Omnia mutantur, nihil interit, is what 
we think, what we must think; nor can the change 
itself be thought without a cause. Our judgment of 
causality simply is: We necessarily deny in thought, 
that the object which we apprehend as beginning to 
be, really so begins; but, on the contrary, affirm, as 
we must, the identity of its present sum of being, with 
the sum of its past existence. And here, it is not 
requisite for us to know under what form, under what 
combination this quantum previously existed ; in other 
words, it is unnecessary for us to recognize the par- 
ticular causes of this particular effect. A discovery 
of the determinate antecedents into which a determinate 
consequent may be refunded, is merely contingent, — 
merely the result of experience ; but the judgment, 
that every event should have its causes, is necessary, 
and imposed on us, as a condition of our human intel- 
ligence itself. This necessity of so thinking is the 



32 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

only phenomenon to be explained." And he adds (at 
p. 591), " We cannot know, we cannot think a thing, 
except under the attribute of existence ; we cannot know 
or think a thing to exist, except in time ; and we cannot 
know or think a thing to exist in time, and think it 
absolutely to commence."'] 

(2) Again, Bishop Berke- \ \ \ rT^TT *T^f ^TWt $HT- 
ley has brought forward co- ^ ^ TW ^^. 
gent arguments to prove that ^ X^ 

the "matter- which [yen *nt*T*R ^Hp^f^- 
say] is alleged in the Bible ^t> inwfTm'JTOIT- 
to have been brought from TTCpErPtTTIOTTOTOTftTT- 
non-existence into existence, ,^^^ ^rf%^ 1ITOT . 
neither exists nor could pos- 
sibly exist. f%WWT^W*J 

(3) In like manner Sir Wil- I ^ I rf^TT ftf%*TO^ WT" 
liam Jones, who was versed *uxwT sft WEto^ra^rr- 
in the scriptures of the Hindus „c- ,—^, g p-*» . « T 

„ . \, « xl intra wT^nSNwRwr- 

as well as m those ot the ^ 

Christians, appears to hold the ^^ fa^TT*: ^TWi?^ 
tenet of Kapila above cited. 3?fq*rf%^T^f ^fafTfrltffT 

[Sir William Jones, at p. 367, vol. i. of his works, 
remarks that "the inextricable difficulty attending the 
vulgar notion of material substances, concerning which 

" ' We know this only, that we nothing know,' 

induced many of the wisest among the ancients, and 
some of the most enlightened among the moderns, to 

1 See the question of " Matter," as regards the philosophical terminology of the 
East and of the West, discussed in Appendix, Note A. 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 33 

believe that the whole creation was rather an energy 
than a work, by which the Infinite Being, who is pre- 
sent at all times, in all places, exhibits to the minds 
of His creatures a set of perceptions, like a wonderful 
picture or piece of music, always varied yet always 
uniform ; so that all bodies and their qualities exist 
indeed to every wise and useful purpose, but exist only 
as far as they are perceived, a theory no less pious than 
sublime, and as different from any principle of atheism 
as the brightest sunshine differs from the blackest mid- 
night."] 

(4) Why then am I bound | a | T^JT^ ^5? f^W^? *§- 
to believe what Christians ^ ^ ^^^ ^_ 
themselves acknowledge to be ^ <. 

impossible, and to abandon * * W **»*& *^' 
my belief in the Veda, which ^ f%faf^R ^fwrn*- 
harmonizes with the evidence TTTWlf^hO^ *3l£fa^TTpJ 
which commends itself to me, 
and the matter of which [as 



c 



^twrf*TO ^ ^ f^^^^t 



in the instances just cited] ^^ 3?^ **TTVtF 
is accepted even by Chris- 
tians ? To clear up this prima 
facie view, we remark as fol- 
lows. 



APHOEISM VI. 

ofrevSatior 1 that the Veda should 



have been revealed by God, 



fa I fr^^'RT^T-are^ 



because, apart from trifles, it TT f%^TT^%*TOT*Tf fw 



•54 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

reveals only such things as l^TWf ^fff^^^^^lT^ 
the speculative intellect is dis- „._-___ » * » 
posed to arrive at without the 
aid of God's word. 

[I say " apart from trifles," because that to which I 
refer especially is the great tenet that only One exists, 
and that nothing but One ever really existed or will 
exist or could exist. To this conception, if not to this 
belief, every one, we think, must come, who, studying 
the mystery of being — by the bare light of his own 
reason — determinedly analyses and takes account of 
every thought and every term in the chain of his 
speculation. I can articulate the term creation, and I 
may appear to attach a distinct idea to the term when 
I say that it means " making out of nothing," which I 
do hold it to mean ; but is it possible for me to conceive 
that what is so made has in it a principle of existence 
which would sustain it for an instant if the creative force 
were withdrawn? I am not able to conceive this. I 
believe that, by a confusion of mind — or confusion of 
words — people may persuade themselves that they have 
a conception of it (as a child may imagine that it has a 
clear conception of a round square)] but I find in my 
inmost thoughts that I have not. Were there a with- 
drawal of the support of the One, I cannot conceive 
otherwise than that all that appears must collapse — as 
the electro-magnet drops the load that it sustained the 
instant that it is disconnected from the source of its 
magnetic power. Can we call such a thing a magnet — a 
real magnet ? No ; it only appears to be one through 
the influx of an adventitious power. The illustration is 



HINDI? PHILOSOPHY. 35 

an imperfect one ; — as what illustration, of the conception 
here spoken of, but must be ? 

Now, while the speculative reason, fearlessly followed, 
brings us inevitably to the brink of that precipice of 
Pantheism over which the Yedantin would have us cast 
ourselves, here, I say, is a worthy occasion for the in- 
tervention of a benevolent Providence, if a benevolent 
Providence there be ; and here, accordingly, a benevolent 
Providence has interposed]. 

(1) The import is this. Had | <^ j ^J mm I TT^rifa 
the tenets, that the Eeal is but ^ ( .^^ ^ ft 

One, — that sin, misery, etc., ^ 

are all illusion, -that Man ^ T » ** *"T OTtT 
himself is God, and so forth, f%^T*frT?rt W^ fT^T^T 
been true, there would be no fT^ftwfar ^f% <T^TO- 
need of a divine revelation to ^^ ^^ft^ft. 
teach them, inasmuch as these * 

facts might have been ascer- ^ W 1^T<T N I ^T^T 
tained by the unassisted in- 7J^? ^^^T^^N^rRJ- 
tellect. But, though in Him, ^. ^-p^ $ft ^ 
the Almighty, we live and ^ ^ r- 

* , • m^§FTWiiwraBR!TOT : 

move and have our being, our 

destiny is at His disposal ; ^ : " *W* ^TTWff *?- 
and so, to set at rest such en- fifTT^TTTT ^t?^ 3?"^ rf en- 
quiries as this, viz., what that ^ : ^^ ^^-^-^ f^_ 
destiny, alternatively, must ^-^ ^ r- p r- 

be, and what are the conditions ^ ^ 

by which that destiny is to be ¥t$ t^fw^fw T" 
determined, a revelation was tTX"^ ^T *?*T3rTT ^^f rWil£- 
needed, and it has been given j^ . 
by the Most High. 



36 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

[Now, with regard to the declaration above quoted, 
of Sir William Hamilton, that creation, as usually denned, 
is unthinkable, we have to observe further, that " un- 
thinkable" is not synonymous with " impossible." As 
Sir William Hamilton remarks (at p. 596), " there is no 
ground for inferring a certain fact to be impossible, 
merely from our inability to conceive it possible" Those, 
then, who prefer the ordinary explanation of the term 
creation, are not bound to surrender their view simply on 
the ground of our inability to conceive the possibility of 
such a thing. But, on the other hand, a Christian is 
just as little under any obligation to adopt that view ; 
and a missionary among the Hindus will give himself a 
great deal of needless trouble if he insist on inculcating, 
as an essential element of Christianity, a questionable 
metaphysical dogma which he himself, in all probability, 
has only taken up by rote. St. Augustine wisely re- 
marks, that, " the opinions of philosophers should never 
be proposed as dogmas of faith, or rejected as contrary 
to faith, when it is not certain that they are so." He 
draws this general conclusion from the more special case 
of questions of natural philosophy. " A Christian," he 
says, " should beware how he speaks on questions of 
natural philosophy as if they were doctrines of Holy 
Scripture ; for an infidel who should hear him deliver his 
absurdities could not avoid laughing. Thus the Christian 
would be confused, and the infidel but little edified ; 
for the infidel would conclude that our authors really 
entertained these extravagant opinions, and therefore 
he would despise them, to his own eternal ruin." 
Moreover, those who, like the Pandits, can really brace 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 37 

their minds to metaphysical speculation, are not to be 
overborne by those more lazy minds which cannot. Dr. 
Whewell somewhere acutely observes that when a dis- 
putant professes that he will have nothing to do with 
metaphysics, you may safely expect to hear him pro- 
pound some excessively bad metaphysics of his own, 
for which he arrogates an immunity from discussion. 
Now I have no sympathy with those (bad and most 
dogmatic of all metaphysicians) who profess to despise 
metaphysics, but great sympathy with those who would 
deprecate the raising of obstructions to mutual good 
understanding on the ground of points in metaphysical 
theory which are absolutely indifferent as regards prac- 
tical results. The thinker is not to be overridden by the 
talker, who insists that there is " matter" (by which he 
means he knows not what), because, forsooth, language 
implies its existence. Language implies that there is 
redness in the rose, though no thoughtful person in Europe 
now believes that colour or any other secondary quality 
exists, as such, apart from a percipient mind. The 
Idola Fori, the fictions of the Market-place, are not 
entitled to the implicit deference in general so arrogantly 
claimed for them by the indolent and impatient, who, 
while, justly enough, professing that they have no turn 
for metaphysics, might advisably abstain from inter- 
meddling where a turn for metaphysics (and perhaps 
even more than this) is indispensable for usefulness.] 

(2) Now, to show how the ( ^ | "^ H^f^ fa^TT 
foregoing considerations affect tt^. ^rfafsrare l 
the matter in hand, we assert 
that — 



38 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 



APHOEISM VII. 



TheVedantic 
tenet does not 



Granting to the rTW^WT 5 ^ *tTT 
Sr h to£: Vedantin that no- *imT imtftft 3^lftl?I- 

7. , f in i ofiudf ex i sts «™*& & *wr- 

besides the One, it neither ^ 

follows that a man is the One, ^ ^ ^^I^ : *" 

nor that a man's endless course ^TT* ^RT"^T^t^ Tm 3FT 

of existence depends upon him- »f fij-sjf^ || ^ || 

self alone. 

[Since we here use the expression " exists of itself" 
it is fitting that we should consider what is meant by 
saying that something " exists " in a different sense 
of the word from that in which something else exists. 
To quote the words of Berkeley {Principles of Human 
Knowledge, § 89), " Nothing seems of more import- 
ance towards erecting a firm system of sound and real 
knowledge, which may be proof against the assaults 
of scepticism, than to lay the beginning in a dis- 
tinct explication of what is meant by thing, reality, 
existence ; for in vain shall we dispute concerning the 
real existence of things, or pretend to any know- 
ledge thereof, so long as we have not fixed the mean- 
ing of those words." 

Now, according to the Veddnta, 1 " Existence or being 
(sattwa) is of three kinds, — 1, Being, in its highest 
sense (pdramarthika) ; 2, such as has to be dealt with 
(vydvahdrika)) and, 3, merely seeming (prdtibhdsika). 2 

1 We quote from the Vedanta-paribhasha, Chapter II. 

2 *nq ii mk*hPS<* ii ^rrwrft^ h TrrffWTftn* ii 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 39 

Of these, being, in its highest sense, belongs to God 
(i.e. soul or spirit) ; being, such as has to be dealt with, 
belongs to the ether [or space], etc. ; and merely seem- 
ing being, belongs to the [merely seeming] silver, which 
is [in fact] mother-o' -pearl [mistaken for silver by a 
beholder]." The first of these is equivalent to substan- 
tial or independent existence, the second to phenomenal 
or dependent existence, and the third to deceptive 
appearance. Let us compare this with the views of 
Berkeley. In regard to the first kind of existence, 
Berkeley declares, " From what has been said, it follows 
there is not any other substance than spirit, or that 
which perceives." 1 Here we have independent exist- 
ence. But such an existence as this, Berkeley concurs 
with the Vedantists in denying to the objects perceived. 
To these (whose "esse" he holds to be "percipi") 
while he denies "an existence independent of a sub- 
stance/' 2 contending that it is either a direct contra- 
diction, or else nothing at all, to speak of " the absolute 
existence of sensible objects in themselves, or without 
the mind;" 3 yet he does not deny a real existence. 
He says, "I can as well doubt of my own being, as 
of those things which I actually perceive by sense, it 
being a manifest contradiction that any sensible object 
should be immediately perceived by sight or touch, 
and at the same time have no existence in nature, 
since the very existence of an unthinking being con- 
sists in being perceived.* The third degree of existence, 

1 Principles of Human Knowledge, § vii. 2 Ibid, § xci. 

3 Ibid, § xxiv. It must be remembered that mind and spirit, in Berkeley's 
language, mean the same thing. This is not the case with *f*I^ {manas) and W^PT. 
(atman) in Sanskrit. See ante, p. 23. 4 Ibid, § lxxxviii. 



40 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

inferior to this, he assigns to dreams and creatures of 
the imagination ; for, in comparison with these, he says, 
"The ideas of sense are allowed to have more reality 
in them, that is, to be more strong, orderly, and 
coherent;" 1 and these, being impressed upon the mind 
M according to certain rules or laws of nature, speak 
themselves the effects of a mind more powerful and 
wise than human spirits." 2 

"While Berkeley and the Yedantists, then, agree 
in holding that existence differs in its degrees, and 
agree also in allowing the first degree — viz., that of 
independent or substantial existence — to spirit alone; 
they differ — apparently at least — in their application 
of the term real. In examining this part of the ques- 
tion, therefore, we may expect to come upon some 
difference of opinion, such as shall imply, on one side 
or the other, an error requiring to be combated. But 
before proceeding to investigate this, let us take account 
of what has been ascertained. We have seen that 
the Vedantins, in allowing the rank of substantial exist- 
ence to spirit alone, hold the opinion which one of the 
most pious and thoughtful of Christian bishops advo- 
cated, not as merely harmless, but as a grand bulwark 
of the truth against the assaults of a debasing mate- 
rialism. Verily, there seems to be anything but an 
obligation upon us to insist that the Vedantin should 
give up this philosophical belief, and accept at our 
hands, as something indispensable to his further pro- 
gress, "an unknown quiddity with an absolute exist- 
ence," the term designating which, Berkeley adds, 

1 Principles of Human Knowledge, § xxxiii. 2 Ibid, § xxxvi. 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 41 

" should be never missed in common talk. And in 
philosophical discourses (he goes on to say) it seems 
the best way to leave it quite out, since there is not, 
perhaps, any one thing that hath more favoured and 
strengthened the depraved bent of the mind towards 
atheism, than the use of that general confused term." 1 

With regard to the third degree of existence — that 
belonging to what presents itself in dreams, etc. — there 
is no occasion for our here remarking more than this, 
that the missionary is not likely to quarrel with the 
Yedantin for calling such things, in general, illusions 
rather than realities. What we are more particularly 
concerned about is the second degree of existence, which 
some of the Yedantins professedly, and the others too 
generally in fact, degrade to the level of the third. The 
second and third degrees are in effect reduced to much 
the same level by the employment of the term vastu to 
denote spirit, and, on the other hand, its contradictory — 
a-vastu — to denote all else. Now the word vastu means 
a "thing," and since a-vastu, therefore, means "not a 
thing," the Yedantins are disposed to treat whatever 
comes under the name as being (in the familiar sense of 
the word) no thing, — or unreal. They are, in fact, not 
disinclined to own the impeachment, against which 
Berkeley has in his own case so repeatedly protested,. 

1 Third Dialogue, between Hylas and Philonous. We beg leave to remind the 
reader that we are not here professing ourselves a follower of Berkeley, nor urging 
any one to adopt his views. We are simply concerned to show which of the Vedanta 
tenets, by being Berkeleian, are not in any way anti- Christian, and not therefore the 
points against which it were wise to direct our efforts. Hence we are at present 
under no engagement to satisfy the reader in regard to all the difficulties which 
Berkeley's theory may, at first sight, appear to give occasion for. More objections 
than were likely to have occurred to any single objector, Berkeley himself has antici- 
pated and replied to. His treatises are open to all, and are not voluminous. 



42 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

of holding that the phenomenal universe is delusive, 
because phenomenal and dependent. The Yedantins — as 
philosophers — (for at present we are viewing them as 
speculative ontologists and not as assertors of a revela- 
tion) — would seem to have been duped by the word thing 
and its kindred term real. They chose to restrict the 
name of thing to spirit, and then jumped to the con- 
clusion that all else must be nothing, or nothing of any 
consequence. 

Waiving here the question of revelation, which does 
not fall within the present section of our argument, we 
would recommend, therefore, that, in reasoning with a 
Yedantin on his philosophical belief, he should be left in 
the undisturbed enjoyment of the opinion that there is 
no independent entity besides spirit, — that opinion being 
one which need not prevent his becoming as good a 
Christian as Bishop Berkeley. We should also leave 
him to think, for the present, as he may choose in regard 
to dreams or waking misapprehensions; but we should 
press him with the unreasonableness of holding that the 
phenomena of waking existence are beneath the notice 
of the wise, because, forsooth, they are not entitled to 
the name of vastu — the name of substance or thing. If 
phenomena have an existence " that must be dealt with" 
(yyavaharika\ their importance will depend upon our 
relation to them ; and if it so happen that our relation to 
them is to be eternal, it is idle to disparage their immense 
importance by dubbing them " insubstantial." Whether 
their relation to us is to be eternal, and what relation 
our spirits bear to that Great Spirit whom we agree with 
the Yedantins in holding to be the sole independently 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 43 

existent — the Self-existent — are questions to be answered 
only by a revelation. 

Confining ourselves, for the present, to the considera- 
tion of ontological theories and terminology, we proceed 
to inquire what is the Yedantic conception of the relation 
of the phenomenal to the real. The Yedantists are some- 
times charged with holding that the phenomenal is the 
real, — in other words, with material Pantheism. At the 
same time they are charged with the wildest extrava- 
gance, of an opposite description, in declaring that the 
Supreme is devoid of qualities, or, in Sanskrit, nir-guna. 
With regard to the relation of the real and the pheno- 
menal, no point appears to have occasioned more per- 
plexity to the European assailants of Yedantism than 
the employ meat of this term nir-guna, so frequently con- 
nected in the Yedantic writings with the name of the 
Supreme [Brahm). We find, for example, a zealous 
writer against Yedantism declaring that, " In any sense, 
within the reach of human understanding, he {Brahm) 
is nothing. For the mind of man can form no notion of 
matter or spirit apart from its properties or attributes." 
And the same writer calls upon his readers to admire 
the extravagant notion that Brahm exists " without 
intellect, without intelligence, without even the con- 
sciousness of his own existence !" Now, the reply to 
all this is, that the word nir-guna is a technical term, and 
must be understood in its technical acceptation. It 
means " devoid of whatever is meant by the term guna" 
and the term guna is employed (as already explained at 
pp. xxxiv. xxxvi.) to denote whatever is phenomenal. 
In denying that anything phenomenal belongs constitu- 



44 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

lively to the Supreme Being, the Yedantin speaks very 
much like Bishop Berkeley, and like other good Chris- 
tians whom Milton's epic has not educated into a semi- 
conscious Anthropomorphism. Berkeley expresses him- 
self as follows : — " We, who are limited and dependent 
spirits, are liable to impressions of sense, the effects of 
an external agent, which, being produced against our 
wills, are sometimes painful and uneasy. But God, 
whom no external being can affect, who perceives no- 
thing by sense as we do, whose will is absolute and 
independent, causing all things, and liable to be thwarted 
or resisted by nothing ; it is evident such a being as this 
can suffer nothing, nor be affected by any painful sensa- 
tion, or indeed any sensation at all. We are chained to 
a body ; that is to say, our perceptions are connected 
with corporeal motions. By the law of our nature we 
are affected upon every alteration in the nervous parts of 
our sensible body; which sensible body, rightly con- 
sidered, is nothing but a complexion of such qualities/' 1 
and so on. The Yedantin, in like manner, denying that 
such " qualities" belong to the Supreme, declares, " We 
ought not to ascribe to Almighty God properties, attri- 
butes, or modes of being, which are the peculiar cha- 
racteristics of humanity, such as the faculty of vision," 2 
etc. In short, the Yedantin denies that the Supreme 
either has or requires either senses or bodily organs ; 
and, holding that organs of sense or motion are made up 
of what he calls gima, as we Europeans in general say 
they are made up of what we prefer to call matter, he 

1 Berkeley's Third Dialogue. 

2 The Tattwa-bodhinl Patrika — the Calcutta organ of the modern Vedantins — 
p. 113. 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 45 

asserts that the Supreme is nir-guna, in very much the 
sense that we Europeans assert that God is immaterial. 
We say, guardedly, "in very much the sense," and not 
simply " in the sense," because the term guna denotes 
strictly, not the imperceptible quiddity " matter," but 
what Berkeley calls the sensible, or the sum of the objects 
of sense. Theologically, the Yedantin, asserting that 
the Deity is nir-guna, and the Christian, asserting that 
God is immaterial, are asserting the very same fact in 
terms of separate theories, — just as two chemists might 
make each the same assertion in regard to some indivi- 
dual specimen, while the one spoke of it as destitute 
of chlorine, and the other spoke of it as destitute of 
oxymuriatic acid. 

To say that " the mind of man can form no notion of 
matter or spirit apart from its properties or attributes," 
is therefore no reductio ad absurdum of the Yedantic 
dogma that nothing of what is technically called guna 
enters into the essence of God. Take away everything 
of what is comprised under the name of guna, — that is 
to say, take away everything that is perceived through 
the organs of sense, and take away every sense-organ, 
and take away all human feelings or mental processes, 
such as alarm, delighted surprise, recollection, com- 
putation, deduction, — take away all this, and there 
remains to the Yedantin, not a mere empty substratum, 
but the One Eeality, consisting of existence, thought, 
and joy, in their identity as an ever-existing joy-thought. 
This, whatever else we may think of it, is something 
very different from a substratum evacuated to non- 
entity. We are accustomed to regard eternal existence, 



46 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

wisdom, and blessedness, as attributes of God. The 
Yedantin, on the other hand, instead of regarding these 
as attributes of God, regards them, in their eternal 
identity, as God himself. 1 Instead of holding, as they 
have been so often accused of holding, that God has no 
attributes in our sense of the term, they hold, in fact, 
that He is all attribute, — sheer existence, sheer thought, 
sheer joy, "as a lump of salt is wholly of uniform taste 
within and without." So far is the conception of Brahm 
from being reduced to that of a non- entity by the 
Yedantic tenet of his being nir-guna, that, according to 
one of Yyasa's aphorisms, as rendered by Mr. Colebrooke 
(Essays, p. 352), " Every attribute of a first cause 
(omniscience, omnipotence, etc.), exists in Brahme, who 
is devoid of qualities." It is rather strange that the 
occurrence of this passage in Mr. Colebrooke's well- 
known essay should not have sufficed to awaken a 
suspicion that the term " devoid of qualities," must be 
employed in a sense other than that of an empty sub- 
stratum — a non-entity. The Yedantin, seeing no occa- 
sion for any such vehicle of the joy-thought, never 
postulated any such. The empty substratum, the 
"nothing," which they- are fancied to place in the 
room of the Supreme, is precisely what, as a nothing, 
does not enter into their conception of the Supreme at 
all. It will readily occur to the reader that the Hindu 
conception of thought, as the ultimate ground of all, 
independently of any substratum beyond it, anticipates, 
in its own way, Hume's extreme development of Locke. 

1 Compare St. John's expression, " God is love." I do not suggest a parallelism, 
for the Vedantic enunciation is meant literally. ISec ante, p. xxxvii. 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 47 

The misconception to which we have now been 
adverting, furnishing, as it has done, seeming ground 
for a charge which has been reiterated against the 
Vedantins under all the varied forms of remonstrance, 
taunt, anathema, and virtuous indignation, has, we fear, 
done much harm. It has done much to confirm the 
modern Vedantin in his opinion that his European 
assailants are incompetent to appreciate his system, and 
in his belief that the creed pressed upon his acceptance 
by such assailants cannot have any solid claims on his 
attention. If it be asked why the Vedantin could not 
explain so simple a matter as this misconception to 
the person who blamed him unjustly, we reply, that 
the asker had better reflect what intense confusion of 
mind has been again and again occasioned, in every 
part of the world, by a mutual misunderstanding of 
a term when the two parties were not aware that they 
really misunderstood one another. People are always 
too apt to fancy that it is in regard to some opinion 
that they differ, when they only differ in regard to 
the employment of a term. 

Eeverting to the charge of extravagance in the 
notion that Brahm exists " without intellect, without 
intelligence, without even the consciousness of his own 
existence," it may be well to repeat here what the 
Vedantin means by the terms thus rendered. By intel- 
lect (or mind) he means an internal organ which, in 
concert with the senses, brings the human soul into 
cognitive relation with the external. This, of course, 
he denies to Brahm, who, as Berkeley says of God, 
" perceives nothing by sense as we do. , ' By intelli- 



48 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED- WITH 

gence, again, the Vedantin means the conceptions of 
an intellect, as just denned, which, of course, cannot 
be present where an intellect, as just denned, is not. 
Finally, by consciousness, he means the individual- 
izing of one's-self by the thought of " ego," thereby 
implying an existent " non ego;" and with reference 
to what is the One sole existent thus to individualize 
Himself? The denial of Brahni's u consciousness" in 
this sense, does not imply unconsciousness in the sense 
in which we employ the term. It merely implies that 
the one — who is not three as consisting of existence, 
thought, and joy, — is an existence, which existence is 
in the shape of thought only, and that thought an 
ever existent joy, which never really abandons (how- 
ever much it may seem to abandon) its absolute unity 
by shaping itself into the complex thought that " / 
am blessedness." The practically important mistake of 
the Vedantin, as we have argued in the aphorism, is 
his assuming that what seems is of no consequence. 

But, it may be asked, is not this system — view it 
as you will — one of Pantheism ? We admit that it 
is ; but we would recommend that it be borne in mind 
that there is, as urged by Sir "William Jones (see ante, 
p. 32), a great difference between the Pantheism which, 
in — or rather across — all that it sees, sees God alone, 
and the Pantheism (more properly called Atheism) 
which, beyond what it sees, acknowledges no God. 
The condemnation due to the grovelling system last 
mentioned, it were idly mischievous cruelty to hurl 
against the Vedantin. The man who believes that 
his spirit is in the same category with his digestion, 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 49 

that his soul is a function of his brain, as the secre- 
tion of bile is a function of his liver, let us not, in 
common justice, insult the Yedantin by mentioning 
in the same breath with him. If the Yedantin be a 
Pantheist, he must be one of the other order, — a 
spirit of a far higher mood, erring though he be. Let 
us be cautious, too, lest we condemn him on a charge 
which he repudiates. Two expressions, familiar in the 
Veddnta, are usually cited in contending that the Ye- 
dantin confounds the Creator with the creature, viz., 
the Yedic text, " All this is God," and the illustra- 
tion of the spider spinning its web from its own body. 
The passage in the Veddnta-sdra, where the illustration 
of the spider occurs, we render as follows : — " Thought 
[i.e. Deity] located in ajncma [i.e. in the aggregate of 
the phenomenal], which has the two powers [of obscur- 
ing the light and of projecting its own shadow 1 ], is, in 
virtue of itself, the efficient cause, and, in virtue of 
what it is located in, the substantial cause ; as the 
spider is in itself the efficient, and in virtue of its 
body [ — which body is not the agent, but the locus of 
the agent — ] the substantial cause, as regards that pro- 
duct [which we call] its threads." 2 Now, as no one 
charges the man who says that the spider made its 
web from its own stores, with saying that the web is 
the spider, so we think that no one is justified in de- 
ciding that the Yedantin says " The world is God," 
on the allegation that the Yedantin virtually does say, 

1 See ante, p. xxxvi. 



50 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

" God made the world out of stores of His own." 
What were those stores ? They -are, in the creed of 
the Yedantin, just what amount to the sense of the 
word power, the word saMi, the recognised synonyme 
for the aggregate of the phenomenal, for the ajndna, 
— i.e. for that which is not God. 1 

But the reader will be ready to exclaim, how can 
we be said to be unfair in assuming that the Yedantin 
says "The world is God," when there is no dispute 
that a Vedanta text declares, "All this is God?" We 
reply, that there is a distinction between "the world" 
and " all this," which, however wire-drawn it may 
seem, yet requires to be recognized. " The world" is 
the display of the phenomenal. It is not this, as we 
have shown from the Vedanta- sat 'a, that the Yedantin 
regards as God. But when he looks on the phenomenal, 
the Yedantist feels that an unchangeable reality must 
underlie this changeable ; he recognizes, through the 
phenomenal veil, the one reality ; and if he exclaims, 
"All is God," is the exclamation necessarily profane? 
Understood as we have put it, the phenomenal being 
ignored as a reality, we think it is not. He only says, 
" All that is real in this visible is the God who is 
invisible." I have discussed this again and again with 
learned Hindus, and I here state my conviction that 
those who condemn the Yedantins as Pantheists on 
this particular ground, would in like manner condemn 
St. Paul, if — not recognized as St. Paul — he were to 
reappear, declaring explicitly what was implied in his 
asserting of God that in Him " we live and move and 

have Our being." ■ See ante, p. xxxiii. 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 51 

In making these remarks, we have been regarding 
the system nnder its philosophical aspect, and we have 
therefore sought our data in the systematic treatises 
of the school. But there is in Bengal a modern sect 
of Yedantists — to our mind not the least interesting 
among the followers of the Yedas — who deny the 
authority of the systematic treatises, and allow of no 
appeal except to the Yedantic portion of the Veda 
itself. "We cannot reasonably dispute their right to 
take up this position. The claim is not other than 
that which Protestants asserted at the Beformation, — 
the privilege of having Scripture as their rule of faith 
and not uninspired dictation. The removal of the con- 
test from the champ-clos of the systematic treatises to 
the wide and diversified region of the Upanishads, is, 
indeed, inconvenient for those who would rather meet 
their man than hunt him. But the challenger cannot 
claim the choosing of the ground, and the missionary 
who heartily seeks the conversion of these men will seek 
it vainly if he shirk the task, however irksome, of ex- 
ploring the field where alone the Yedantists of modern 
Bengal will consent to be found. He must try to 
take accurate account of the Upanishads ; that is to 
say, he must not content himself with picking out a 
few of the passages which are most open to ridicule, 
but he must endeavour candidly to understand what it 
is, in these treatises, that satisfies the modern thinkers 
of Bengal. The study, if entered upon in a mocking 
spirit, might at least as profitably not be entered upon 
at all. 

In the aphorism on which we have been comment- 



52 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

ing, we affirm that, even granting that nothing of itself 
exists besides the One, it neither follows that a man 
is the One, nor that a man's eternal destiny depends 
npon himself alone. 

(1) But [the Hindu may I \ I i=R *ff^ ^TW^- 
ask] if the identity of the ^^ ftf ^ 
human soul and the divine c , . 

soul be denied, then of what *ft*TO**HtftT**t- 
nature do you hold the human f^rf TWT^T^T^TTTT^ I 
soul to be ? In regard to 
this doubt we declare as fol- 
lows. 



APHOEISM VIII. 



The eternity Human SOuls, ^t^TWff ^lfT% S^f" 

of human souls, ' ^ 
of what tod. ftough created) wi]1 __^ ^_^ |( ^ (| 

have no end. 

(1) If it be said that in , ^ ( ^ ^ ^ w . 
that case there is a contradic- 

tion to a necessary rule, viz., **™* f^nrft^faffi f%- 

that whatever had a begin- *???f3fHr Tf*T ^ I cTHT 

ning must have an end, we ^f%^ iTT^T^T^TfT I ^- 

reply: Not so ; becanse there ^^ ^-^^ 

is no proof that such is the * 

necessary rule, and because ^^ *WT<TJ *T^TR^- 

the blank assertion of it can iPTO^rsTTO S^^T^W^- 

be set aside by a blank de- ^^-^{^ ^^-^ 

nial, and because, as in the ^ ^ 

45thA P horismofBookI.ofthe ^*W™%^ ^ *" 

Sankhya Pravachana, so here ^f^TrF v I *%W$ ^ TJl W 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. . 53 

too we may say, this [ — that ^fgif^rfTf ^^* Tf%H^- 
nothing can be endless which ^. ^ .^-^^.^ 
had a beginning — ] is, "a mere ~ , * ._ 

denial on the part of unintel- ™W^nS *** H*ft I 
ligent persons." Further, ^5T5§ * T^fa^f?T *R- 
God, who is able to sustain f^ f^frrafirsffi ?r^ sfTj: 
for one moment those whom ^i^^,^^ . 
he has created, can with equal ^ ^ ^ N ^ e 

ease sustain them during an ^Tfiftm **? ^tlTOT3- 
eternity. The question only 3TTf%3T^faT^wf^f^^ 
remains, whether or not He xjt^-^t-^j l?f^T?T ^TOTT 
chooses to do so. To this we ^ *>. ^ *" 

reply, that, in the book which 

we hold to be the revelation *nprq^ f* *?T*rf*?f?T ?J 
of the will of God, we are 7\ "5[^p? I ^RpT^fT^f^nf- 
informed of the promise of ^ T ^ T ^ -^^-^{^ 
God that He will sustain the J _ . c -, _ 

human soul m existence 

through eternity. But the ^^ ^rt^cTTOTTF^W^T 
doubt is not to be entertained 3^^ fTj^TJTTOTOfa^- 
whether there be any proof ^^j rf fr^^, 
that that book reveals the ^ 

will of God, for we have 
already discussed the esta- 
blishment of the authority of 
that book by the argument 
from miracles, and by the tes- 
timony of competent persons 
who underwent suffering in 
this world solely for the pur- 
pose of attesting those miracles. 



54 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

(2) Now we bring forward | ^ \ ^j^j ^ iffaV^R^ip^- 

another proof that the Chris- -^r*. ^^^ mr ^,^.^„^, m 

tian religion is from God. "* 

fa I 



APHOEISM IX. 

cSSt of ^ ie Christian re_ Hf^NrcfrF^nransN *$r- 

££££ by ligion is established ^ v ,f : ^^jf^y ^ 
by the evidence of prophecy. ^ 

(1) If you say, but if pro- |\|JR srf^ ^fw^fm: 
phecy be a sign of authority, ^^f^ -^ ^^ 
then why should not those -. ^ -^ ^ 
lists of kings, which were *\ <v <\ 
drawn up in the Puranas be- fa^lT TT^^T^^t f%f*T- 
fore those kings came into f?f *f f^re^H ^f^fa 
existence, be worthy of our ^ ^ ^^^^ ^. 
belief ? We reply : Not so ; % -s * 

because we see there nothing ^T^TtT: TOp^WTO- 
to determine whether these 3T TTrf ^tR: ^TW^f 3?f%- 
lists of kings were drawn up ^^pf fM%^^T^WrT s I 
before the kings came into 
existence, or whether they 
were interpolated in the 
Puranas afterwards. 

(2) Now we state what | ^ | ^ ^Hn^fta**- 
peculiarly distinguishes the ft^f^ ^T^ £- 
Christian miracles [from the 

miracles of the Puranas]. ^ * 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 55 

APHOKISM X. 
^r The Prophecies ?erSWT*m tfTOJ- 

reallysuch. which establish '.Ju^,^™- 

Christianity were made before , °\ 

the advent of Christ, because ^ T ™ *F* ^^ *^fr 

they are fonnd in the sacred ^T^ft ^*TO^T*W^*?'R- 

books of the Jews, who are up ^j^ || »o n 

to this day the enemies of 

Christ. 

(1) That is to say,— the ! * ' ^ T ^ ^Tfrfr# 
prophecies regarding the f^^P^W ^T^^t^^r 
Messiah, to be found in the ^^ tpHf^T ^tRW- 
Old Testament, the Scripture t: -s . ^ 

of the Jews, represent the ^ 

Anointed One under the seem- "W^ f^fa^f^wr- 
ingly irreconcileable charac- >3TTfWf%rf WE "tff^RT^"- 
ters of a conqueror and a suf- ^r ^.^^ ^^^ 
ferer. But the Jews, eager ~ " . 

for deliverance from the ™*TWHPft ^ 
tyranny of strange governors, 3TT*reW*rn 3\1|«T ^m^f 
looked only for a Messiah who TT^q^T^I^rarff^W ^TVTpT- 
should cause the overthrow of ^ ^^^ * ^ 
their enemies. When Christ ^ _ . 

came on earth, to suffer, and W 3 : «™^ UPW- 
to conquer sin, death, and cSpWHT tJf5TT^W ^W~ 
hell, then the Jews denied oJTTT*? TT^T ^"^^I^T^T^ 
that this was the Christ's ^fr^ ftft^. ^. 
office ; — to this clay they ~ ~ 

look for a temporal deliverer. ^ T ^ ^^ ^Tfr* T^ 
Yet when the matter is con- "fffft^^ I ^T^ f^T^TRT- 



56 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED AVITH 

sidered, it appears clearly $ ^J^ijrTrT "Rfft^ra ^ 
that the prophecies do not in ^ V^^^ 

every respect consist with a j? -^ ^ ^ ^ 

merely trinmphant and tern- *TOrrf»Fl ^n** 1 T^* 
poral deliverer; bnt they find ^ W^l: ^3T^ mTpff^T 
in every respect their fulfil- ^^^^q ?tt: *shpfc 
ment in the history of Christ. ^ ^ ^ 

(2) The veracity of the ( ^ , ^rfc^^^. 

Jewish Scriptures, of which , c 

we possess volumes transcribed «\ ^^ 

several hundred years ago, as *T^T ^?T^T^^%^^rr^WT- 

well as translations into hun- ^T^T^JT^^^T^TTrf 3\fwrf- 

dreds of languages-so that, ^ fa ^^ ^. 

even if an invention, yet, like ^ • _^ 

the Yedas, with their [volumin- ^ T ™ : TO3r#frWif*mfc- 

ous and various] commentaries, «T ^flfcFnT^TT'Tf ^T^"^- 

they could not be supposed to ^^j^tj^Tcjj ^T^^HRTTW- 

be a recent invention — is cor- _ *- ^ 

roborated by fresh evidence, ^ 

through the discovery of cities ^ w * ™^ ^ftWT *T- 

[such as Nineveh] which had % TTT^t ^^f ?5p?f%f?r*f- 

disappeared under the sands ^^Jjf^ ^-^ *rf%^- 

of the desert, exactly where ^ - C * C * 

the Scriptures describe them ^ ^» 

to have stood in all their TWWf Tf^ T$R3T ^*r «, 

pomp, and where the prophets WW^TVf^TTOTWTfa 

declared that they would be- f^^ ^^ Tf ^_ 

come an uninhabited waste. ^ 

And the predictions in regard ™* ift^*****- 

to the Jews themselves fur- ^% TWWT'rrc:*^ I ^1" 




HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 57 

rush further proof of the vera- ^rrfq 3?^?Tfj *ITWT ^U;T~ 
city of the book. The exist- 
ence of this people up to the 



city of the book. The exist- ^^ ^^ *cf *TWrT 



present time, throughout all V 

nations, and yet comniing- ^^pT^TCTW^I 
ling with none, is a standing 
miracle. 

(3) If it be said that the | ^ | s?«T qrfTO^Hrch* S~%- 
prophecies are no evidence, j^^^^-^ ^^ 
because they are of obscure ^ ^ -s ^ c 

and doubtful meaning, we ^ v> 

reply: Not so; because the WreRTTWT*} rT^irhJ- 
obscurity of their meaning Tffiflrsg ^P^m^dl^ - 
may have been designed to ^^^ ^ c* T fa *?fiT- 
bafEe attempts at their ficti- c 

tious fulfilment. « No pro- ^ ! ^ : ^ T ^ T **" 
phecy is of private interpre- ^jf%ifa rr^RTfa^fllW- 
tation," for all the prophecies Tf^iRfTTT *4m Har- 
are severally explained through 
the manifestation, on the ful- 
filment of the matter, that 
each really was a prophecy. 

(4) Now, it were fruitless , ^ , -^^^ Traur- 
to bring forward evidence that * <- *v -s 
a particular book contains a 

revelation of the will of God, ^^TTWn^ TraTW*- 
if evidence have not been <["3{«T f^W^rf^Trft^T^^ 
shown that there is a God; ^-^ , ^ ^^^ 
so we have to consider whe- . ~ 

ther there be a God. Accord- ™ ^ ^T^mT^T- 
ing to the teaching of the ^3N^N ^fft ^Tf% 



^#faf ^TWrlWT^ 



W[TWWTcTJ 



58 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

Veddnta, there is really no ^ff^r f% "ST^j'^Tn^'TTfHTT- 
will of God; for if by the -j ^ ^ fr^w*^! 

word God, is meant Brahm. ^ ^ -s ^ 

then that consists of know- ****™T* ***" 
ledge only, and is what is ^1 I ** ^T t^T^TTT- 
meant by the word Veda itself. ^t^R xf^ ^^T^frf ^??m- 
And the Veda cannot be the -^.. . ^£_^j:_. *- „^. 
revealer of the will of God, 
else we should find a duality ; 
whereas, according to the 
creed of the Yedantin, there 
is no distinction between the 
Yeda and the Lord. 

(5) Again, according to the 
SanJcht/a creed, there is no 
need of acknowledging a Lord, 
since everything is accounted f% ^"^rR^T oRfofir^iT T{- 
for by Nature, the unintelli- ^(tj^Tqq^: | ^R^rfifcT- 

gent maker of worlds. In __, , r ~s . _ _ 

reply to these opinions oi the ^ 

Veddnta and the Sdnkhya we f^ft^fT ?T^Tf% sT^WtTT- 
have this to say,— that if it f^fT^^TTT^T ^pgtpr^ 
be not agreed that there ex- ^^j ^^-j-^-^-^^ 
ists any thin g besides Brahm, . ^ ^ 

,, / . . , ,. wt HTTWsre^'rof^r: i 

then there is no foundation 






for the employment of argu- ^ f% ^rf^fTWfwfr ^- 
ments, either affirmative or ^"T^ft «flf?T ^TrT v rTfr ^*T 
negative. If there is any real ^^ 3^-^^.. 
Yedantin in the world, then 

to argue with him would be **™^™ *™. ' *V* 
like arguing with a child or a ^T^UW^TrewrsJHrefl- 



HINDtT PHILOSOPHY. 59 

madman. In the words of lrf^?g^ •TT^Vf^P^ ^|5f- 
the 26th Aphorism, Book L, ^ S ^ T ^f^^. 
of the Sarikhya Pravachana, ^ r^r^ 
" There is no acceptance of 
the inconsistent ; else we come 
to the level of children, mad- 
men, and the like.' 1 

(6) We commence, then, a \ \\ <vn m^jfeu- 
separate Book, in order to * r ■• ^^f^—-^ ~, 
establish that the Creator #< ^ 

of the world is intelligent : a * ^Tf^rR<brf^T>£rT 
point acknowledged by the ^T^j UU *$f Trf^f^fg^R^rr- 
Naiyayika, but denied by the ^f^^^T^^ n ?^ I 
Sdnkhya Institute, which is 
the vestibule of the Veddnta. 1 



See p xviii, 



60 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 



BOOK III. 



NATURAL THEOLOGY. 



Now, following out the ar- ?r ^ f%<JT§;TTfT^ tt^f- 
gument already cited as cur- ^ T ^ T7T -^ .j-^-^. 
rent among the Naiyaiiikas, _ » _ _ 

viz, that the earth, with its «^f*F ^W- 
sprouts, etc., had a Maker, ^*TTORprfi[f^r^ihrcc " 
because it is a product, and it f%f^rf^jsr« ! jjn , 'T «T^FTfa3r 
could not be made by the like ^^^^ q ^^. 
of us ; so that one different , * . "* -. 

from us, a God, must be its * W V faWfTfY 
Maker,— we first set forth the PFFTOfff I 
principle on which the argu- 
ment is based. 



APHOEISM I. 
Evidence of It is settled that FTtT cefiT^f rqf%f^RH7r - 

a Designer. 

the Cause of the ^^^^-^ 

world operates intelligently, ^ * ^ ^ _ 

because we see means adapted >» ^ * ^ ^1 % 
to the production of ends. 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 61 



(1) Now, in opposition to \ \\ ^j "RUf^T^T^f^- 

the Sdnkkyas, who say that 



the world is not made by one 



^iRPtffirfiff^ w^tt: 



operating intelligently, be- 
cause Nature alone may, un- Tgf^S^? ^TcTWU 3<ST- 
conscionslyand spontaneously, ^j TT^rffi S<TT *I*T^ ^f^" 
construct the world, just as 
the milk spontaneously and 
unconsciously becomes devel- W**v"*l ^ 
oped in the udder of the cow 
for the sake of the calf, we 
declare as follows : — 



APHOETSM II. 

theory™ t We re J eCt the T^T^Tf^f t ^3 *- 

SSST- argument of the ^ ^. ^^^ 
SanMya] because the illus- 
tration is not a fact ; for it is 
quite impossible that the milk 
should exert itself spontane- 
ously for the sake of the calf. 

(1) In explanation, let this , ^ , ^^-^^ ^_ 
story be heard by the atten- ^ 

tive: — A certain king's son, «\ v „ . 

observing that, always at the ^PWfwi^VWR^ft- 
time of his hunger's becom- f^*T^ ^f%f%cRf^R3T- 
ing sharp, a variety of food, ^^^^ ^ 

brought by the hands of his * . c 

immediate attendants, is set ^^ WPJ^W^W 
before him, fancied that cooked WT Tfa ^ rf*fa 3?^<Tf 



WSTrT II ^ 



62 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

food developes itself spontane- V^7[t ^RT^^ *T*5 ^T^fT 

ously for my sake, and he ex- Jj^^j^ ^ ^^ 
pressed himself to this effect 

before his attendants. But ^ TW ^ : ^ ^* T ^ ** 

they, having smiled to one <TT«ra ^Tf^WT f%f%rfT- 

another, instructed him as fol- iff f^^^j^ff Tfi^rfi^Tf^ 

lows: — " Prince! this food is . _. «i • ^^^^^e^ ^,^ t 

the result 01 arrangements es- e ^ 

tablished by the will of the *^™ T^ftft I TO* 

king, thy father ; for nothing TTI^ Sfa ^W^TWt rtrf^rR:~ 

unintelligent, such as a jar or ^f^f^ ^^j^ ^ 

a web, is ever seen to exert l^V^^sj^ 

itself spontaneously. " Just ^ ^ ^ 

so, too, in the case in hand, f*T* ^^ ^T^TOT^ 

does a melancholy smile come TT^RiCW^ ^^TT^TW 

over the face of the wise when ^^ ^-^^^f ^ 

they hear the Sdnkhyas fool- «\ ^ -v 

ishly saying, as it in emula- * 

tion of this king's son, that ^^ ' 
the preparation of the calf's 
food is independent of intel- 
ligence, and spontaneous, in- 
stead of being effected by a 
Divine Foreseer for the accom- 
plishment of a proposed end. 

(2) But [the Sdnhhya may 1*1 ^ ^ ^nifaT 

say] the soul is itself Divine : T^Trf: "TOf^iffTsrerTO *R- 

so that, claiming the services ^ ^ ^. { w ^ raT _ 

of Nature, it is competent to ^ _ ^ * 
create the world; and though ^^^ ^WSfT*- 

it be in the bonds of Ignorance, WTf T^^^T^ **n f5^T^ 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 63 

it may recognise its divinity ^T*PJ^cF s I ?T^Tf% 3ff%- 
throngh instruction by a fit ^-y^tpfY ^TT^^f^cfT q- 
person, as was the case with ^^e*,*^^, ^r^^Trr ^- 
the king's son [m the story 

given nnder Aph. I, Bk. IV, ^HWt WIR* W 
of the SanMya Pravachand], fwra*IT«l ^TT^ <4 ^fa'rT 
as follows: — " A certain king's ^fi^rT ^rf^^^TW* wV- 
son, in consequence of his be- ^^ ^ ^^^ Tr5nr |y 
rug born under the star of the ^ ^ ^ * 

tenth [and nnlucky] portion tflftlW*W«fi*W 
[of the twenty-seven portions "^T^f Tm^fT^f W^T TTTm- 
into which the ecliptic is di- ^ TT^WR^T^^H^ TT~ 
vided by astrologers], having ^^ , ^rfkrf^,- 
been expelled from his city, ~ ^ ^ 

and reared by a certain for- ^ T?T . tf^f^TW- 
ester, remains under the im- fH^mT^r^^ WT ^ ^- 
pression that 'lama forester.' f^ ^T^fw^T^XTrTjra- 
Having learned that he was _^-__-i w _. .=,„„-=,,. 
ahve, a certain minister m- ^ v» 

formed him, < Thou art not a TW*fa W* ^ ^f%" 
forester : thou art a king's *T^w: OTKfaiN ^?- 
son.' Jnst as he, immediately, ^^^-^^ ^ f^.. 
having abandoned the impres- -v ~ ^ r -s 

sion oi his being an outcast, 

falls back on his royal condi- ^Jffofil ^ I ^^7? 1 
tion, saying. 'lama king;' TTT'^nWWn^W 3v^lfg- 
so too it [the soul], in conse- ^^{^ -^-^^ 
quence of the instruction of ^ -s 
some kind person,- to the effect 

that < Thou, who didst origi- *U *ff ^T^nT^T Ijm^- 
natc from the First Soul, which ^cjTfa^rT Tf^T rf^7 ^T*m- 



64 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

manifests itself merely as pure ^(cfTf^tcffire I cftfa sfifa^J 
Thought, art thyself a portion ^ w ft ^^ T ^ 
thereof ' having abandoned the _ _ -^ 

impression of Nature [or of ^ft «!* tflWTOTft**- 
being something material and ^^•n^Jt'TTW I ^T^ ^T~ 
phenomenal], falls back upon 3^ 3fTntf^rf%^TfTf^^T 
its own character, saying, =I ._^ w ^« Tt ^_ T . ,^^-S _-. 
1 bmce I am the son of the ^ 
Deity, I am myself Deity, and m ' 
not something mundane and 
different therefrom.' And so 
it is needless to postulate any 
deity besides the soul." If 
you say all this, I reply : [Not 
so], for such a story proves 
nothing, the illustration and 
the thing illustrated being 
alike groundless. For that 
prince was a prince by con- 
vention — princehood [indepen- 
dently of the consent of others] 
being a fiction. In like man- 
ner the fruits of soul's works 
are dependent on the will of 
Another ; not dependent on its 
own fancies as to its inherent 
divinity. And that Will on 
which soul's treatment is de- 
pendent cannot be that of a Na- 
ture which is [devoid of will, 
being] devoid of intelligence. 






HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 65 

(3) To make this matter ( ^ | ^%«f fipre ^lift- 
clear, we cite the doctrine of _u c __~.__™„ ^S-- _ 
the NaiydyiJcas \ Gautama, ^ ^ «n« v#^ ^ ^ 
Bk. I, Aph. X.], to the effect ^T^^^^^- 
that effort [or volition, pra- «l«*«i^wft $fa ^T^W 
yatna\ as it is a property of fgrf T^T^f?* ^T^jt%^T- 
soul only, is therefore eyi- _fo_.__-___f^. . 
dence of it, in opposition to * 

the decision of the Sdnkhyas 
[Kapila, Bk. III., Aph. 59], 
to the effect that " Though 
she be unintelligent, yet Na- 
ture acts, as is the case with 
milk." 



APHOKISM III. 



The criterion Desire, aversion 

of the intelli- 
gent. 



enjoyment, ^^^ f^ „ ^ „ 
suffering, and thought, are s 

the mark of soul. 

(1) And each of these I \ I TJ^TTWSrai^ f%y- 
severally is to be understood ^ ^^j | ^^.^^ T? „ 
to be a mark. And thus it «n ^^ -s ^ 

is rightly declared by the ^ *«tN***TO- 
Naiyayikas that the doctrine frrfTOT*T ^T^TTTT^ TO- 
of an unintelligent Nature's 3<ftfrT ^Tfasft^ mo&i \ 
working with a view to a 
special end, is untenable be- 
cause self- contradictory. 

(2) But [it may be said] I ^ I TO * WWT^fafT- 



66 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

though this may be held in- $ $fq Tfl>^^"5rf^tr^^ xr- 
consistent with other evidence, ^^ - ^^^ . 
yet that Nature does work * ^_ t . 

unconsciously with a view to ^R^J TOUT ^nre Pf- 
a special end can he gathered T^m I 
from the Veda. This prima 
facie view we repel [in the 
words of Yijnana Bhikshu, 
commenting on Aphorism 9, 
Book I. of the Sankhya~\. 

APHOBISM IV. 

•aara [This cannot be] > wrfwri 3t> sft * 

£7—°^ " for it is an esta- 

Wished maxim that not even TOVffl* ^T^TrfJI 8 II 

the Fe<:/a can make one see 
sense in what is absurd." 

(1) Well, it has been laid , ^ , ^ -j-^^-^. 
down [in Aph. 1 of this Bk. e 

III.] that, through our seeing ^^TTWm?r^W?T s 
the adaptation of means to ^f^^TlffC ^fs^^T"^ 
ends, it is demonstrated that ^^f^^^:-,-^^. 
there is an intelligent Maker «n -n _ «-\ 

of the world. We proceed to ^ ^ 

show how it is that His intel- ^3%^^faf^*n;: 
ligence [or designingness] is "R^!?? I rTOTf% I ^?T V \%- 
thus proved by our seeing in ^ n^tf iqp f%^ q- 
the case before us the employ- ,. _ J* ^ . - 

, * a * a 4. a ^^I^T^T^t pr^fTTf^ fo- 

ment of means adapted to ends. 

To explain [in words adapted ^TT^ft *fir TfTCTffiRf 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 67 

from those of Lord Brougham's cjrnj ^f ^Trffsr^N? rTC- 
Discourse, p. 32]: -A the- ^^^-^^ 
ologian, on seeing any pur- ■ <, 

pose manifestly accomplished, * T ^ ^ T ^ T «** *!P*- 
always reflects as follows :— f%^5l3f r^T irf?X>8- 
a If I myself desired to per- ?tt^T«J1?T^T^ f^T^fhjT- 
form this operation, and were _— ^—-a. ^ *+ -,^<^ , 
acquainted with the laws on ^ 

which its performance de- *"" ^J W^^?* r " 
pends, should I accomplish it M^^WT^^rtsi^m^TT - 
by any other means than the ^^^^-^-^^J^ 

means here seen to be em- «ac «\ -n^ ^^ 

ployed tor its accomplishment r 
If not, then it is clear that f*"Ufa I 
some intelligent agent, pos- 
sessing a knowledge of what 
is required to be done for the 
production of this result, has 
employed those means in pro- 
ducing the result." 

(2) Having thus shown the , ^ , ^ vt^jrwt- 
scientific ground of the deci- •. r- _s 

sion that the employment of V*™*™ _ 3^*^ 
means with a view to an end W4F* ^TT^]^ "^l^f "J?^7|j 
presupposes intelligence, now #rf%cff 7F&RI ?ib i^fiT- 
desiring to set forth a narra- ^^^^^^ 
tive illustration to exemplify v 

the ground thereof popularly, ^ 
we state the illustration in an 
aphorism. 



68 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 



APHOEISM Y. 

The argument A « o "Knnf S^ 

from design "-^ <* WUcH. WTaTTI II U II 

illustrated. ™ '^HJI * II 

(1) And the narrative re- 
garding the boat is this, e.g., \ \ \ ^hWW T^T- 
When a man of the woods, ^r^T^I *T^IT ^T «irf^p[T~ 
having arrived at the bank of ^^ ^^ ^ ^_ 
a river, beholds the branch of ^ 

a tree carried down by the V* ***™ *W*T- 
stream, then perchance he W^ft3f*?f?T cf^*T *RW 
reasons thus: "This tree, the -^Y ^HFTlr^T^ <^ ^~ 

bank having been undermined _^ ^ „. _„:v „ *,^ 

by the stream, having fallen ^ 

into the current, and having ^f^^T^ ^KR ift- 
been stripped of all its leaves ^rf ^f?t rf^frT T%<ft 
by friction with the bottom, ^^ f^ f^^-^ { 
is borne along by the water 5 " C * 

and further than this he does ^ ^ 
not reflect upon the case. But WTf^^^cT^rRT^fa- 
when he perceives a boat, ^f%?lt SfW rRTrff ^Tfw?" 
deserted by its crew by reason ^^ ^ ^ T *?W*T- 
of a squall, floating on the ^ * , 

water, and, after coming to- * ^ T *™f*«rT** In- 
wards him, stranded on the <T f%^IT*jfiT V T[$ #^T?ft 
bank, then, having his curio- f^^x^TTfT'TT f^n^^rl 
sity excited, he , considers that ^^ ^ ^^ 
structure. " This structure, ^ ' ^ 

which, by reason of its having *™ S*rtwft?WTTO- 
a hollow form, is buoyant like ^T^^feffT sf% ^NT*?*rf?r 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 69 

a hollow jar, has its lower ^^ T ^ j ^rg rj_ 
portion composed of planks ^ ^ 
jomed together, so that being »v 

very light it may float. And ^^ ^TH *f% *TOT ^ 
staves are arranged on both ^T^EfWIT TT'flfa "^T^T^- 
sides, moveable and with ^ : , -^^.-^^f^ ^ 
flattened ends, so that these ^ _ . ^ 

rf put m motion would cause ' ' ^ 

this [vessel] also to move. ^Tft^TOt ^ SirTTft 
And places for sitting are "^j^^ | ^^•fT^TSI'RIT- 
seen, convenient for the per- ^. ^^.^^^ 
sons who are to pull the pro- ^* c 

pellant staves. And staves ™ ^T^rR: HfflfJT: 
are fitted inside, at such a *f% ^T^rfT iRWtgW^T- 
distance from the seats as is -q qTTt T^T^^^J f%"3T- 
exactly proportioned to the ^^^^^j^^ 
measure of an ordinary man, ^ 

so that the rowers, by resting ^ **fW*rrf^pT- 
their feet firmly against these, ^Tr^Tf^^f^fsraTT^- 
may without hindrance apply ^ s ft t\WT^ TOTci: 
their strength.^ From all ^^^^^_ 
this, without going into the ^^ ^ 

question of the sails, the mast, ^^^ l^T* ^ ^™ 
the rudder, etc. ; even the man f^ff^«fTf?f I 
of the woods decides with 
certainty that — " Therefore 
this structure was evidently 
made by some one intelli- 
gently, with the design of 
accomplishing such an end as 
this," 



70 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

(2) So, pray, in the com- \ ^ | ri%? fiff ^TT^T^- 
position of the bodily parts of ^^^^.^ _,_._ 
plants and animals, is not the ^^ _____ 
extraordinariness of the em- ^Wf^TOT^ - 
ployment of means adapted to ^WWcli *t ^fiffT^V^T- 
ends even more striking than ^^^T^RrTrrlNTTWT^ " 
the extraordinariness wtich ^_.^____ T __, f _, __ f ____. 
belongs to the above-described _ 
composition of parts in a boat ? PCTfiC* fH^TWT 
Or, in the way shown in the ^TC^TT^farT'ftW'R'rr - 
MuMavali [as cited in Bk. I., f^^f^^ ^^.^. 
Aph. V § 4], is not this earth ^ ____^_ 
with its vegetable growths, V* 

etc., distingnished above arti- ^^TT^^^T^- 

ficial things by endless dis- ^^fr S^ftf?f cn_R fa^*t 

tinctions, so that here there ^-^ ^^ ^ ^j^ | 

must be a pre-eminent Lord, 

possessing supramundane 

knowledge and power, who 

makes use of means with a 

view to ends ? Let not this 

be regarded by the intelligent 

as a superfluous repetition. 

(3) But then, if it be said, „,.;- __v 
Granting that there is a God, * 

of the character above stated, ^TO^^^TT^ 1 *^ 

still, how can it be proved rRF^Tfa ^jfar^sr "R^T- 

that there is a Trinity of Per- ^ T ^ ^f^ cff^ijTnjfT 

sons in that One God, as as- ~ «v «s __ rTr _ i A ii 

sorted in Bk. I, Aph.VIL, we ^ ^** ^™^" 

reply : This, like theother mys- ^TOT^T^Tf? fa^TT: *- 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 71 

teries of the Christian religion, t?«sj: ( ^I^( TT«T5rai^T <T«ft- 

is matter for consideration. ^^^^^-^^ 

Now, therefore, although the ^ _ ^ .-s 

mmd of man is incompetent to ' 

clear np the several mysteries UI^PC^J T333>T^ ^TJ^J- 

of this religion, we commence WSJT^WTTWT I 

a Fourth Book for the purpose 

of discussing, briefly and to 

the best of our judgment, the 

Christian mysteries. 



72 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 



BOOK IV. 



OF THE MYSTERIOUS POINTS IN CHRISTIANITY. 



*rf%!T'TmTTfr ^reft 



Now, beginning to speak of ^pq Tf^ffi-^^i fMm 
the mysteries of the Christian WTWT ,, : ^^^^ 

religion, we first state, as fol- 
lows, the doctrine of the divine 
Trinity. 



APHORISM I. 



Mystery of In the Scripture 

the Trinity in x 

Unity - we are told that 



the lather is God, so also is *» 

the Son, and so also the Holy ^ ^f^TT^fr rTO^T ^ 

Ghost, and further that there T^rarftf ij^tT fTCm?f^T«f 

is but one God ; but we are ^fe it <> n 

not told how this is to be ex- °" 

plained. 

(1) If the Vedantin throws | \ | ^m ^^m?[ 7T TOftf?! 
out the doubt-how is this ft^fqr^^jift^- 
possible, — to be in the shape of ^ ^ 

three, and yet one r this is s ^ N ^ 

our first reply. If the truth ^ <TT3cT v xj^rafofa: 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 



of the Christian Scriptures has ^f^t^TOlHrr^RT "RTTTO 
been established by the pre- ^ ^ ^ £^ ^_ 
ceding arguments, and if these ^ c 

contain statements which in- WW^TOTOm *ft rf- 
form us of a unity in trinity, ^TO^^frf^ij S^^ $fa 
then, though it be not stated ^ T f^ grejTrft ^T^TO I 
in the Scripture how this is 
to be explained, yet these 
statements must be in some 
way reconcileable. 

(2) Our second answer is j & j f^?f|^y (3TtTT ^fr 
this. If it be hard to conceive ^ -v ^ ^ 
how the One God subsists ia ^ 
Three Persons, it is as hard to ^ ^^Tf^TTWT ^TTfa- 
conceive how the One Eternal f^?fiT«T ^lftw^"3?fr ITRT- 
Spirit has produced human ^^^^^^^^^ 
thinking souls personally dis- ^ O *s ■% ^ 
tinet from Himself ;-yet tbis ^ ****** *W- 
distinct personality is proved ^^W^IWTTtJ^: I 
by the separate self-conscious- 
ness of souls severally. 

(3) Our third answer is this. I ^ I ^"fft^^tTTT ^f^ 
If the Vedantim say that it is ^^^f^ ^^.^ 
the One Sole Spirit which is * ^ ^ 

manifested in the form of all * ^ 

human souls, then what stum- ^ ^ UTT^K^igfa- 
bling-block is there in the way ^T'tTO ^ft^H"^ f%* m^ I 
of their acceptance of the doc- ^ ft ^ TWp| j ^ T ^ 
trine of the Divine Trinity? ^ c 

For if the one doctrine have ^ : ^ : ^^^ UTfr 
been accepted by them on the whw H^TW *T?5 "^ 



? r 74 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 



authority of the Fk&z, then they ^j"^ 1$ Jp5Tf^JrT<3TT^T- 
ought to be prepared to accept qw ^ sft §. ^-f^. 
the other doctrine, since it has 
been already proved that the '"*«*U 
Christian Scripture, and not 
the Veda, is the true autho- 
rity. 

(4) Further, it is not ne- 1 8 I f^^^iNrrrr^ 
cessary to hold that whatever ^^^^^^^^ 
transcends our comprehension ~ _ J 
involves a contradiction. The ^ ^^T^W 
prophetic description of Christ, ^ f^nSt ^fT^ Sfa *?- 
as a sufferer and yet trium- ^"rT^f T^TT^JT *ff^5l<Ff%- 
phant, as the humblest and yet _*_ „^rv -s 

the highest, etc., was matter ^ 

of mystery until explained by ^ T WfTT ?! T^ T Wie- 
the events of His life. ^t?T s I 

(5) Now, in order to set , ^ , ^ j^qb^ ^ WT - 
aside the doubt that a mystery ^ ^ ^ ^ 
is neither matter of proof nor ^ 

of disproof, but that one must <***f ^farT \fH W%\ fa- 
just remain silent in regard to ^TSPff W^TW^TlT^If- 
it— intending to suggest that ^^^{^^ ^^ 
proof and disproof cannot both -. ~ ^ J _ 

be inapplicable, because of the ^>*^f%* «**?! 
rule [known as that of "Ex- ftt^f^^^ I 
eluded Middle"], that there 
can be no alternative besides 
being and not being, — we pro- 
pound that rule as an apho- 
rism. 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 75 



APHOEISM II. 

of T Exotoded An assertion must j^^rf nT querent 3T 

— either be true, or else ^^ ^pw. 

its contradictory ; there is no 

other way, because there is no ^WTOVTUTO^JI ^ II 

way besides being and not 

being. 1 

(1) To illustrate : — [as Sir 
William Hamilton remarks, at 
p. 529 of his Discussions, "We 
find that there are contradic- 
tory opposites, one of which, 
by the rule of Excluded 
Middle, must be true, but 
neither of which can by us 
be positively thought as pos- 
sible." For example, as he 

observes at p. 581], Time can- I \ I rTOTf% I 3?T*RTRc[ 
not be conceived by the mind ^.^^^^ ^-^.-^ 
either on the one hand as -s ^ . 

absolutely commencing or 

absolutely terminating, or, on WSWTfa 3fT*n" S^cPC^- 
the other, as without begin- thrS^TO^TrT lrT^TRTf*TT- 
ning or end. Yet time must ^ T ^ft $ft ^ T ^, T ft. 
be either of the one nature or ^ ^*r- 

the other [-though neither ^Wr«wWi» 
alternative can be positively faWTTf^3W«p*T*TT- 

1 Stated by Mr. Thomson (Laws of Thought, p. 280), thus : — « Either a given 
judgment must be true, or its contradictory ; there is no middle course." 

8 



76 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 



thought, our couception of ^R^J^Tt^f^TTT- 
time as without beginning and ^^ ^^ | ^ ^^ 
end being not positive but , -s -s * 

negative, whilst a conception tTOft*^TOTO*rr- 
of it as absolutely beginning *rT*rof}^T"JT^% ^f tITT 
or ending cannot be formed at ^f m^T^T W^T^mfrf 

all]. So again Fas Sir William „*. ,^,-tv^..,, $ 

addsj, time present, when we ^ 

meditate on it, ceases to pre- ^^ *^* T ^W^HJ- 
sent an object for meditation, vsm $fq ITcIT^^^^T^W ^- 
as if vanishing into nonentity, ^ T?m -ft s ^^ ^ 
since we discern in it no posi- ^ ^ ^ ^ 

tive character whatever, 01 

length, quantity, protension, ^K^Rt ?ttrT*?Y 3tI*TT- 
etc. And for this reason, in •TTOTW ^efnT^W 3?<3T^T«T- 
Bk. II. of the Nyaya, Section ^f^-ft ^^.-^^ 
VI., " On the sifting of time * J _ ^ 

present," haying stated, as the ™™ ™*T**TWfaTO 
prima facie view, the unrea- ^"RWR^JrTT^fT "^TOTIU^ 
sonableness, as aforesaid, of $fq «j W^T*fT^f^^T^wf%- 
time present, and then decid- ^ ^ ^^ VTTW 
ing that although the nature * ^ 

of time present be inconceiv- W^pmreTVW^ W*I- 
able by the mind, yet time fa W^TW^T^^^TTT- 
present is inferrible from per- ^T^Tf^rfcT I 
ception [of the objective or 
subjective], inasmuch as with- 
out that [time present, in 
which, and not elsewhere, any 
perception has place], percep- 
tion would be impossible, 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 77 

Gautama has well declared in 
his aphorism [42 of Bk. II.], 
that "were there no present, 
there would be no cognition 
of anything, because percep- 
tion [together with inference, 
and all else that is based on 
perception], would be impos- 
sible.' ' And thus, although 
as regards time present, it be 
impossible to conceive it either 
as being or not being, yet this 
does not establish anything 
distinct alike from what is 
and what is not; but, what 
is proved by an effect, is 
just the existence of the cause, 
since, besides a thing's either 
being or not being, there can 
be no other alternative, [and 
it is not the non-existence of a 
cause that is deducible from 
an effect]. 

(2) Now, intimating that , ^ , ^ T ^ j^^ la- 
this rule does not help us to r * <^_-v *- ^ 
explain a mystery, we declare , " TW,W SfafWC 
as follows :— T^ ^TO^Wft I 



78 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 



APHOKISM III. 

pS^S B y explaining T ^-^^^ ^ 

no mystery, things which we ac- , ~ * -s 

knowledge to be mysteries, 

we should contradict our ac- M ^ M 

knowledgment of their being 

mysteries. 

(1) For instance, such illus- I \ I ?T^Tf% I UTT^T" 
trations, adduced in explana- ^^^-^^ ^^j^ 
tion of the mysterious doctrine ^ ^ -n 

of the Divine Trinity, as that of # 

the triangle consisting of three ^jf^^rTO^frfwhr- 
lines mutually combined, or of ^?T ^^3?teicfWrec|HNf|- 
Chaitra Maitra and Yishim- ^^^^j-^^.. 
datta, rendered of one mind "V ^ 

by friendship, are to be "^ ^™ : ^^ 
eschewed by acute reasoners, ^TT^^fT: I fTTf*TTK"rRJ 
because the momentary light ^T^^f^T^f^^^ ^" 
thrown thereby on such doc- /^-_- TT „__- _ 
trines is immediately swal- ^ ^ e _J 

lowed up in tbe glaring spuri- ^* W TTOftm*- 
ousness of such illustration, ^TnfWwtVSPT^W^'gT " 
resulting from its utter in- ^TW^^T sra^fawraj 
applicability to the case of 
what is sought to be illus- 
trated. 

(2) Now, in order to de- ^ 

scribe the peculiarities set ' '^ ^T*HTt^- 
forth in the Christian Scrip- *tT*tf?rf%i?tag^W*?^t- 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 79 

ture as pertaining to the ^J^TJTJ^ ?fw?T T*T f^^TT 
Second Person in the Divine _t ___. _^. . 
Trinity, we state as follows : — ^ 



APHOEISM IV. 
Mystery of The Word was * TF^Y *fM *T>m II 8 II 

the Incarna- 

tion - made flesh. 

(1) " Was made flesh," that I \ | TfW sp^fcT I f^- 
is to say, the Lord became in- ^ : q^^T37ft^TaTW: | 
carnate as the Son. * 

(2) Here the dissentient I ^ I ^ fluf^^T!" WT" 
Hindu is to be admonished rTcpff^r; ^„^3_£j„£y_ 
with arguments similar to the ^ *. ^ c^ 
arguments stated when esta- nc ° 
blishing the Divine Trinity; fwhrffa: ^TO^TTifr 
for he, acknowledging many ^TT^rrTTT^WW^rT^I^ 
incarnations of the Lord, ^WWr ^f ^Tf^rr- 
can find no absurdity in ac- -s 
knowledgmg the incarnation s ° ^ 

of Christ; but the only ques- ^" ^TW^^T^T- 
tion open to him is, which W^<TTT* ^t^^^I ^frT 
Scriptures are they by force ^^ ^ ^j^. , ^ 
of the authority of which the ^ 

incarnation of the Lord is to ^^^W" 
be acknowledged? And to f^ftTTm^^^JTct- 
the question how an incarna- Iff^Jf^ TTTTtPC cTTtTT% 
tion could take place? the ^ ^nft^ **,*fq 
counter- question — ho ware our 
souls linked to our bodies ? *TOT*T*TfT N I 
— is a sufficient reply; — for, 



80 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

although we are ignorant of 
that, this in no way invali- 
dates the fact in question. 

(3) Now, to consider the | $ | ^ij^TCrfTT^^ft"" 
purpose of the Incarnation, ^ f^ TT foj ^raft I 
we declare as follows . — 



ft S^fTrfTT *P^W II. UJI 






APHOEISM V. 

the^AtonemeSt. The Lord became ^ffqTrT^m^tf%TTTira- 
incarnate as the Son, to make 
atonement for the sins of men. 

(1) If it be asked, how | ^ \ ^5Rj cjrej^cf ^TlN 
could atonement be made 
through the acting thus ? we 
reply : Everywhere, even in the 
Veda, etc., it is seen to be the ^W^rT t!*T <TT^ ^TT" 
natural conviction of mankind f^^fq ^4^ *W5TRf *ff?f: 
that sin requires atonement. ^—^f^^ ^-^,^ , li,; „,. 
If it be agreed that this uni- e ^ 
versal tendency of man's mind 3*Ttf%*t *W*t H^FrT* - 
is a just one, then the question f^fTT^tf^ ^?f^ ^tf^^frT 
remains, what kind of sacrifice ^f^ trrtjf^fCTT^ <fftfTfr 
is to be offered to the Deity ^ <> ^ c rk __ * ^ 

* ,, l ^ • at *f%WTOT **TO*§ta Tfa 

for the removal of sm r JN ow, 

whatever offering we can pre- f^T^fsrsffi I rf^ ^rT s 
sent, in the shape of goats or f%i?fq WTTOTWf^JTO- 
bulls or the like, all this ^^ ^ ^^^ 
already belongs to God, and ^ •« *** -\ 

is only lent by Him to us for v <^ ^ 

a few years; and thus these WW ^ srfimsWT^- 



HINDtT PHILOSOPHY. 81 

offerings can haveno efficiency ^^-j TRTwfWfte?? 

except through God's favour : ^-s -__ ^ 

and so we are informed, m the 

*\ _____ 

Law, what sacrifices God gave ^* *RR^TOTTfTJ rf^JT^ 

the Israelites to understand r\ TRjil ^*f ^TIU c^f*f ^"^Crf^f- 

would obtain His favour. A ^ ^ ^^ft ^ 

sacrifice, effectual in itself for t ^ ^ 

the removal of sin, can there- W^IWWni I ^W" 

fore be provided by God alone; f?#*3 WifirYW|3[*rt W- 

and such a sacrifice, we learn f%^Tff *pfRfN "313^ ^ 

from Scripture, was provided ^-^^^^ 

through the Incarnation. How c ^ 

God is satisfied eyen with such ^^T^T^ I *PTOt- 

a sacrifice is a mystery, and ^TOTf^VTTfq ^f%RT 3<^T 

consequently not to be ex- ^p-^ -. ---gf^ --.. 

plained; since an explanation ^^-^ f _^ ^ 

would involve selt-stultrhca- ^ 

tion [on the part of him who ^TTOTTTcTJ ^3*T ?5 mY" 

should offer explanation of ^^T^f^TT^^'CR^r^t^'T'Or 

what, in calling it a mystery, -^ T ^-^-- : ( 

he declares to be inexplicable]. 

But what behoves us is merely 

to appropriate to ourselves the 

benefits arising from such an 

atonement. 

(2) If it be said that the 
benefit of an atonement thus | ^ | «f^fw ^rr^TfT^f^J- 
prepared by God for the re- 
moval of the sins of mankind 
must be common to all men. 



•StPS W^cTT WTO I?re- 



since there is no distinction, TW ^n^fainnf^fa ^ 



82 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

we reply: Not so, because tR^-rqrfY ^TCT ^75- 
Faith is the means of appro- __. . 
priating the benefit. 

(3) But then, it may be , ^ , ^ f%f^^T 3T£T 
said, according to the text, -s 

that « Faith without works is ' W ^^ * 
dead," good works must be ^WtTT W^CW^TT 
co-operative in the production fifi^jT ^^"^TpC^T oTOT^F 
of the benefit through faith; ^ ^ ^f^f^ 
and so how can faith alone be ^ ^ 

the determining cause of the ^ ■ ^ T ^ 
benefit ? We reply : Faith *nTTT?V ^TT ^TgT %?$: 
alone is the means of appro- vW"^^«tT ^^T^TT ^^T- 
priating the benefit of the ^^ _% ^p^. 
atonement; but good works ^ * 

are an invariable effect of ,Rrw ' ?nr * W^PF* 
faith, and are evidence of their ^f%Rjre$ ^Yw«?n ?f- 
own cause. In whatever per- %sj g^jf^ 'ST^T "it- 
son these [good works] are not ^ ^ ^ w ^. 
found, there is in him no real * 
faith, but only a semblance of W" ^ T: ^^ T *5^ T 
faith. And thus there is no TW^J faf^TOT ^T^T *2^- 
conflict between the two de- ^^ ^^-p^p^f {^^ 
clarations [of St. Paul and of 
St. James] that men are justi- 
fied by faith, and that faith 
without works is dead. 
■ (4) Now, it may be asked, m ^ „„. ^^j- 

how can man, without free- . ^ t ^ t ^ 

will, be amenable to question *t W*T*WHWtrtfwr 
as to transgression of duty, ^Tfa3»TTTfa3W%(3'J? : 3rr - 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 83 

whether in the matter of faith ^: cjf^j ^^T^TI 3TR;WT- 
or works? And how can ^ ^^g ^icTO H- 
freedom of the will, in the ^c^, _ ^ * 

shape of non-dependence on a x N 

previous cause, consist with W1N^qR^i«fl«f «f Rv 
the doctrine already laid down ;gj^ \ ^T rT^TCpl iff^n" «RT- 
fin the commentary on Aph. j^^.——^-™^-^™ _. 
V. oi Bk. 11. J, ot the impos- * *\ -\ 

sibility of conceiving an un- ^ ^T^TW^ *3T?T^rT- 
caused origination ? For, on f^fa ^^t f%TfefJ W^** ' 
the alternative of freedom, the f^ j 
will must be in the shape of a 
cause which is not an effect 
[and this, according to your 
doctrine, is inconceivable] ; 
and if it be an effect, then 
there is an end of its [inde- 
pendence or] freedom. To re- 
move this doubt, we reply 
[following Sir ¥m, Hamilton 
at p. 597 of his Discourses]. 



APHOBISM VI. 

The freedom How freedom of 

of the will. *\ o. . 

the will is possible ^W^IT Wim^T ^T" 
in man or God, it is impos- ip^^ipqf 3\^j *fT?rf^r cfT- 

sible speculatively to under- 
stand ; but, practically, the 
fact that our will is free is 



^ITTrr^T^TT^ ^re- 
established by the conscious- ^@PTT ^Tfa^TTtfaifTO^- 



84 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

ness of [our moral account- ^^^^.^^ _ 
ability, or] our deserving to ^ ^ ^ 

be asked the reason of our ^ ^ 

violation of duty. 

(1) In accordance with the , m , _^ ^ ^. ,rv 

indication already given [un- ° 

der Aph. II. of this Bk. IV.], **^fa ufirtTf^rf^lTT 
that things which are incon- ^TrT^sFfif rfT^^t Sf^3TT- 
ceivable, may yet be possible, ^ ^^^^j ^^-j 
there is not, on the theory of ^ . -s 

freedom, an assumption oi 

more things inconceivable than ^^^^f^l ^ f%rf 
those the assumption of which ^CTfv^nTTf^^^^T - 
is necessary on the alternative ^ Tf ^ ww ^ mn:: 
theory of necessity. Such be- ^ 

ing the case, the consciousness ^W3^T^T imfcT I 
of our moral accountability *R 3?f%cMjf^rT ^T^ I 
falls into [and turns] the scale TjTT^^^T^^^ihj 1 ? - 
[in favour] of the theory of ^ ^ ^^_ 
freedom. On this point a cer- ^ ° 

tain sage [Sir Wm. Hamilton, ^ t: ^TOW ilTTOWT: I 
at p. 597 of his Discussions], rT^Tf% I f%WTW3TT^f- 
says, More things inconceiv- -qf^^-jp^^-j ^^ 
able are not necessitated on -s rv * «s 

the scheme of freedom than * ^ 

on the scheme of necessity. ^^f%:^TfTW3TffaT- 
To explain. The scheme of ^^f HTXfTT^njij sfa^ 7$- 
fatalism is pressed on our ac- ^^^^-^^^ 
ceptance by the dread of the -* ^ -r- 

inconceivability of a pheno- 5 * 

menon's originating without a ^nT^^^fNnT^T^ I 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 85 



€ause, 



and it is just such ?|V%ifV '^Td^MTTfT^^- 
origination that is the basis of ^ j^ jn^fig cIT- 
the acceptance of the doctrine ^ 

of liberty; while on the scheme "* ^^ ^^ ^W" 
of fatality also there is an W% T& ^T^HT *TVtaT*T s 
exactly equal inconceivability t^j^ f%^ T ^TfwTTTf?*- 
of a beginnings series of ^fl^^ft^,,^ 
causes and effects, which [as- 

sumed] beginningless series is ^W^JWrn I ^T^T F£ 
the basis of the acceptance of ^t?Tt ^Ttv^TTTfrf^^R^- 
the doctrine of fatality. And ^^^f^^.^. 
these two schemes, of liberty * -s ^ ^ 

and necessity, are thus deter- 
mined to be theoretically 
balanced ; but, practically, the 
doctrine of freedom is the most 
correct, because, without free- 
dom, the consciousness of 
moral accountability could not 
be justified. If men are ac- 
countable for transgression of 
duty, it is quite clear that they 
must be free to perform their 
duty. 

[The words of Sir Win, Hamilton, rendered in our 
Sanskrit version as above, are as follows : — " The scheme 
of freedom is not more inconceivable than the scheme of 
necessity. For while fatalism is a recoil from the more 
obtrusive inconceivability of an absolute commencement, 
on the fact of which commencement the doctrine of 
liberty proceeds; the fatalist is shown to overlook the 



86 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

equal, but less obtrusive, inconceivability of an infinite 
non-commencement, on the assertion of which non-com- 
mencement his own doctrine of necessity must ultimately 
rest. As equally unthinkable, the two counter, the two 
one-sided, schemes are thus theoretically balanced. But, 
practically, our consciousness of the moral law, which, 
without a moral liberty in man, would be a mendacious 
imperative, gives a decisive preponderance to the doctrine 
of freedom over the doctrine of fate. We are free in act 
if we are accountable for our actions."] 

(2) But whence is the exist- | ^ \ ^ ^gTrft sf%T*T 5T- 
ence, permitted by God, in ^ ^^-^ * ^ 
this world, of suffering which , Z 3 

causes all this perplexity, and ^*™^< S«pm^rTgT- 
why are we involved in this WVi rUT ^:?ir37|*W^ 
suffering ? We state in an w^rT^iff ^JWT *TOT*rR: - 
aphorism the Christian avoid- ft ^ ^^ ^ 
ance of this question, as pre- # , s 

ferable to the Hindu attempt *WW ^^T^Wnf vfK- 
to get rid of it by the theory ^lX ^"^fa I 
of Transmigration. 

APHOKISM YII. 

J$ffi& The Permitted ex " ^^T^fcfW^* 

SSmvS istence of evil, since, ^ c 

as we hold, it is a ^ 

mystery, is inexplicable. The ^TTT^TT VITf^^faTTW 
attempt of the Hindus to stave VTTT^^^^T^T^TWT^xr - 
off the said inexplicability, by j^^^. ^ ^^ft f^_ 
the assumption of the infinite _ c 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 87 

non-commencement of the 
series of births, is in no way 
adequate to the explaining of 
the case. 

(1) "By the assumption of . _ , 7Jtnrn i l ^ „_„. 
the infinite non-commence- s-s 

ment of the series of births," f^^T^fa I ^f^ ?TT- 
etc. [~To borrow the reason- ^cf ^^TT^TW^TT^^'RT- 
ing of Paley, Nat Theol chap. q ^. ^n^Jf^f^r^hrir- 
ii., in reference to another «n ^ ^ ^^#- 

case, in support of which the *• ^ 

same futile attempt at expla- **^fa I * HW ^wnpTC - 
nation is made.] If, by going ^TT^Tf"^ "Q^ "^^ W^- 
further and further back, there ^ ^ ^.^^.^^ 
were diminution of the unac- ~ r -s *v 

countableness, then, by going TWrfw^rTTO *W- 
back indefinitely, even the WT^fa^TOTfifrfcrfir rf- 
surcease of the unaccounta- %3^tjijT^TpjTT3n?tT - 
bleness were possible. This __ ^——-.^i^ ^-,o,_ 
method of accounting is ap- ^ 

plicable only in such a case ™ : ^^ ! *^<5 ^f" 
as that where, accordingly ^f^^^t^T^TITT fpPhT- 
as we suppose the number to qTT ^ T ^ T ^^{^ T f v . 
be greater and greater [of the ^ ^ 

terms, here] of the things to s 

be explained [viz., the cases ^^ ^ftf^^Tqfrf^^- 
of evil] and the explainers t^T^JT?!ifT^?ff ^T^W^^ - 
[e.g., the repeated births], ft ^ft^TO I ?TOTf% 
there is continually an ap- ~ ^ 

proach towards a limit. There, *** qftf^UTW - 
by supposing the number of ^^ffefTT 3?^^rT TTWT'J 



88 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

terms to be infinite, the at- ^^ ^jft fTtfapjf^f^^- 
tainment of the limit is con- ,^WCT^ftmft I TJ- 
ceivable. But where there 

is no tendency to approach a *TOirWT*qftf*^ 
limit, nothing is effected by fa^*U ^H^fT^T <pr- 
supposing the number of terms ^fffT^TTT^ "STcR^Tf^- 
to be greater and greater. frre ^ ^ ^^ TT - 
And this applies alike to r 

one series or another, though ^^^T^TTT^W - 
they should differ in properties ^Trf^ I *q7PI ^Nfirqf^- 
other than the one in ques- f^^WT^TTUffWfi^T^ - 
tion, such as being finite or ___ r t^ , _ — «« . 

infinite, etc. To explain,— 
as a chain consisting of a finite 
number of links cannot sup- 
port itself, so exactly is it with 
one consisting of an infinite 
number of links. And of this 
we are assured (though it has 
never been tried, since that 
would be impossible), because 
there is absolutely no approach 
towards the limit of self-sup- 
port, though we suppose the 
number of links, beginning 
with ten, to be a hundred, a 
thousand, and so on. And 
it is the same with all chains, 
however they may differ in 
other respects than the one 
in question [viz., incapacity 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 89 

of self-support], such as length, 
numerical difference, finite- 
ness, and so on. 

[The words of Paley are as follows: — "If the diffi- 
culty were diminished the further we went back, by 
going back indefinitely we might exhaust it. And this 
is the only case to which this sort of reasoning applies. 
Where there is a tendency, or, as we increase the num- 
ber of terms, a continual approach, towards a limit, 
there, by supposing the number of terms to be what 
is called infinite, we may conceive the limit to be 
attained ; but where there is no such limit or approach, 
nothing is effected by lengthening the series. There 
is no difference as to the point in question (whatever 
there may be as to many points) between one series 
and another ; between a series which is finite, and a 
series which is infinite. A chain composed of an in- 
finite number of links can no more support itself than 
a chain composed of a finite number of links. And 
of this we are assured (though we never can have 
tried the experiment), because, by increasing the num- 
ber of links, from ten for instance to a hundred, from 
a hundred to a thousand, etc., we make not the smallest 
approach, we observe not the smallest tendency, towards 
self-support. There is no difference in this respect (yet 
there may be a great difference in several respects) 
between a chain of a greater or less length, between 
one chain and another, between one that is finite and 
one that is infinite.' 5 ] 

(2) And thus it is impos- \ ^ | TTOT^ ^TpTTT^%- 
sible, by the theory of trans- ^ ^ ^ sf%R _,_ 



90 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

migration, to account for the TrfH 'SfTrf^rT^f %*rrf3q^ 

variety of evils encompassed ^ft^ ^RniNfreT- 
with which a man is born ^ 

into this world, or to ex- W *^ ^f^3^T- 

plain how an infant, which ^W^fft^rf^rjf^l^^^ 

never exerted free will at all, 5T^TfR;f%q|T^*T ^ ^T^- 

comes to experience suffer- r^. , _ TTTT=r ^— T „ . 

mgs. As a chain does not ^ 

become competent to support *&™ S ^ ^1"^T qr^T- 

itself through indefinite addi- ^TWT*T ^^ *T ^*{T rrtfa 

tion of links, just as incompe- srorer^T^Y ^faTWT3" 

tent is the theory of transmi- .„„ rv 

gration to account lor the ^ 
diversity of condition in the 
case of human souls. 

(3) But, it may be said, 1^1^ ^^sTO *** fir- 
such a book, professing to f^^ ^^ft ^. 
clear up doubts, can be * 

no revelation of the will of ^T^Wm*TT TOHIT- 
God, because, since there is 'TOT VFQ f^K^nra?TC[- 
no clearing up of the ques- ^q^ n^^^^, ^. 
tion how the existence of evil 
is permitted by the Deity, 
there is really no proof that 
we have here a revelation of 
God's will. To meet this 
doubt, we propound an aphor- 
ism. 






HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 91 



APHORISM VIII. 



Mystery not 
distinctive of 



If you reject ^ W Sfawf *ir«jft- 

Christianity, then ^ ^ vm ^f^ ^Jft 
you must reject the wld of ^.^^ ^^ 

sense also, since else your de- ^ 

cisions are inconsistent. TT VTrTJI "^ II 

(1) Now, that by such dif- I ^ I TO ^:W*^T«TO- 

ficulties as the Christian reli- fxf^™— „_-___/^_ 

gion is beset by, in respect ^ # .* "V 

of the permitted existence of ' *" 

evil, this world also, which *f^ TOTOTtWV S*T 

has the same author, is beset, Tro^pr $fq ^TfVcJ *3X^f^ 

— that there are not more -^^^^f^ sfif _ 

difficulties in regard to the ^ -^ 

Christian religion than there * T *3«^ : 'W * 

are in regard to the world ^•Stm ^TOrt ^M TffT- 

itself, we commence a Fifth WSfT^WTT^ II 
Book on purpose to show. 



92 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 



BOOK V. 



THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION TO THE CONSTITUTION 
AND COURSE OF NATURE. 

Now, beginning an exposi- ^rcj ^iTStr^farera^T - 
tion of the analogy of the ^. ^^.^^.^ 
Scriptural arrangement to that , 

of the mundane system of ^T^cTT HTHfapiT- 
cause and effect, we first pro- TWITO ^T^T ^TOf^m l?T- 
pound as an aphorism the ^qfi^re JTrTSTTni ^- 
quintessence of the doctrine —jfx 
of an ancient sage [Origen]. 

APHOEISM I. 

origen's state- The man who be- ^ 

^umenJ.^ **" Heveg fl^ fl^ gcrip . ^T^lT^tfT^ ^t^fa 

tures were given by the Cre- ^rtsf^T^^RfFf ^flfrnifa^ 
ator of the world, is not dis- ^ T?rT fa TWT ft w ^_ 
turbed even when he sees the ^ ^ ^ , ^ 

same sort of difficulties in the ft " ^^ ^ f?T " * ■ 
world and in the Scriptures. 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 93 

(1) " Of the same sort," | ^ | ^WTT^tffT I TJ/T^- 
etc. To the same effect ^ T f^ T ^> sfil ^ferT 
another sage [Bishop Butler] ^ ^ .^^ 

says ,_i f by such difficulti J ™fir m^fN *v 

as these it is proved impossi- ^WWRf ^T^T"^" 
ble that the Scriptures should 7f^ ^T'Sffi rTf^f rTTf*T^ 
have been given by God, then, ^jfrfafl ^ ^^. 
by the very same difficulties, ^ ^ 

it would be also proved im- IWVWfiWWWIJ 
possible that the world should rT^W^^Wf5K^7$^p- 
have been made by God. ^ : ^ TTTflpTT: i 
But the arguments for their 
being both alike the work of 
God have been already exhi- 
bited [in Books II. and III.] 

[Origen's words, as given by Butler, are these : — 
"He who believes the Scripture to have proceeded from 
Him who is the author of nature, may well expect to 
find the same sort of difficulties in it as are found in 
the constitution of nature." Hence, adds Butler, " He 
who denies the Scripture to have been from God, upon 
account of these difficulties, may, for the very same 
reason, deny the world to have been formed by Him," 
which, however, the reader, at this stage of the argu- 
ment, is supposed to have conceded.] 

(2) Although it would be \ \ \ ^^^RTf^rfrlN 
proper for us to leave off here, f^^-^f— ^ OT T *?fa- 
since, to the intelligent, not a ^* ^ 

word more requires to be said ; ^WW^ft^l^lWl^ 
yet, since all persons are not ^faf ^TTT^f *n?I3r mfe- 
thoroughly intelligent, we areTOT^fhffl^hra? - 



94 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

must endeavour to make in- ^ff% ?J«^Tfv3nf^«rh2iT- 
telligible, even to those of ^ f ^^ ^^ , ^ 
lower capacity, the foregoing t ^* 
words of those two great ^W^^T^T: «T- 
teachers. With reference, ^Tf^^T^T^WTCT^- 
then, to the question how it ^ Tj^ij^TfTsftrTFre c&^j 
is that its analogy to the con- ^^^ „. ^ 

stitution and course of nature 

proves the Scriptural scheme Y^FTOT^ITO rrTT" 
to be the work of God, we ^¥ra^-re*rT*fT^5R^ 
propound an aphorism, to in- ^^^-p^ wmT 
timate, that, analogy, in the -_firfs«_a_ , 1X1M 
shape oi likeness, produces * ^ 

only a probability of what it tW^ t^WBT irftrfnftfif 
is desired to prove, and that ^t^faft ^"^rf% I 
probability, arising from the 
contemplation of likeness, 
though it is of the nature of 
an inference, is yet an assur- 
ance lower in degree than that 
of inference proper. 



APHOEISM II. 



Analogy de- 
:ribed. 

akin to induction, is evidence 



Analogy, though *Tf TSWWR^Trffa*? - 



falling short of an induction. ^ 

(1) And, from the contem- , ^ , ^^^^ 
plating of likeness, assurance - _ "^ _ 

of the following kind arises *TTT Tlfafay^ cTOTft 
[—in other words, the form of ^ ^T W^toYsTO^T 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 95 

analogical reasoning is as fol- ^T^ffisrr ^W ^f^ *T^ft~ 
lows] : « two things resemble foftn^ ^ ftf*&: 
each other in one or more -s ^ ^ 

respects; a certain proposi- * s ^'^ ^ 
tion is true of the one, there- 
fore it is [probably] true of 
the other." 

(2) But [as Mr. Mill, in | ^ | ^*T ^rp^ ?<%- 
his Logic, vol. ii., pp. 97-8, ^^^^-^ ^^^_ 
goes on to say, "we have -v .*s 
here nothing to discriminate ^ ^ s 

analogy from induction, since ^ Tm ^C^T^TfT ^^}WT 
this type will serve for all rTT^'^^l^rf^r^Y faftp- 
reasoning from experience," ^ m ^ q^ ^ TT ^_ 
so] if it be asked, when the ^ J 3 ^ 

unperceived is established TW^lWWW I 
through perception of like- 
ness, as is required in all 
cases, in what respect is there 
any falling short of induction ? 
— we reply, that in induction 
are employed the ascertained 
invariable conjunction or non- 
conjunction of certain proper- 
ties ; but it is not so in the 
case of a conclusion from ana- 
logy [or of assurance arising 
from perception of likeness]. 

(3) But, it may be said, _ s^ 
the cause of a genuine infer- ^ ^ >* 

ence is a genuine induction ; «C^J**T*f l*cj' ^Tf"aiW ^- 



96 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

and what use is there then «!TTT«TT^'qiri£?R ^fifTO 
for analogy, which you ac- ^ ^^ TWT ^^| f^_ 
knowledge to fall short of in- # 
duction ? To remove this ^3 ^^ ! 
doubt, we propound an aphor- 
ism. 

APHOEI8M III. 

Practical value Anal02"V th0U°Tl ptj U>JTr»TZ?TqTT?"Q'g>'D"P- 

falling short of induction, is ft ^^-^^^ ^_ 

universally the guide in prac- 

tiee. **"■ 

(1) The import is this. It \<^\ *%$ ^q; | ^Tf"S^" 
is only in the case of beings ^^^^^ 
who are not omniscient that 

knowledge, in the shape of W1^T^*frgW* 
probability, and not consist- ^TT«T 5?T^cT I ^RWif n> *T 
ing of certainty, arises from fcj^fa cpg ^fiTRimM- 
the contemplation of likeness ^^ ^ ^^^^ 
[or from analogy]. For, in 

the case of one omniscient, *WTO?rf TOPTTOT f*TOT- 
nothing whatever — present, ^T^TRf fa'SJT^^R %f 
past, or future— is matter of ^f^-^ j ^JJ^-j-j. 
probability, since He knows ^ . ^ 

with absolute certainty the .. ^ 

truth of what things are true ^ ^ITT^f^fa I 
and the falsity of what things 
are false. But in the case of 
the like of us, who are not 
omniscient, it is probability 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 97 

that pre-eminently furnishes 
the motives of conduct. 

[In the words of Bishop Butler, " Probable evidence, 
in its very nature, affords but an imperfect kind of 
information ; and it is to be considered as relative only 
to beings of limited capacities. For nothing which is 
the possible object of knowledge, whether past, present, 
or future, can be probable to an infinite intelligence, 
since it cannot but be discerned absolutely as it is in 
itself, certainly true or certainly false. But to us, pro- 
bability is the very guide of life."] 

(2) Now some one who, as |^lTO3tf^pT^hrT3CT- 
if he were omniscient, does ^^^^^^ 

not acknowledge any autho- 

rity in the probability which ™^^ ^ TW " 
results from the contempla- ^T^cTTt^T^^nftwt 
tion of likeness, and who is sqii"gTraTWT«TCT^ $3^ 
accustomed [in the books of 
Hindu philosophy] to cer- 
tainty in respect of a thing's 
being, or else not being, so 
and so [ — and whose language, 
therefore, abundantly wealthy 
as it is, almost grudges us 
terms for the discussion of 
probabilities] , may doubt 
whether error must not be 
inevitable, if we follow evi- 
dence which falls short of per- 
fection. To this doubt we re- 
ply as follows. 






98 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 



APHOKISM IY. 

certaint^-o ! In the absence of ^Tff^TT^TWT^TW fTfTT 

bability not to . . , 

be despised, superior evidence, f^-g TfTITW TT1T^*TWt^ 

evidence comparatively infe- * -n^ -\ ^ -\ ^ 

rior is not to be despised, as 

a lamp in the absence of the ^^ s " ** " 

daylight. 

(1) "Not to be despised," I I I ^TT^jfamra | 
etc. For if the inferior ought ^ff^ ^J7§rg «T ^p€j?f ^;f?f 
to be rejected because the su- p^^^^ ^ ^_ 
perior is unattainable, then, ^ ^ 

since they are unable to fly *JP"ft* *WTc^T*T*- 
through the air as birds do, "^TrTJJT^T^TTTfa *ft3fT *T 
people ought not either to -^^sj: | 
walk with their feet. 

(2) Again, the attendants | ^ | %^ cjr^f^rnRT- 
ofa certain child whose mother ^^ j^. ^^ ft _ 
has died, seeing that he cannot 

survive without milk, desiring *"" J*V W* ^ ' 

to procure milk, there being ^"flpu 

at hand no cow, or she-buf- ^f^^f^Jj ^^ 

falo, or the like, become hope- rs 

less as they look around on v ^ 

stones, logs, pieces of cloth, ^fa^Tf^rT SW^rf^*- 

etc, all very unlike in charac- ^TTJTO'rft f^TTSTT: ^ - 

ter to the cow or any other ^ T ^^^.g^Jj-^-^.. 

source of milk. Suddenly f^*V ^ 

observing a female of the ^ 

Bos Gavaeus, an animal of a TOpf WlfFfiSlft ^T- 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 99 

kind they had never seen be- f^^TT ^^f ^TTf^fa ?|- 
fore, on the probability that ^ T ^^ T ^f ^ wwn|r _ 
she, resembling a cow in many ^ ^ 

respects, even though desti- ^ * 

tute of a dewlap, may per- ^T^ ^TT^^WfT^U- 
haps give milk, putting her -g^fq ^f t^T^t ^R- 
to the proof, they obtain milk ^ ^^^ , 
from her. In this instance, 
we see how analogy, though 
falling short of a perfect in- 
duction, instigated [and rightly 
too] the conduct of those per- 
sons. 

(3) But then we see that, | ^ | ^ ^fr% f^f Tffrr 
in mundane affairs, the cause ^^--^ ^^faft 
of action is will, preceded by . ^ ~ . c 

knowledge; whereas, in the ^ TOJT#* TrTTO 
Christian institute, action is W? ftvt^m I <mf% I \- 
enjoined with a view to know- ^^ ^"^raiJ ^f^SffH ^ 
ledge. To explain. We are ^ ^^ ^ ^^ 
informed in Scripture [John ^ , 

vii, 17], -If any man will "** ^ **« ^ « 
do His will, he shall know of fT^T^T^ ^T3TT«n^ *JT- 
the doctrine, whether it be of f% TTT^^WT^ **TVTrr 
God;" so here there is no r^ 

analogy between the world 
and the Scripture. To meet 
this objection, we propound 
an aphorism. 

Ufa. 



100 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 



APHOEISM V. 

Belief may Belief in the doc- "*fI£*J*TO^P? ^ST rim- 

be the reward s3 x * 

u, * fa ' t™es of Christi- ^^ f ^ ^f^. 

anity is indispensable ; but «s 

this may grow from doing the 

will of God, and experiencing ^^^ *T ^V?T II ^ II 

the benefit of so doing. 

(1) " May grow," etc. A \\\ ^rJ T^T I ^f%^T- 
sick man, though doubting ^f^^ T ^ T {^^_ 
the skill of the physician who <- ^ r^ -*. r* 
attends him, yet, by obeying 

his directions and by experi- ^T^T^f fTrfTO^T^- 
encing the benefit of such tfi^rTTH^"^ fTf^ff^ 1% 
obedience, may come to place ^^ j^ ^^ ^^ 
confidence in the physician. 
So is it in the case before us : 
such is the import. 

(2) Moreover, whatever | ^ | ^rftr^ ^H"f% JfgV- 
proofs, establishing the truth ^^ Tm ^ TWT f- ^ 
of the Christian Scriptures, _ ^ ^^ ^ _ 
have been set forth in Book * T ^ «** *™ & 
II., so long as a man does not ^facTTpr H^Tilft ^TW^} 
also act upon these in accord- "q^: Tf""g*J3TO««n'«reTfx; 
ance with the Christian Scrip- * ^^ft ^^^ f 
tures, so long will they fail c 

to confirm belief in him. Y*W* T TO^TW I 

[As Mr. Fitzgerald remarks, at p. 6 of his edition 
of Butler's Analogy, " I am not sure that any one 
could be a fair judge of the sufficiency of the evidence 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 101 

to determine belief, until he had allowed it to deter- 
mine behaviour."] 

(3) But, it may be objected, , ^ , ^^^-^^ 
we are told that belief results . * «\ 

from doing the will of God; ^ ^* 

but doing the will of God just ¥T^W¥ *r^TO* I t" 
consists in believing, — for we ^^ft?T ^f^^ ^< & T3^TI?~ 
are told in Scripture [John ^ ^-^. WW^? *' 
vi., 29], " This is the work of 

God, that ye believe on him ^ T ^ T ^ T ^ W * T ~ 
whom he hath sent,"— and W^ f^TT^T^ T^ WT 
the sense of the proposition fi^f%ff "^"^^ff^f I 
that " belief in Christ results 
from belief in Christ" is nu- 
gatory. With a view to re- 
moving this difficulty we pro- 
pound an aphorism. 



APHOEISM YI. 

r^fleS Eelief ma y be of ^^T ^TT **^1?T fr: 

of assurance. twQ kinds? attended 



*^*T^fit ii 4 



by doubts, or entirely cleared 
from doubts. 

(1) To explain,— The ex- \ \\ <nRlTf% Tf ¥ ^^T- 
pression employed, in address- ^ .5^ ^ -^ ^§ ^_ 
ing Christ [Mark ix. 24], ' JLffft 

"Lord, I believe, help thou ^ **™*J f^ffW?? 
mine unbelief," met with no ^** *§&** ** f^T^KT 
rebuke from Christ. The im- *T^faT ^TgT f^fTT T *R- 
port of the expression was ft ^ ^^fa^j ft... 



102 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

this, — "My faith is not steady: ^^^f^^T^T^HJ^ffrT 
— help thou this weak be- „-_<|. . 
liever by the bestowal of un- 
doubting faith." 

(2) And so the matter as- |^| frar^TO f^RUT^h I 
certained is this: 1st, It is ^^^ ^^^^ 
fitting that, by reason of the , ^ 

external evidences, we should ^ T m * TO *P5gfW!W- 
aclmowledge the truth of the i^T|[rT^ft%^fa fw# 
Scriptures, as it is said in ^f^f^ ^ T f% ^f^Tfa *- 
Scripture [John xiv, 11], « or _, ft ^ ^.^^ ^ 
else believe me tor the very * ^ 
work's sake;" and again fa^fr^ ^TO^Stf^ 
[John v., 36], " the works whRRR*IT«TJ ^fa^^TO- 
which the father hath given <^j7g^ T ^ T ^^ifa 
me to finish, the same works ^ * 

that I do, bear witness of me, 

that the Father hath sent me." ^^ ^^ W* ***T 
2nd, It is fitting that the ft^f^T^ft TnStsnTO^rTif- 
faith thus originated, though ^^^^^^^ 
still encumbered by doubts, -s ^ _ ^ 

should be ingenuously carried ^ , 

out into action, as a child in ^^^^^^^TT^- 
many cases acts according to ^fifa^nR f*T^fT*JT I ^^T- 
his father's directions, trust- ^ ^.^.^^ ^. 
ingly, though not knowing * ^ _ -. 
the motives which his father *"<***** TO *W- 
has in view. And further, 3rd, WW I 
It is fitting that thoroughly 
defecated faith, amounting to 
knowledge, should be the re- 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 103 

ward of that faith which sprang 
up uncavillingly even while 
there existed causes of doubt. 

(3) Well, grant that all this I ^ I ^ M^ffJ ^fa^C 
is as you have said,— now it is ^^^ ^^ -^ -gTffiTT^r 
alleged in Scripture that God ~ ^_ -v c 

governs both this world and 

the other world according to fWT^VlTTOT^PraT^ 
a fixed scheme. What, then, 3f^"ffter# rf"^ ?TTf ^t«T^" 
are the facts in that scheme? ^-^-^ f^p^-. ^^_ 
[or, in the words of Butler, . ^ ^ , 

« What things are implied in ^™W J '"^^ V**" 
the divine government of both Tn I 
worlds, according to the Chris- 
tian doctrine?"] To meet 
this inquiry, we propound an 
aphorism. 



APHOKISM VII. 

what the The divine govern- "*f¥V*fTWTOTfTWT 

divine govern- ° ^ 

widslpnet ment of both worlds ^ftcff^cgcp^reT *PH T^ 

according to . , . , . 

SSufiT" lm P lle *> aecerdmg ft ^ ( ^^ 

to the Christian doc- 
trine, these propositions, viz., ^^FPrNffaii Ptafl- 
lst, All souls are appointed ftw^t I ^^ *J<C*SiYtR: 

to exist endlessly ; 2nd, It is f^Tr^T^^T^fTTf^^^f^- 
^Pointedth-t everyone, after ft ^ ( ^ f 

death, shall be either rewarded c 

or punished; 3rd, The abiding ft*NT*lt qft^T^ ^^T" 
of souls in this world is for ^TW^flT^T^NrRftf^r TZ- 



104 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

the purpose of trial, and of ?ffa: I ^m ^T^cR^T -qy-q^f- 
discipline for the next world; ^ ^^.^ _,^^ f 
4th, Since this world, through "* e 

wickedness, tends to ruin, and * n ^"^W w " 
since men's knowledge both of ^WRTT^'f^T^p^TT^fSir- 
their own condition and of nqqTO^^fTftaT^T "^tR- 
duty has become corrupted, ftft -^. , ^f^J 
occasion was thns given for ^ ^ ^ 

God'scontrivinganewremedy; f^J^W WS* Wrrft- 
5th, The truth of this reme- ^^faifa^W rfTY^"- 
dial dispensation, which con- q T ^ irnnf^nSTO??!^- 
sists of a special scheme car- r ^ ^ - ^ 
ried on by a divine person, ^ 

the Messiah, for the benefit of ^^T^T *T ^T^ufa 
the world, is proved by mira- ^Tftcft «T ?T ^TRJ ¥7$fcl 
cles; 6th, And that means of -^-^-^ ^^ ^^ 
salvation is not revealed to 

all, nor proved with the strong- ^^^P*™^ " 
est possible evidence [with evi- ^^ JW^'R fTTWn ftf- 
dence not less strong than the "^^^^^FTf^^^^Crl 3T»[- 
strongest good evidence] to aU _, ^ft^ ^ ^^ 
those to whom it is revealed ; ^^ 

but it is revealed only to such ^^TOPTOTWftlW " 
a part of mankind as God has ^^TTfafT tTtj re: ||^ || 
chosen, and with such parti- 
cular evidence as God has 
chosen. 

(1) "To exist endlessly , ^ , ^^-^^-^ 
after death," etc. The import ~ ^ ^ 
is this. It is unnecessary ^ 

here to set forth proofs that ^ofTT^fa^ TOT^r- 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 105 

such [endless existence] is TT^fta"Rt TfTlfch^ih^nTT- 
really the condition [of soul], mgqjfa ^^^^^ 
and that this state will be in ^ ^ 

accordance with each soul's **™**: *TOPnt*«IT 
deserts, since our dispute is *TO f^T^5TJr^JrT^TfT v I 
not at present with him who ^TT^^^^T^TTTflltT^rTTT- 
denies the soul to be other „ T1WI .. S „„,,_ T ^, „^ *^. 
than the body ; but we have ^ d 

entered on an argument with ^W^T*rr^TrT N l W^rT" 
those only who accept as au- ^ff^JTT^^TfT^f: Vft- 
thoritative the Hindu Spiritual ^^y^-^ ^ ^ftf^^ w . 
Institutes. But we do not, c$_ 

on the strength of the Hindu 

Institutes, accept the theory W^Tf3f^faiTTTc!J ^:- 
of transmigration, because we ^§^T3W3ff%T3f <^T^I?*?^Tr! 
do not allow that the Hindu -^g-^ q7f: ^^ {%. 
Institutes have any authority ~ ^ 
as proof. And it must not % 

be said, moreover, that, since ^^^ft^^WtW^T- 
the existence of evil cannot JJT^^I TJ3 "Pr^fsTrr^TfT I 
be without some cause, trans- ^^^^^^ 
migration is established as its ^ ^ .. 

cause, because we have already ^ ^ ^ 

shown that even by the sup- fu%RTJ ^r^TTW^I'fTTf- 
position thereof, the existence ^^fft^WTf^WT^Prrct^sr- 
of evil cannot be accounted for. ^-cj. w ~^ __ 
In the Christian Scripture, the * N 

truth of which has been esta- 
blished by the arguments set 
forth [in Book II.], it is de- 
clared that the endless condi- 



106 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

tion after death is, in the case 
of some, a condition of endless 
happiness, and, in the case of 
some, a condition of endless 
misery. 

(2) " State of trial and dis- I ^ I ^ft^Tf^^T^fa I 
cipline," etc. The special ^ ^^^^^ 
means of salvation which have t*> 
been enjoined by God, consti- * 

tnte one trial for the proud frt^fhlf^Tft <TTf% 

and rebellious heart of man. *rffaT^pTrf% rtf^^T^ ^- 

The particulars of this have 3^ ^{^-^.^ ^ 

been set forth in the section ~ t -. ^ ^ 

on the Atonement [Book III., ^ * 

Aph. V.] For man, by rea- *CTrT s WRT^ysraTW- 

son of pride, would fain ob- ^JT^tHT^N ff^^^Tf^- 

tain salvation, not through ^-^-^ ^^ 

what is done by another, but c ^ _ _ 

by works of his own, such as ^ ^fa^fr "* * 

perseverance in austerities, TWT*u^ I 

however wearisome, — by 

something other than the 

imputation to himself of the 

merits of Christ's death. 

(3) " The ruin of this world I ^ I ^J ^fr^T^ ^R- 
through wickedness," etc. The 7^ ^^^f*TWTf^ I 
doctrine of the Hindu Insti- ,-_j*__ w ____-, _ 
tutes is, that ignorance is the ^ J ^^ 
cause of the unhappy state of TW*f^ft*TW^m 
the present life. But this ^lf%^T*r[: ^cj ff^FT^TT- 
doctrine is unproved, for we w | ^^^^^f^-^ 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 107 

do not admit that those in- 3TTTTTf%^ TJ^ f^r^T^T 
stitutes are any proof. Nay, w ^ ^^ ^^ ^ 
the further a man advances in ~ _ , ■ # 

vice, the less censeious ef Ms * T ™* ^ T ™&™ 
sinfulness does he become; and •^W^ffl^m rT^TT"^ ^T«T- 
so, from forgetfulness of his ^f^nn^T^ ^^:*§T^ 
danger, he dreads not the pain ^r^, , ..„._.* „ mr „ 
of retribution [ — thus owing . ^ 

to ignorance his freedom from ^ T ^ ^ T1 *^t -^cT: 
mental distress]. On the other TOffT rRIT c^T ^ffa^r 
hand, the more truly a man ^f^ ^ ^^^ ^t^W *»- 
discerns his own condition, the *^_ _„„rv_,„rv -± 
more is he distressed by the 

view of his own sinfulness, and *^ ?TT ^ ^TT^f%fft *T- 
he remains in dread so long as ?f?T \ 
he has not found any means of 
deliverance from his sins. 

(4) [If it be asked, " Whence \ % \ q^m ^^ ?J 



^:^sn3%?pr^ ^sh^ffi 



is sin ?" we reply that] we 

have already acknowledged, in 

the chapter on the Mysteries, ^WITCHC^ ^^ fafa- 

that the source of the existence *TOJ 

of sin, like the cause of the 

existence of evil, we cannot 

tell. 

(5) "Not revealed to all < *J *3wraTT N Trf?T T 
men," etc. But it may be ^Tfq?rf?rfr[ I ^T^T WTe[%- 
said— Since all men are under ^^ -.^ ^ ^c^. 
apprehension of terrible and . ^ ^ 

eternal misery, the means of *T *IT5f%TOT^ *TT*- 
escape from such misery ought ^*^*TT^«ITtnra: ^T*T^ 

10 



108 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

to be told to all ; — and so, why irf^f mn^m TraT^TW ^" 
has it not been told to all? We ^^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
reply, that we have not here un- * ^ ^ ^ ^ 
dertaken to remove all the ob- W * ™ ^V* 7 * *^ ^In- 
jections that have been raised or u^rei m w^fe- 
that maybe raised either against T^rfs^^ < ^ T^TT ^ftiiT" 

the course of nature or against f^™—-^^^,*,.^,- 4. 

the will 01 Uod as revealed in n. • *s 

the Christian Scripture; but ^ *T*P5t *TTW W * *- 
[what we have undertaken is] ItTT: ^fft sft ?$ ^f^t^4" 
toexplainthattheworld, though ^j^r^xf% ^^rrf% «j ^- 
established by the evidence of _^-_ *vr ._ -^. 5 §£ 
the senses, might be disbelieved 

on the ground of the very same ^ : JraT^finflft ^T*l 
objections, on the strength of «r ^T^T wf^"f?f ^W rf^jT- 
which you say that the mys- ^ j^^^^^^. 
teries announced in the Chris- ^ * ^ ^ 

tian Scriptures ought not to be ^ TTO ^ ***** *" 
believed. And so it is fruit- ^t ^TWTO^T^*TO*t- 
less to raise these same objee- ifcj | 
tions against the Scriptures, 
the truth of which is esta- 
blished by other unobjection- 
able proofs. 

(6) But, it may be asked, 
since it was declared in Scrip- I x * ^ ^^*TOT^l ^ 
ture [Eevelations, xv. 3]," Just ^lf ^ITST^T ^f^ffTTI ^<2JT- 
and true are all thy ways," ^ ^^fn HTO^u^fcTTH 
how is it acknowledged by you ~^ <>* 

who accept the Christian reli- ^^>^^TftT- 
gion that you are unable to SfafRlfM'WBTTN? 3W 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 109 

justify those ways in every 3?f?fm^Jrr Tfw "^rfj ^f- 
respect ? We reply [with Dr. -^^ m ^ f% c^ |- 
Chalmers], To utter such an ^ . ^ 

expression is fitting lor those ^ * s 

only to whom the day of the re- ^PW*T*«lf^* 3TTTT ^- 
velation of hidden things has isff ^TT^^rT^iTT^'^T In- 
come, whose condition of hav- m ^-^-^^J^ ^, 
ing the secrets of God hidden 

from them has ceased, or by **&*«* I rHY^ *%- 
whom the fulfilment of God's Wf '^I'RIT^T^ t^^H^ " 
designs has been witnessed. 2|>TWTW^l'n5IT: *1$ <J *N^T- 
But previously to such great ^^ ^£ Tj<ftf%rC- 
and final manifestation of the ^_ 

hidden things of God, we have ^ ! Wn^fTWTOT 
only to expect with humility ; W<5*ni wfa T WTf^R 
and the mysteries which in our <g^rt?fa ^^PrNrrf^T I 
present state we cannot com- 
prehend we must silently 
acquiesce in. 

[The words of Dr. Chalmers, in his Evidences, vol. i., 
p. 310, are these : — " This [Eev. xv. 3] might well be 
said by those to whom the day of the revelation of hidden 
things has come, and to whom the mystery of God is 
finished — or who have witnessed its fulfilment. Previous 
to that great and final manifestation, it is our part to 
wait in humble expectancy, and to acquiesce in the 
mysteriousness of many things which at present we do 
not comprehend."] 

(7) Further, whoever says . 

that he can now everywhere ' * ) ^™* ^ l *■ sft 
discern God's wisdom and *P3ffi HT^ffT WT *TW- 



110 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH 

goodness, he, like one " lying ^j^ ^ffasff ^T?J Wt- 
for God," injures with great ^ ^ WrR^- 
effort [or unintentionally does s . 

his' best to injure], though * TT w ^ ^ Wmw 
loving it, the very cause which T^I^kT rT^R *raWH^F^W 
he seeks [thus disingenuously] q^j ^^ ^^ I 
to advance. 

(7) Let us now recapitulate | ^> | rTOT^Tf^T'TJsrer ef- 
the matters that have been ^^ T $ T^rT^t f^TOT- 
laid down in the several sec- -^ 
tions of this treatise. In Bk. ^*^< I W I *- 
I. is an account of the leading *ft S^T$ Tf¥*m^TTfa- 
points in the Christian reli- fif^tfTjT \ f%<ft?T ^"g^^fo- 
gion. In Bk. II. is an ac- ^^^ff^. 
count of the arguments for the , ^ ~ ~ 

truthfulness of the Christian ™ ' *** s * *™ ft' 
Scriptures. In Bk. III. it is 1TTtft?niftOTHT ^f^&PT- 
shown that this world wasmade f^TSjT 35<1< 5 [f*I^P!f I ^fj^f 
by an Intelligent Worker, pos- w ^j^^^. 
sessed of power transcending ^ e 

that of mortals. In Bk. IY. W T^f^wft 5*- 
it is shown that as there are ^rfa W^WTO^' <raT- 
learned, from the books which ^-^^-^ sprft ^-^_ 
reveal God's will, things dif- ^^ ^^ ^WT*ft- 
ferent from the visible, and 

which we cannot explain,— ^tTOTft^tTpr *^- 
so, too, are there in God's f?r f*f^W | ^^^ TJ^Tpg- 
created world things seen and ^^^^-^-^.j. *^-_ 
yet mysterious, and by us at ^ ^ . - . ^ 

present inexplieable. In Bk. ^¥^^>mf% 
V. it is shown that as the mys- T& ***&* ^WWlrtfo 



HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 1 [ 1 

teries, because of which it is sf^TeST^rTTR rTT^^fft T" 
imagined that the Christian ^^ ^^ ^^^ 
Scriptures ought not to be ^- 
believed, are analogous to the ^^WW^t^TTTm- 
mysteries which exist in the ^STCWhraf^n^T *IT%- 
yisible world, and which yet 5^ fi^tjTgfofft | 
do not cause men to dis- 
believe in the world; there- 
fore, they ought not to be 
brought as objections against 
the Scriptures, the truthful- 
ness of which is established 
by the evidence already ad- 
duced [in Bk. II]. 

(8) Thus strong reasons I ^ I ^4 rTTC<T N ^lfteV- 
have been stated for the pro- ^^j^f T?T*TOWre- 
bability that the Christian ^ 

Scriptures are true ; and if ™ TOlfo *T^- 
they are true, it is quite clear wf*T $*t TTT*!reniN <f- 
that tremendous consequences ^"•f^tafT^ $fw*rra^Tf*T 

must attend the rejection of „,.„.<x ——j^ , „„ _ T 
_ r . n J , WIT 5 ? ^fl^T^ I ^ ?TT" 

them. We wind up, then, * ^ 

the present discussion of the T*TW^raW^tW - 
leading points in Christianity, ^«nffH rrfssrTTTOTf'RTl- 
by indicating to those who •fr^j^ Tf^ifcc^j^cr ^T- 
desire to know the whole * ♦ r- 

truth 01 these Scriptures, the ^ 

method of satisfying that de- ^'^ ' 
sire of knowledge. 



112 CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH HINDTJ PHILOSOPHY. 



APHOEISM VEIL 

advfcTrSf SearCh tLe SCri P" Tf^WTW f^T^ 

mquirer. tures j— search the 



Scriptures. 



^fTTWt^T Tft H c II 

(1) The repetition is to in- | \-| sft^T TRr^RWW- 
dicate [as it will do to the ^ . 

reader of the Sdnkhya Apho- 
risms], that this is the con- 
clusion of the section. 

(2) " Search," etc. That is \^\ f^TTtifrr Tfa I 
to say, they are to be studied ^f^ f^q^r ^ T - 
diligently and candidly, not c ^ , 

With the intention of finding &***$* H^flrBreT* 

objections, but with the desire ^WTOTW'TtaT TW$' I 

of finding the truth. Further, f%^ ?p»JTflVT«lTCi!jrTi rf- 

at the time of thus studying, _^ f^^ ^ ^^^. 

let him with sincerity and hu- ^ 

mility pray to the Lord of the "* T^lft PWTC *fa*T- 

universe, saying, " Show me ^Tl[ ^fT^t^T: TTT^ft^? 

the truth who am seeking to ^-{^ ^^ ^ 
know it, and the way in which 
I ought to walk." Amen. 

Here ends the Fifth Book ^ ^rf^f w 

of the Elucidation of the Chris- d * 

tian Religion. *" ^™ ■ 



APPENDIX 



OF 



NOTES AND DISSERTATIONS. 



Several points involved in the preceding treatise 
appear to call for a fuller exposition than could have 
been given, where each point first presented itself, 
without the risk of injuriously interrupting the thread 
of the argument. Such points may be, perhaps, profit- 
ably treated in separate Notes, in which a somewhat 
familiar style of treatment, and an admixture of dialogue, 
— employed not less for the sake of perspicuity than of 
vivacity, — may be not displeasing to the reader. Our 
first dissertation is on the subject of " Matter," a most 
important topic where the missionary has to reason with 
idolaters, — much more with idolaters imbued, from the 
cradle, through the very language, with a system of 
metaphysics of such a nature that, if the missionary 
neglect or fail to master it and its strictly defined ter- 
minology, he will strive in vain to make his arguments 
against idolatry intelligible, even to the most candid 
among those whom he addresses. One missionary, for 
example (the case is not feigned), thinks that he has 
stated, with sufficient precision, the proposition that 
" God is not material," when he has stated to a Hindu 



114 NOTE A. 

that God is not dravya, i.e. not a " substance," which an 
idol certainly is; — but he omits to keep in mind that 
there is (as Milton says), " spiritual substance" as well 
as " material," both of them included under the head of 
dravya = " substance;" so that his proposition conveys 
to the Hindu the assertion that " God is neither Matter 
nor Spirit." These things, though metaphysical, are not 
trifling. The man who thinks them such, mistakes his 
vocation when he ventures to become a missionary to the 
Hindus. Again, the missionary may perhaps feel equally 
convinced that his meaning ought to be understood when 
he has propounded that God is no padartha, — this term 
certainly being denotative of a " material thing," — but 
it denotes also whatever is meant by any term, — so that 
the proposition here conveys to the Hindu the assertion 
that the term " God " has no meaning, denotes nothing, — 
not even the non-existence of anything. Another reasoner 
suggests — for " Matter" — the term Vastu, which, where 
it is a recognised and defined metaphysical term, denotes 
the " Supreme Spirit," to the exclusion of whatever is not 
spirit. But the reader who cares to see this question 
discussed more fully need not be longer detained from 
the note following. 

NOTE A. 

A DIALOGUE ON THE TERM "MATTER" AND ITS POS- 
SIBLE CORRESPONDENTS IN THE HINDU DIALECTS. 

You have frequently expressed a wish, my Theophilus, 
that I should explain to you clearly and concisely those 
opinions of my Hindu friends which, in the current ex- 
positions of them, appear to be so strange as to render it 



ON "MATTER." 115 

scarcely credible that a thinking person should seriously 
entertain them. It occurs to me that I may in some 
measure perform what you require of me by giving 
you — to the best of my recollection — an account of a 
conversation, on the subject of " Matter," which took 
place the other evening. You know Eusebius, our in- 
defatigable missionary. He had just returned, rather 
wearied, from preaching all day amidst the noise and 
distraction of a meld, or religious fair ; but he brightened 
up as he saw the inquiring young Brahman, Taradatt, 
approaching. Eusebius and I had been sitting on the 
high bank that overhangs the Ganges, where the sacred 
stream glides past the garden of the excellent Philoxenus. 
By the strangest of coincidences, Lawrence happened 
to be with us. You know Lawrence, with his huge 
quantity of reading, and his frequent, or, rather, habitual, 
absence of mind. Taradatt smiled as he sat down and 
addressed Eusebius. " You have been labouring to en- 
lighten the holiday makers at the meld to-day, my dear 
Sir, if one may judge from your jaded look." " You 
have guessed rightly," replied Eusebius; but why do 
you smile?" "At the amusing inexhaustibleness of 
your patience," replied the other. " Surely," exclaimed 
Eusebius, "you do not expect that I shall ever give up 
labouring in my vocation from despair at the apparent 
ineffectualness of my efforts ? It is my part to labour ; 
it belongs to God to give the increase in his own good 
time." 

Taradatt. — My being a Hindu does not prevent me 
from appreciating and honouring your perseverance in 
the face of difficulties. But I could not help smiling at 



116 NOTE A. 

the thought of the discouragements to which you must 
have been exposed to-day. Did your audience consist 
entirely of the illiterate ? 

Eusebius, — No. There was a forward young man who 
interrupted me from time to time, declaring that all that 
was true in my account of the Deity was to be found in 
the books of the Hindus, from which the Europeans had 
borrowed, or stolen, without understanding the real im- 
port of what they were appropriating. He produced a 
marked effect upon the people, by declaring that my 
views of the omniscience and the omnipresence of God 
were lamentably imperfect, — the true view of that subject 
being conveyed, he contended, in a text of the Veda, 
which he quoted in Sanskrit, and which, of course, not 
one of them understood a word of." 

Tdradatt. — " Can you repeat the text ?" 
Eusebius declared he feared he could not, not having 
fully understood it himself. Only he was sure it con- 
tained a pointed reference to the word " all," and sounded 
somewhat like so and so, — reciting here certain sounds, 
with which, Theophilus, I cannot at this moment tax 
my memory. The words which had appeared of so grave 
import to the listeners at the meld, had quite a different 
effect upon the Brahman, who burst out laughing, assur- 
ing us, as gravely as he could, that the words were 
quoted from the Grammar of Pdnini, and that they bore 
reference to nothing beyond the fact that in all cases the 
word "cow" was optionally amenable to a certain euphonic 
rule. Eusebius himself could not help smiling at the 
barefaced impudence of the trick which had been played 
him; and Taradatt took advantage of the incident to 



ON "MATTER." 117 

press a suggestion which it appears he had made more 
than once before. 

Tdrddatt, — You see, my dear Sir, that you would be 
the better of knowing our sacred language. I do not, 
indeed, promise you that, even with a knowledge of the 
Sanskrit, you would be able to convince the illiterate. 
Our low-caste Hindus are too modest to think for them- 
selves. They commit the keeping of their consciences to 
the hands of us Brahmans just as, I have heard, the 
people on the continent of Europe make over the same 
trust to their own Brahmans. The Europeans are un- 
fortunate in this, that they are necessarily misled, their 
guides being blind leaders, or, at all events, guides grop- 
ing in the dark ; but in this more favoured land the 
people have reposed their implicit confidence in guides 
who have eyes and who have light. The people here are 
content with guidance ; they do not seek for light, which 
might possibly dazzle them. Can it be, that you, Eusebius, 
shrink from meeting the learned of India on their own 
ground, preferring, as less arduous, to defy them from a 
safe distance, and to come to close quarters only with the 
avowedly uninstructed, who afford you an easy triumph 
in argument, though, you will admit, they afford you 
little else ? 

Eusebius, — You wish to provoke me, I perceive, to an 
argument with your learned self, friend Taradatt ; and 
you know very well that neither I nor my brother mis- 
sionaries are wont to shrink from a contest with you, 
arduous as you may choose to think it. But you are 
not ignorant that a characteristic difference between the 
Gospel and the lights which the Brahmans declare that 



118 NOTE A. 

they possess is this, that to the poor the Gospel is 
preached. By the poor we understand those whom you 
look upon as of low caste, and hence unworthy, or incap- 
able, of enlightenment. The Gospel acknowledges no dis- 
tinctions among men, except to point out the lowly as the 
especial objects of its care. 

Taradatt. — But are these to be the sole objects of its 
care? 

Eusebius. — By no means. How can you insinuate 
that we have made them so ? You have long had the 
New Testament in your loved Sanskrit, and you have 
more recently received the Pentateuch in the same. I 
wish that, to us, as large a proportion of your Veda were 
available, if it were only as a literary curiosity.* 

Taradatt. — Your mention of the Veda reminds me that 
the portion of it which has been printed in Europe is 
accompanied by an ample commentary, without which 
even we could not understand the text. Now, much of 
the text of your Scriptures is, to us, at least not less 
obscure. Have you no explanatory commentary ? 

EuseUus. — We have, and more commentaries than 
one. To select from these the portions most likely to be 
needed by a Hindu reader, and to digest them into a 
separate volume in the vernacular, or to print them along 
with the text, would be a commendable work in one who 
could do no better. 

Taradatt. — I should welcome such a work, though I 
should like it in the Sanskrit rather than in the ver- 
nacular. 



* The substance of this Note appeared in the Benares Magazine some years 
when only the first volume of the Rig Veda had been published by Max Miillcr. 



ON "MATTER." 119 

Eusebius. — That is to say, you would prefer keeping 
it to yourself and your brother Brahmans. 

Tdrddatt. — If I did, yet its being in Sanskrit would 
scarcely secure that end. But let that pass. I am not 
so anxious to keep all knowledge to my own class, but 
that I should be very well pleased if I could make you 
yourself understand and appreciate the sublime philosophy 
of the Hindu religion. 

Eusebius, — Why, Mr. Colebrooke has enabled me to 
do that already. But that need not prevent you from 
indulging in some declamation on your favourite topic. 
I am all attention. Lawrence, who is watching the first 
glimmer of the rising moon on the ripple of the stream, 
will not interrupt you without good reason ; and as for 
our other friend, he, for reasons of his own, is not likely 
to interrupt you at all. 

This last observation, my Theophilus, was designed 
to convey a gentle sarcasm on myself ; Eusebius holding, 
in spite of all my protestations to the contrary, that I am 
half a Hindu, because I am fonder than he is of their 
sacred language. You, my friend, know that the im- 
putation is undeserved ; but it would have been useless 
to remonstrate with Eusebius, so I contented myself with 
shrugging my shoulders in the way of protest, whilst 
Lawrence, removing his eyes from the moon, looked 
benevolently, yet mournfully, on Taradatt. The latter, 
instead of becoming eloquent on the theme proposed, 
simply stated his belief that one thing alone existed. 

Eusebius. — "Well, what thing ? 

Tdrddatt. — Do not accuse me of trifling with you if 
I answer " that thing." As one of your poets makes a 



120 NOTE A. 

lady ask, so I may ask here, " What's in a name ?" If 
there be but one thing, then this one thing is all, and it 
may be (what nothing else supposable can be) definitely 
named by that which you Europeans call a pronoun, and 
which we, the followers of Panini, call a sarva-ndma, or 
" name of all or any thing." We call the one thing, in 
Sanskrit, tat, i.e. " that." 

Eusebius. — Good ; — but if you, like your lady in the 
play, have no predilection for any name in particular, 
you will perhaps have no objection to give me some other 
name in exchange for this "that," which does not please 
me. 

Tdrddatt. — Let the name be Brahm. 
Eusebius. — Has that name a meaning ? 
Tdrddatt. — The word being derived from the root 
vrih, "to increase," may signify "that from which all 
emanates." 

Eusebius. — From which all what emanates ? 
Tdrddatt.— -All that which is no thing,— Brahm being 
the one only thing — the sole reality — according to the 
sense of that term as derived from the Latin res, a. 
"thing," as I suppose it is. 

Eusebius. — Well, laying aside for the present all that 
is no thing, pray tell us all that you can about the one 
thing. 

Tdrddatt. — All that can be told about it, — in fact, all 
that it is, — may be enounced very briefly. It is exist- 
ence, knowledge, and joy. There you have the whole. 
It is not a something, of which these are the properties 
or qualities, — but these are it, and it these. 
Eusebius. — And this material world ? 



ON "MATTER." 121 

Tdrddatt. — That to which you give the name of a 
material world is an illusion. 

At this moment, Theophilus, Lawrence, who had 
seemed previously to be wrapped in his own thoughts, 
broke silence and spoke as follows : — 

Lawrence. — "We are placed in a system in which 
mankind will deal with us, and we, in spite of all theories 
to the contrary, must deal with mankind, as if the objects 
of sense were real. Hence it does, I own, seem to me an 
unpractical philosophy which leads men to treat these 
things as if they were unreal." 

On hearing these words, Theophilus, the Brahman 
seemed not a little perplexed. After pondering them for 
some time, with his eyes fixed upon the ground, he looked 
up, designing apparently to reply to the speaker ; but, 
perceiving that the eyes of Lawrence were again bent 
intently on the moon, he turned to Eusebius, and re- 
marked as follows : — 

Tdrddatt — Men do deal with one another as if the 
objects of sense were real ; and, for aught that I can say 
to the contrary, they possibly must so deal with one an- 
other, so long as the illusion of a world continues. I, 
for one, am not concerned with the inquiry whether this 
or that philosophy is "practical" or "unpractical." I 
ask simply, what is true? What you Europeans call 
" practical," is, I imagine, what we Hindus call vydva- 
hdrika ; and we admit the importance of attending to 
such a consideration, so far as concerns this illusive 
world; but we do not see how the consideration bears 
upon the one reality, which is the sole object of sound 
philosophy. If I mistake not, your own Berkeley was 



122 NOTE A. 

idly charged with inculcating an " unpractical " philo- 
sophy, when he questioned the existence of material 
substance ; but the best of your writers now-a-days 
acknowledge, that, while he questioned the existence of 
anything under the phenomena, — to be called material sub- 
stance from its being sub or under these, — he did not deny 
that there were such phenomena as required such and such 
actions to be practised. For example, he did not neglect 
to practise the action of getting out of the way of a loaded 
wagon, although he held that the driver of the wagon no 
more believed in the existence of a material substance of 
the wagon, over and above all its powers and properties, 
than he himself did, — the conception that there is any 
such inscrutable substratum, being, he contended, the con- 
ception of his metaphysical opponents, and not that either 
of himself — accused of over-refinement in speculation — 
or of the wagoner not so accused. We do not, then, 
treat phenomena as if they were unreal, — that is to say, 
as if they were not ; but we deny that they are real — 
that they are things. Our treatment of them is " prac- 
tical," our conception of them, at the same time, is 
correct. 

Eusebius. — We % must look a little closer into that 
word real ; — but hark, Lawrence, who has seemingly been 
in a brown study since he last spoke, appears to be again 
about to speak. 

Lawrence. — " And as experience is our guide, and not 
theory, in practical matters ; as, further, men often entail 
upon themselves, and even upon others, very great 
misery, even in this life, by obstinately following their 
own theories of things, in opposition to the teaching of 



"ON MATTER." 123 

men of experience, it becomes a very serious question 
for you, whether you ought not to be able to prove the 
Vedanta system far more demonstratively, before you let 
it have the least influence upon your practice. And the 
choice between Christianity and Brahminism is a prac- 
tical question, and one which you will find, the more you 
know of Christianity, to be materially affected by the 
view you take of our relations to matter." 

The Brahman, Theophilus, on hearing this, became 
apparently more puzzled than before. He paused so long 
that at length Eusebius interrupted his meditations by 
asking what was the Sanskrit word for matter. 

Taradatt. — There is no Sanskrit word for " matter." 

Eusebius, — You surprise me. Colonel Vans Kennedy, 
I know, denied that there was a Sanskrit word answer- 
ing to our philosophical term "matter;" but Sir G. 
Haughton immediately supplied him with a dozen. 

Taradatt. — "What were they ? 

Eusebius replying that he could not undertake to 
recollect them, I, Theophilus, being not unwilling to 
aid, in some subordinate manner, a discussion which 
interested me not a little, got up and fetched the book, 
which happened to be among the borrowed volumes that 
enrich my library, and occasionally reproach my punc- 
tuality. Eusebius, turning to the place [the 221st page 
of the (London) Asiatic Journal, vol. xviii., new series, 
1835], read out the words of Sir Graves Haughton as 
follows : — "I must, however, go beyond this refutation, 
and inform your readers of what they might reasonably 
have expected, namely, that the Sanskrit language con- 
tains many words for matter. Take the following examples : 

n 



124 NOTE A. 

vastu, vasu, dravya, sarlra, murtti, tattwa, paddrtha, prad- 
hdna, mula-prakriti ; and, with the Jamas, pudgala." 

On hearing this list read, to each item in which it 
struck me that Lawrence nodded a mild approval, the 
Brahman, Theophilus, gradually opened his eyes wider 
and wider. At the close, he rubbed them as if in doubt 
whether he were awake ; and then he requested a sight 
of the volume. Having certified himself that the words 
were printed as they had seemed to strike his ear, and 
that he was therefore probably awake, he asked Eusebius 
whether he was content to receive each or any one of 
these words as the synonyme of the term " matter," — 
the fay of the Greeks. 

Eusebius. — I am content to hear what you have got 
to say against receiving them as such. 

Taradatt. — Let us look at them in succession. The 
•word vastu (as the Vedanta Sara will tell you) means the 
Divine Spirit, the one thing recognised as a reality in the 
Vedanta. The whole of what we talk of as the world is, 
according to the Vedanta, a-vastu, i.e. " not a thing." 
"What you speak of as the material world is what we call 
not vastu. And the same applies to the term vasu, the 
second in the list. Then the term dravya, as stated in 
the Tarka Sangraha and a score of other works, is the 
generic name of earth, water, light, air, ether, time, space, 
soul, and mind. 

Eusebius. — Soul, do you say ? 

Taradatt. — Certainly. Soul is one of the things be- 
longing to the list headed dravya. Do you hold it to be 
matter ? 

Eusebius. — Heaven forbid. 



"ON MATTER." 125 

Tdrddatt. — Then I fear that this term will not suit ; 
the more so as I imagine you will object to classing time 
and space as varieties of matter, 

Eusebius. — Pray, on what principle do you class these 
with earth and water ? 

Tdrddatt. — On the principle that qualities, etc., belong 
to them, as you may see by referring to the 23rd verse of 
the Bhdshd-jparichchheda, the text-book of the Nydya, that 
is in the hands of every schoolboy. 

Eusebius, — Then you hold time to be a substance ? 

Tdrddatt. — What do you mean by " substance ?" 

Eusebius. — Its meaning accords with its etymology. 
It is that which " stands under," and serves as it were 
for a support to the qualities which could not exist apart 
from it. 

Tdrddatt. — I like your definition, for it is my own ; 
and so if time has any qualities, then time is the sub- 
stance in which these its own qualities inhere. But tell 
me : — We mortals have wishes and we have fears ; we 
have doubts, difficulties, and, occasionally, joys. Do 
these exist apart and of themselves ? 

Eusebius. — No. A wish does not exist without a 
wisher, nor a doubt apart from one that doubts. Why 
do you ask a question the answer to which is so self- 
evidently obvious ? 

Tdrddatt. — I ask it because I am curious to know 
whether you hold that these wishes and doubts can exist 
apart from matter. Is your wisher or your doubter neces- 
sarily material ? 

Eusebius. — By no means. I happen to remember that 
your own revered Gautama declares that " desire, aver- 



126 NOTE A. 

sion," etc. belong to the soul. The soul is a spiritual 
substance, not a material substance. 

Tar Matt. — You remember rightly ; you refer to the 
tenth aphorism of Gautama's first lecture. But you speak 
of spiritual substance as differing from material sub- 
stance ; — do you really then, in Europe, hold that there 
is such a twofold distinction in " substance ?" 

Eusebius. — Unquestionably. There are, indeed, men, 
calling themselves " materialists," who hold that there is 
only one substance ; but those who recite the creed in 
which the persons of the Trinity are acknowledged to be 
"the same in substance]** speak, as Milton does, of spiritual 
substance, not of matter. If you will glance down the 
page that is before you, you will see an apposite remark 
of Cudworth's, which, as Sir G. Haughton observes, Lord 
Brougham, in his Discourse on Natural Theology r , page 93, 
quotes with applause. Pray read it aloud. 

Tdrddatt. — Ah, here is what you refer to : — " What- 
ever is, or hath any kind of entity, doth either subsist by 
itself, or else is an attribute, affection, or mode of some- 
thing that doth subsist by itself." "Well, I agree with 
Sir G. Haughton that this is obviously true. But tell 
me, in your opinion, does the Deity " subsist by itself," 
or is it " an attribute, etc. ?'' 

Eusebius. — Of course you know my opinion. God 
exists of himself. His is a spiritual substance. 

Tdrddatt. — This I expected you to say ; and I tho- 
roughly agree with you. But I must now beg you to 
explain the passage which had just caught my eye on the 
opposite page. 

Eusebius. — Bead out the passage. 



"ON MATTER." 127 

Taradatt. — I find Sir G. Haughton, in page 220, de- 
clares as follows : — " Every one conversant with these 
subjects must know that, in philosophical language, sub- 
stance, body, and matter mean all one and the same thing, 
and, as such, are opposed to spirit." Permit me to ask 
you, when your creed speaks of the persons of the Trinity 
as being "the same in substance" does it mean that they 
consist of the same matter ? 

Eusebius. — Again, I say, God forbid. But allow me 
to look at the book ; for the passage that you have just 
read makes me suspect, as you did of yourself a little 
while ago, that I must be dreaming. 

Taking the book, Theophilus, Eusebius appeared 
the more perplexed the more he pondered and reperused 
the passage asserting the identity of " substance, body, 
and matter." At length he exclaimed : — " Indeed it 
seems to me that Col. Yans Kennedy, when he assailed 
Mr. Colebrook's account of the Vedanta, and Sir G. C. 
Haughton, when he defended it, must have been engaged 
in a game of cross-purposes, which the enlightened Mr. 
Colebrooke himself, — had he not been then, alas, upon 
his death-bed, — would have been able to bring to a satis- 
factory conclusion. 

Taradatt. — Pray explain what you refer to. 

Eusebius. — I shall perhaps be the better prepared to 
do this, if you will first complete your detail of objections 
to the string of terms which Sir G. C. Haughton offered 
to Col. Kennedy as equivalents for the philosophical term 
matter ; — but see, here comes the cheerful Chrysostomus 
and his meek-eyed helpmate. Let us welcome them. 

The cheerful Chrysostomus, you must know, Theo- 



128 NOTE A. 

philus, is a valiant polemic, — formidable in argument, 
for his good-humoured imperturbability, as he is attrac- 
tive at all times through his imperturbable good humour. 
With a sigh that seemed to come from a heart as light as 
heart could wish, he shook his head gently at Taradatt, 
who, receiving this not unexpected greeting with an 
expression of countenance blending the comic and the 
kindly, without further exordium addressed him. 

Taradatt. — "We are enquiring, Chrysostomus, whe- 
ther there be any Indian term answering to the word 
" matter." 

" And where is the difficulty ?'' exclaimed Chrysos- 
tomus. " Down in the city, padartha is one very good 
word for it, and dravya is another." 

Taradatt recapitulated the objections to the term 
dravya, which I have already recorded; and Chrysos- 
tomus shook his head, as if he thought that there were 
here a splitting of straws ; but just then Philoxenus, 
hearing that a lady had arrived, hastened out to say 
that tea was preparing; and the lady was led off, 
followed by her worthy spouse. 

The Brahman then resumed his criticism of the list, 
remarking that to place among the synonymes the term 
sarira, which (as rendered rightly in Wilson's Dictionary, 
and also in Sir Gr. C. Haughton's own) means only the 
body, looked almost like a punning design to burlesque 
the proposition that " substance, body, and matter, mean 
all one and the same thing." " The next term," he con- 
tinued, " viz., murtti, which, in common language, means 
a form or image (jxop 4>r ; ), means, in philosophical language, 
whatever has definite limits. Earth, water, light, air, 



" ON MATTER." 129 

and mind, we are told, 1 are of this description, while the 
ether is a substance not of this description. If the sub- 
stance air extended as far as the substance ether, it would 
cease to bear the name in question, yet this would be 
very different from its ceasing to be material" 

Eusehius. — But what do you hold to be the definite 
magnitude of the mind ? 

Taradatt. — In the .system to which the term under 
discussion belongs, the mind is held to be of the size of 
an atom. 2 

Eusehius. — Well, let that pass ; — but pray continue 
your censures. The next term that you have to deal with 
is tattwa. 

Taradatt. — The term tattwa belongs more peculiarly 
to the Sankhya school. Being, according to the ordinary 
etymology, an abstract derivative from the pronoun tat, 
" that," it answers to the hcecceitas of Duns Scotus ; but 
in the Sankhya it is employed as a concrete term to de- 
note the eight "producers," the sixteen " productions," 
and "soul." 

Eusehius. — In such an acceptation the term certainly 
does not correspond with matter ; but, though the term 
bears a sense so extensive in the Sankhya system, may it 
not answer to the term matter in some of the others ? 

Taradatt. — In the Nyaya it bears a sense founded on 
its supposed etymology, — it means the nature of anything 
as it really is, — in short, truth. 

Eusehius. — Its supposed etymology ? Is the etymology 
called in question that you have just mentioned ? 

1 See the Bhasha-parichchhcda, v. 24, and its commentary, p. 12. 

2 Sec ante, p. xxiv. 



130 NOTE A. 

Tarddatt — Certainly ; by those who know what truth 
is. There is but one truth that can be declared to any 
one ; and that one solitary truth, — obscured only by the 
unavoidable imperfections of language, — is conveyed in 
the formula tat twain, " That art thou." The hearer of 
this truth — (from the terms of which, you perceive, truth 
itself takes its designation of tattwa) — when he has rightly 
understood and accepted it, changing the " thou" to the 
first person, reflects thus — " Jam Brahma." This is so 
far well; — but he must finally get rid of the habit of 
making even himself an object of thought. There must 
be no object. The subject alone must remain — a thought, 
a joy, an existence, — and the only one. 1 

Eusebius. — Take breath, I beseech you, and then let 
us finish the list, the next term in which is the word 
padartha, which our friend Chrysostomus thinks a good 
one. 

Tarddatt. — The term padartha 2 means " substance" 

(including soul), " quality," "action," "com ." 

" In short," interrupted Eusebius, " it seems to mean 
everything ; — is it so ?" 

Taradatt. — It means everything that is,— with the 
varieties of non-existence into the bargain. 

Eusebius. — Yery possibly it may do so in the philo- 
sophical systems ; but when the word recalls to the 
mind of the generality of hearers the idea of sticks and 
stones, and rivers and fruits, and so on, why is it not as 
good a word to use for matter, when speaking to those 
who are not philosophers, as any other ? 

1 See ante, p. xxxvii. 2 Tarka-sangraha, p. 1. 



"ON MATTER." 131 

At this question, Theophilus, the Brahman looked 
as if taken aback. After some reflection he replied. 

Taradatt. — Let me understand yon, my dear Sir. 
The question in hand, if I am not mistaken, was this,' — 
viz., Do such and such terms represent the European 
term " matter " so precisely, that the difference in 
opinion between Colonel Yans Kennedy and Sir Gr. C. 
Haughton could, so long as we employ one of those 
terms as the substitute for the term matter, be brought 
under the cognizance of learned Hindus in such a 
manner that the difference of opinion could be intelli- 
gently entertained, and rightly adjudicated upon, by 
these competent judges? I deny that the terms are 
such as to allow of this. Few more competent judges 
could have been found than Eammohun Eoy ; and yet 
he, when the dispute was laid before him, 1 was so abso- 
lutely ignorant of the meaning of the term matter, 
that he thought that he had settled the question 
submitted to him, by pointing to a passage in his 
own works, fully supporting Mr. Colebrooke's inter- 
pretation, "that," according to the Vedanta philosophy, 
"God was not only the efficient but the material cause 
of the universe." I have been all along talking on 
the supposition that the enquiry is, how you are to 
let Indian philosophers understand what you mean by 
matter, — not — what words may serve when speaking 
to the illiterate about material products, without any 
reference to the philosophical conception of matter at all. 

EusebiuB. — Well, — let it be so. I shall expect you 
to explain what bearing the remark of Eammohun 

1 London Asiatic Journal, vol. xxxv., new series, 1835, p. 214. 



132 NOTE A. 

Eoy has upon your spiritual Vedantism, which it seems 
to me to reduce to something very like simple material- 
ism ; but, in the first instance, pray finish your list of 
terms. What objection have you to pradhdna ? 

Tdrddatt. — The term pradhdna belongs to the 
Sdnhhya philosophy, where it is interchangeable with 
the next term in the list, viz., mula-praJcriti, as Professor 
H. H. Wilson's translation shows. 1 Either term is 
usually translated by the term nature. Such a term — 
(for of the Jaina misuse of the word pudgala, I, like 
other Brahmans, know nothing) — comes, perhaps, nearer 
to the term matter than any other in the list; but 
yet it will not serve as a substitute for the utoj. You 
cannot speak of the pradhdna of a jar, or the pradhdna 
of a web, as you speak of the fay or matter of a goblet 
or a statue, because pradhdna is the name of a single 
power, like the " Nature" of European sceptics. Further, 
instead of this pradhdna being a substance, you may 
learn from Professor Wilson, 2 that it is the aggregate 
of the three qualities, " goodness," " foulness," and 
" darkness." 

Eusehius. — Aha, my friend, — but I happen to have 
jotted down in my note-book an extract from the page 
preceding that to which I presume you mean to refer 
me. There 3 Professor Wilson says that, "in speaking 
of qualities, however, the term guna is not to be 
regarded as an insubstantial or accidental attribute, 
but as a substance discernible by soul through the 



1 " Mitla, 'the root,' prakriti ' nature,' is pradhana, 'chief,'" &c. See Wilson's 
Sankhya KariJca, p. 16. 

2 Sankhya Karika, p. 53. ;i Ibid, p. 52. 



"ON MATTER." 133 

medium of the faculties." What, then, is the use of 
founding upon its being called a quality ? 

Here, Theophilus, I ventured to express my own 
opinion on this point. " Professor Wilson," I said, 
" rightly reports the opinion of the Smithy a when he 
says that what are usually spoken of as the three 
' qualities,' (guna) might with propriety be termed c In- 
gredients or constituents of nature.' But while it 
would follow logically that, if nature be substantial, 
these its ingredients or constituents cannot be insub- 
stantial, it also follows logically that, if these ingredients 
or constituents are not substances but qualities, then 
nature, the aggregate of them, cannot be substantial, 
but is an aggregate of qualities." Here Eusebius show- 
ing symptoms of impatience, I paused deferentially, and 
he exclaimed, as I had partly expected — " What room 
is there for any such opinion, forsooth, when Professor 
Wilson cites the very words of Kapila's commentator, 
who tells us that Satwa and the rest are ' things,' 
not i specific properties.'" 1 "Forgive me," I here ex- 
claimed in turn, "if I object to the rendering, in this 
present connexion, of Vaiseshika gunah by l specific 
properties,' instead of by l the Vaiseshika gunas? Accord- 
ing to the Vaiseshikas, the gunas — the things to which 
exclusively these philosophers allow the name of i quality' 
—are twenty-four in number, and to these they deny 
the possession of, or the right of standing as substratum 
to, any of the said four-and-twenty qualities. The 
twenty -four 'qualities' of the Vaiseshika philosophy, 2 are 

1 *r*rr^fa ^rrftr^ W*rcrr g*n: h 

3 See the Tarka- sang r aha. 



134 NOTE A. 

called guna ; — and the Sankhya commentator, dreading 
that his own three 'qualities' might be mistaken for 
these, took care to warn ns that they are not the 
Vaiseshika gunas ; — and, to make assurance doubly sure, 
he stated that they were spoken of by Kapila in terms 
which a Vaiseshika or a Naiyayika was bound to apply 
only to a substance, — viz., as l themselves having 
qualities.'" " Well, well," interrupted Eusebius, " waiv- 
ing that question, let me recall friend Taradatt to 
the dictum of Eammohun Eoy, ' that, according to the 
Vedanta philosophy, God was not only the efficient but 
the material cause of the universe.' If God be the 
material cause of a material universe, then what is God 
but matter? Eeally I begin to doubt how I am to 
avoid agreeing with Colonel Kennedy that it is impossible 
to suppose that Mr. Colebrooke, who employs the same 
terms — saying of God, that ' He is both efficient and 
material cause of the world' 1 — could be of opinion 
that such a system could be otherwise than material. 
I see, indeed, that Mr. Colebrooke, by what Sir G. C. 
Haughton calls 'a fortunate departure from his usual 
reserve,' 2 has left an explicit record of his opinion of 
the Yedanta philosophy that removes all doubt as to 
his conception of its nature. The Yedanta, he says, 
' deduces from the text of the Indian scriptures a 
refined psychology, which goes to a denial of a material 
world.' 3 But is not this contradictory to the other 
assertion? Deny a material world, and what do you 
mean by its material cause ? Sir G. C. Haughton 

1 Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i., p. 371. 2 Asiatic Journal,, vol. xviii., p. 215. 

3 Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i, p. 227. 



"ON MATTER." 135 

appears to have been conscious that there was some 
inconsistency here, for he seeks to shift the blame from 
Mr. Colebrooke to the Vedantists themselves. Mr. 
Colebrooke held the Vedanta to be a refined psycho- 
logy, and l consequently,' argues Sir G. C. Haughton, 
' should it appear to be, as Colonel Kennedy asserts, 
a system of gross and material pantheism in the writings 
of Mr. Colebrooke, such an inference must be deduced 
from the expressions of its Indian interpreters, who are 
faithfully rendered by him.' 1 I must say, I think 
Sir G. C. Haughton had better have confined his defence 
of Mr. Colebrooke to this single assertion that the 
inconsistency belongs to the system itself which Mr. 
Colebrooke faithfully expounded. No more then needed 
to be said. The most marvellous thing of all is the 
fact that Colonel Kennedy, with the inconsistency star- 
ing him in the face, could speak of the Vedanta as 
( the most spiritual system that ever was imagined by 
man.' 2 Solve this riddle, friend Taradatt, if you have 
the power, — which I greatly doubt." 

Taradatt. — The riddle can be solved without diffi- 
culty. There is no such inconsistency as you imagine 
in the system, and neither is there in Mr. Colebrooke' s 
exposition. Colonel Kennedy misunderstood Mr. Cole- 
brooke, and Sir G. C. Haughton, with his well-intended 
interference and his pet dogma of the co-extensive 
signification of the terms " substance" and " matter," 
bewildered the Colonel still further. The Eajah, Eam- 
mohun Eoy, was right in declaring that Mr. Colebrooke 
was right. Had the Eajah been as thoroughly well 

1 Asiatic Journal, vol. xviii, p. 215. 2 Ibid, p. 98. 



136 NOTE A. 

versed in the technical terminology of European philo- 
sophy as in that of the Vedanta and the Nyaya, he' 
could at once have placed his finger on the misconceived 
term which lay at the bottom of the strange logomachy 
recorded in these papers of the Asiatic Journal. Mr. 
Colebrooke, had he been in health, could have done 
this ; and I can fancy the readiness with which that most 
candid of scholars would have given up the use of a 
term which was liable to such misconception. When 
Mr. Colebrooke, or Eammohun Eoy, speaks of the 
Yedantic tenet that God is the material cause of the 
universe, do you suppose he means a cause consisting 
of the matter which we have been hitherto in vain 
seeking to find a name for in the list offered by Sir G. 
C. Haughton ? 

Eusebius. — If not, then what is it that he does mean? 

Taradatt. — Why, surely, — if we have had such diffi- 
culty in finding — what we have not yet found — a term 
in the philosophic vocabulary of India answering to 
matter, does it not strike you as an odd circumstance 
that the same vocabulary should so readily supply a 
term for a u material cause?" 

Eusebius.— Now that you mention it, the circum- 
stance does seem indeed somewhat odd. But may we 
not turn it to good account? We want a word for 
" matter;" — tell me then your word for "material/' 
and I imagine that we shall only have to lop off the 
adjectival termination in order to find what we were 
in search of. 

Taradatt. — It grieves me to disappoint you, but in 
the present instance your disappointment is unavoidable. 



"ON MATTER." 137 

The Sanskrit term rendered " material cause" is sama- 
vdyi-kdrana. In the Yedanta books the term updddna- 
kdrana is more commonly used, but the same thing is 
meant. The portion of the term (viz., samavdyi) so 
frequently rendered, by Mr. Colebrooke and his suc- 
cessors, "material," is the adjectival derivative of the 
word samavdya — -which Mr. Colebrooke rightly renders 
"intimate and constant relation." 1 

Eusebius, — "Intimate and constant relation?" — this 
will never serve as an equivalent for matter. 

Tdrddatt. — No. But it will serve very well to 
denote the relation between a substance and its quali- 
ties, as it is employed, in our philosophical vocabulary, 
to do. Hence the logomachy of Colonel Kennedy and 
Sir G. C. Haughton might have been prevented if Mr. 
Colebrooke had rendered samavdyi-Mrana by " substantial 
cause" instead of " material cause." That Mr. Cole- 
brooke did not confound substance with matter, like his 
well-intentioned defender, is evident from his speaking 
of soul as a substance. " Being a substance," he says, 
"though immaterial, as a substratum of qualities, it is 
placed in Canade's arrangement as one of the nine sub- 
stances which are there recognized." 2 Now, pray ob- 
serve, — Soul, though immaterial, is a substratum of 
qualities : — qualities, according to Plato and the Yedan- 
tists alike, have not an esse such as their substratum 
has : — hence, soul, the immaterial, is the only real 
essence ; — Mr. Colebrooke was right in saying that the 
Yedanta is a "refined psychology;" Colonel Kennedy, 
rightly entertaining the same view of the Yedanta, was 

1 Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i., p. 267. 2 Ibid, vol. i., p. 268. 



138 NOTE B. 

to blame for boggling at Mr. Colebrooke's employment 
of the technical term " material cause" for what might 
better have been called " substratum ;" — and Sir G. C. 
Haughton was to be condoled with for a confusion of 
ideas in regard to the co-extensiveness of matter and 
substance, which are no more co-extensive in meaning 
than cow is co-extensive with quadruped. 

Having heard this, Eusebius, as it appeared to me, 
became thoughtful. He shook his head several times, 
as if doubtful. At length he looked up briskly and 
exclaimed :— »" "Why do you talk of soul, as if there were 
but one ? I have a soul ; you have a soul ; even our 

friend here " " Stop, my dear sir," exclaimed the 

Brahman, "we have separate minds, but soul is one 
only — pure and unchangeable.'' But here, Theophi- 
lus, as you will observe, the conversation diverged from 
the question of matter ; — so I will not at present report 
the discussion that ensued. Ultimately left alone, I 
joined the circle at the tea-table of Philoxenus, where 
the conversation, cheerful and miscellaneous, bore little 
reference to the notions of the Hindus. 



NOTE B. 

ON THE HINDU EMPLOYMENT OF THE TEEMS "SOUL" 
AND "MIND." 

You ask me, Theophilus, what the Brahman was 
going to say, when my last communication was abruptly 
brought to a close by the diverging of Eusebius from 
the question of the term "matter." Eusebius, then, in 
reply to the Brahman's assertion of the unity of soul 



ON THE TE11MS "SOUL" AND "MIND." 139 

and the plurality of minds, exclaimed — " You talk most 
strangely, explain yourself if possible." 

Taradatt. — You observe the moon, which Lawrence 
has kept gazing at, — indifferent to our conversation, on 
the subject of which his mind is apparently made up. 
Now look into any of these large earthen vessels which 
Philoxenus keeps filled with water for the benefit of his 
beloved shrubs and trees. If it should seem to you 
that the moon is visible in every one of these, as well 
as in the sacred stream that ripples before us, would you 
conclude that there are many moons, some of them at 
rest, as in the water-tub, and some in agitation, as in 
the rippling stream ? 

Eusebius. — No ; because there is but one real moon, 
and the others are reflections. 

Taradatt. — Good : — and if the water, to which these 
reflections are due, were removed, what would remain ? 

Eusebius. — Why, as regards the present question, 
the moon itself. 

Taradatt. — True. Now, in like manner remove the 
ignorance or delusion, out of which men's minds are 
made, and then there will be no dim or disturbed re- 
flections of soul, but soul itself will remain alone. 

Eusebius. — You ought to be very sure indeed that 
you have good evidence for the authenticity of a revela- 
tion which asserts things so repugnant to reason and 
common sense. 

Taradatt.' — On the contrary, I think, we may dispense 
with the trouble of enquiring into the credentials of a 
revelation conveying a doctrine which so irresistibly 
approves itself to the reason. 

12 



140 NOTE C. 

At this declaration, Theophilus, Eusebius shrugged 
his shoulders, Lawrence sighed, and I myself felt moved 
to speak, which I proceeded to do as follows: — " That the 
doctrine of the Vedanta so entirely approves itself to the 
reason ought to lead you to doubt, Taradatt, whether 
the doctrine required a revelation, and was therefore likely 
to be the subject of one. I do not refer to those queer 
observances, such as inhaling the breath by one nostril 
and expelling it by the other, which are inculcated in 
the system, and which, in my opinion, are so far from 
approving themselves to the reason, that an unquestion- 
ably authenticated revelation alone could justify their 
being gravely considered. I refer solely to the great 
tenet that only One exists, and that nothing but One 
ever really existed, or will exist, or could exist." 

Here Eusebius, starting up, put on his hat, and, 
turning on his heel, walked off. Taradatt, who seemed 
to waver between the inclination to follow his friend 
and some curiosity to hear me out, laughingly welcomed 
me as a convert to Yedantism ; while, disregarding the 
interruption, I proceeded, — until ultimately left alone, as 
I mentioned before. 1 



NOTE C. 



ON "LOGIC" AND " RHETORIC," AS REGARDED BY THE 

HINDUS. 

He who undertakes to argue with a learned Hindu 
will be the better of knowing how a Hindu reasoner 

1 See ante, p. 34. 



OX "LOGIC" AND lt RHETORIC." 141 

arranges his arguments, and why. This has been 
generally and often mischievously misconceived. A 
misconception of this matter suggested [Benares Maga- 
zine, 1852, vol. viii., p. 251] the following 

REMONSTRANCE TO SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON ON HIS 
INJUSTICE TO THE HINDUS. 

The reader may probably recollect the notable para- 
dox of Dr. Campbell's, that " there is always some 
radical defect in a syllogism, which is not chargeable with 
that species of sophism known among logicians by the 
name of petitio prtncipii, or a begging of the question" 
(Phil, of Rhet., vol. i., p. 174). This " epigrammatic, 
yet unanswerable remark," as Mr. Dugald Stewart styles 
it, was well answered by Archbishop Whately, when 
he observed {Logic, bk. i. § 4) that Dr. Campbell little 
dreamt, "of course, that his objections, however specious, 
lie against the process of reasoning itself, universally ; 
and will therefore, of course, apply to those very 
arguments which he is himself adducing. He should 
have been reminded of the story of the woodman who 
had mounted a tree, and was so earnestly employed 
in lopping the boughs, that he unconsciously cut off the 
bough on which he was standing. '' 

Sir William Hamilton (in his Discussions, p. 615) 
has answered this "unanswerable" epigram of Dr. 
Campbell's, less epigrammatically, but more searchingly, 
in a passage which we transcribe the more readily, as 
it will afford us an opportunity of vindicating what 
Sir William calls " the Hindu syllogism," against his 
undeserved disparagement of it. He says : — " Mentally 



142 NOTE C. 

one, the categorical syllogism, according to its order 
of announcement, is either analytic (A), or synthetic (B). 
Analytic, if (what is inappropriately styled) the con- 
clusion be expressed first, and (what are inappropriately 
styled) the premises be then stated as its reasons. 
Synthetic, if the premises precede, and, as it were 
effectuate the conclusion." He then goes on, in a note, 
to say, " This, in the first place, relieves the syllogism 
of two one-sided views. The Aristotelian syllogism is 
exclusively synthetic ; the Epicurean (or Neoclesian) 
syllogism was — for it has been long forgotten — ex- 
clusively analytic ; whilst the Hindu syllogism is merely 
a clumsy agglutination of these counter forms, being 
nothing but an operose repetition of the same reasoning 
enounced, 1st, analytically, 2nd, synthetically. In 
thought the syllogism is organically one ; and it is 
only stated in an analytic or synthetic form, from the 
necessity of adopting the one order or the other, in 
accommodation to the vehicle of its expression — 
language. For the conditions of language require that 
a reasoning be distinguished into parts, and these de- 
tailed before and after other. The analytic and syn- 
thetic orders of enouncement are thus only accidents of 
the syllogistic process. This is, indeed, shown in 
practice, for our best reasonings proceed indifferently in 
either order. 

" In the second place, this central view vindicates the 
syllogism from the objection of petitio principii, which, 
professing logically to annul logic, or at least to reduce 
it to an idle tautology, defines syllogistic — the art of 
avowing in the conclusion what has been already con- 



ON " LOGIC" AND "RHETORIC." 143 

fessed in the premises. This objection (which has at 
least the antiquity of three centuries and a-half) is 
only applicable to the synthetic or Aristotelic order of 
enouncement, which the objectors contemplate as alone 
possible. It does not hold against the syllogism, con- 
sidered aloof from the accident of its expression; and 
being proved irrelevant to this, it is easily shown in 
reference to the synthetic syllogism itself, that it applies 
only to an accident of its external form." He goes 
on to say, that the synthetic form of the syllogism is 
the "less natural. For if it be asked, 'Is C in A?' 
surely it is more natural to reply, 'Yes' (or C is in A); 
for C is in B and B in A (or, for B is in A and C in 
B), than to reply, B is in A, and C in B (or C is in 
B and B in A), therefore, C is in A. 

" In point of fact, the analytic syllogism is not only 
the more natural, it is even presupposed by the syn- 
thetic. To express in words, we must first analyse 
in thought the organic whole — the mental simultaneity 
of simple reasoning, and then we may reverse in thought 
the process by a synthetic return. Further, we may now 
enounce the reasoning in either order ; but certainly, 
to express it in the essential, primary, or analytic 
order, is not only more natural, but more direct and 
simple, than to express it in the accidental, secondary, 
or synthetic. This also avoids the objection of P. P." 
[i.e., the objection that the syllogism involves a petitio 
principii.~] 

Well, let us first consider how this debars Dr. 
Campbell's objection, and then we may proceed to the 
vindication of the Hindu Philosophers. 



144 NOTE C. 

The synthetic syllogism is of this form : — 

" All things smoking are fiery, 
The mountain is smoking, 
Therefore the mountain is fiery." 

This is the form of syllogism contemplated by Dr. 
Campbell, and he says that here the question is begged. 
The question is, whether the mountain be fiery or not ; 
and he alleges that you beg, or take for granted, the 
very question in dispute, when you lay down the pre- 
mise, " All things smoking [and among these the smok- 
ing mountain] are fiery." This seems plausible ; but 
let us now look at the analytic form of the same syllo- 
gism, which is as follows : — 

" The mountain is fiery, 
Because it is smoking, 
And all things smoking are fiery." 

In this form of expression we do not begin by 
laying down anything which can be charged with taking 
for granted the point in dispute ; we propound affirm- 
atively, for discussion, the point in dispute itself, and 
then assign a reason, and then propound a condition 
in the absence of which the reason would avail nothing. 
The objection of " avowing in the conclusion what has 
been already confessed in the premises," does not apply 
to the argument in this analytic form ; and as the argu- 
ment in this form is none other than the same argu- 
ment in the synthetic form, neither does the objection 
really apply to the latter. 

But now, however far the Scotch Philosophers may 
have gone astray, we should like to be told what there 
is in all this that, the Hindu Philosophers have failed to 



OX "LOGIC" AND "RHETORIC." 145 

discern. Let us follow Sir William through his analysis 
of the syllogistic process just quoted, and see whether 
there be any one single step in it for which our Sanskrit 
books do not supply the counterpart, and no " clumsy" 
counterpart, but something as perfectly elaborated (at 
least) as ancient Greece or modern Germany (or " modern 
Athens" either) can offer us. 

To begin with the beginning. Sir William Hamilton, 
as we have seen, observes, that, " In thought, the 
syllogism is organically one ; and it is only stated in 
an analytic and synthetic form, from the necessity of 
adopting the one order or the other, in accommodation 
to the vehicle of its expression — language." Good : — 
and have the Hindus failed to discern this ? So far from 
it, that they have endeavoured, and, as far as we are 
aware, at least as successfully as any that ever attempted 
it, to embody this organic unity of the syllogism in thought 
in a linguistic unity of expression. When they discuss 
the laws of the mind syllogizing " for itself" — i.e., to use 
Sir William's language, " in thought : ," — they notify 
the organic unity of the process by wrapping the two 
premises in one sentence so constructed (viz., in the 
shape of a period), that, until the last word of the sen- 
tence is uttered, no demand is made — or rather no pre- 
tence exists — for either affirmation or negation. In 
reference to the stock example above quoted, the pre- 
mises " in thought" are propounded, in their unity, 
by writers on the Nyaya, thus: — "By smoke, invari- 
ably attended by fire, is attended this mountain." We 
subjoin the Sanskrit 1 (from the Tarka-sangraha, ed. 2, 



146 NOTE C. 

p. 39). Can Sir William Hamilton point out, anteriorly 
to his own statement regarding the organic unity of the 
syllogism " in thought," any expression, in a European 
work, evincing a more thorough conviction of the truth 
in question than this periodic form of expression adopted 
by the Hindus for conveying the premises in their 
simultaneity ? To our mind it was a noble, and far 
from unsuccessful, effort to emancipate their exposition 
of the mental process, in its unity, from those hampering 
u conditions of language," which, as Sir William re- 
marks, " require that a reasoning be distinguished into 
parts, and these detailed before and after other." In a 
period \ strictly, nothing is detailed " before and after 
other." The " yes" or the " no" can no more legitimately 
leave the lips of the auditors till the last word of the 
period has been heard, than the bullet can leave the gun 
before the process of loading is finished and the trigger 
pulled. 1 

Let us now follow Sir William in his next step. 
" The analytic and synthetic orders of enouncement are, 
thus, only accidents of the syllogistic process. This is, 
indeed, shewn in practice, for our best reasonings proceed 
indifferently in either order." Good again ; — but have 
the Hindus failed to discern this ? Not a bit of it, as we 
shall show. The Aristotelic syllogism may be, as Sir 
William observes, " exclusively synthetic," and the "long 

1 Some one may perhaps say — Nay ; but when you have uttered thus much of 
your period, viz., " by smoke invariably attended by fire," then we may legitimately 
interrupt you, and deny the invariable attendedness. To this we reply, that you 
have no legitimate right to do any such thing. For anything that you know, before 
you have heard me out, my period might have been intended to run thus — " By 
smoke invariably attended by fire this mountain is not attended, because [I choose to 
hold that] there is no such kind of smoke." You have no pretence to understand me 
till I finish my period. 



ON "LOGIC" AND "RHETORIC." 147 

forgotten" Epicurean or ISTeoclesian syllogism " exclu- 
sively analytic;" and Dr. Campbell and Mr. Stewart, 
conversant only with the former, may have written (as 
indeed they have) most dismal uonsense on the whole 
subject ; but have the Hindus done so ? Again we re- 
ply, — not a bit of it. We have seen how the Tarka- 
sangraha (following hundreds of consentient writers), re- 
cognized, and sought to symbolize, in language guardedly 
periodic, the unity of the syllogism " in thought," — the 
" reasoning for one's-self." l Let us now see how the 
Hindus regard " the analytic and synthetic orders of 
enouncement, — the mere c accidents,' " as Sir William 
justly observes, "of the syllogistic process;" and let us 
see whether they failed to discern the fact that " our best 
reasonings proceed indifferently in either order." Let us 
turn to the Vedanta-paribhasM, section second. There 
we read as follows : — " Eeasoning is divided into that 
which is for one's-self, and that which is for another. 
Of these, that which is for one's-self has been already 
described ; but that which is for another is effected by a 
process. This process is an aggregate of parts ; and the 
parts are three only, in the shape of — 1st, the proposi- 
tion, the reason, and the example [ — making up Sir 
William's analytical, or more natural, form of exposi- 
tion] ; — or, 2nd, the example [ — equivalent to the major 
premiss — ], the application, and the conclusion" 2 [Sir 
William's synthetical, or less natural form]. 






148 NOTE C. 

And here, before we go further, let us remark in 
passing, that Sir William's parenthetical protests against 
things being " inappropriately styled" the premises, or 
u inappropriately styled" the conclusion, do not apply 
at all to the language of Hindu philosophers. When 
the matter in question is stated first, as in the analytical 
form, they style it the proposition (pratijnd) ; when it is 
stated last, they style it the conclusion, or issue (niga- 
mana). The u clumsy" instances of want of termino- 
logical foresight in Western speculators, thus noticed by 
Sir William, do not occur in the Indian scientific language, 
where things are not named from their separable accidents. 

But why did the author of the Veddnta-paribhasha 
think it necessary to impress upon his readers long ago 
the essential equivalence of the analytic and synthetic 
forms of the syllogism, to which Sir William Hamilton 
has found it necessary to call the attention of Western 
sages in the year 1852 ? He tells us, when, in continu- 
ation of the passage last quoted, he says that the five 
members of what Sir William Hamilton calls the " clumsy 
agglutination," are not, as some Hindu learners by rote 
might have imagined them to be, indispensable; " for," 
to quote the work itself, " since no more than three mem- 
bers are required to set forth the general principle and 
its relevancy to the subject, the other two members [of 
the five-membered exposition] are superfluous." 1 Here, 
then, we see that the Hindus were just as well aware as 
Aristotle, that three members suffice to contain all the 
essentials of a process of reasoning, and just as well 



ON "LOGIC" AND "RHETORIC." 149 

aware as Sir William Hamilton, that these three mem- 
bers may be arranged indifferently in either the analytic 
or the synthetic order. What, then, becomes of Sir 
William's scornful remark that "the Hindu syllogism is 
merely a clumsy agglutination of these counter forms?" 
It is irrelevant altogether, — the five-membered exposition, 
which it alludes to, not being the Hindu syllogism at all, 
but the Hindu rhetorical exposition. Sir William Hamil- 
ton might, with the same (absolutely the same) pro- 
priety, accuse Euclid of a " clumsy agglutination" of the 
analytic and synthetic syllogisms, because he begins by 
stating his proposition as a proposition, and ends by re- 
stating it as a conclusion. Sir William very well knows 
that logic and rhetoric are not the same thing. At page 
641 of his Discussions, he says, "Here we must not 
confound the logical with the rhetorical, the necessary in 
thought with the agreeable in expression." Good : may 
we, then, cherishing, as we do, the profoundest admira- 
tion for Sir William Hamilton, entreat that he will 
not 1 (in imitation of those who have on this point erred 
before him) continue to confound the logical with the 
rhetorical when again writing or speaking of Hindu 
speculation? We have shown him that the Hindus 
have the analytic syllogism of Epicurus, the synthetic 
syllogism of Aristotle, and an expression (not excelled 
in precision by any similar attempt that we are aware 
of) for his own syllogism "in thought," in its organic 
unity. Is all this to be ignored, and the error of the 
earlier investigators of Sanskrit literature, misrepresent- 

1 [This was written in 1852, after a letter, the last received by me, from Sir 
William Hamilton.] 



150 NOTE C. 

irig the oration as the syllogism, 1 to be for ever perpetu- 
ated ? Sir William Hamilton is not unknown to living 
successors of the old Indian sages on the banks of the 
Ganges. But had the unfortunate passage on which we 
have animadverted been the first on which the eye of 
one of these readers alighted, the chance is that it would 
have gone some way to confirm the impression, here 
yet too prevalent, that the Europeans, though capital 
workers in brass and iron, had better leave the discus- 
sion of things intellectual to those whose land was the 
birth-place of philosophy. 



[In justification of the foregoing remarks, we quote 
from the familiar text book, the Tarka-sangraha (Benares, 
1852), as follows :— ] 

THE CHAPTEB ON INFERENCE. 

w \$\ w*r *na*n!: i tt^p* *R<rr 3f^?Tf%f?t wj- 

TRANSLATION. 

" An induction (anumdna) is the instrument of an 
inference (anumiti). An inference is knowledge that 
results from syllogizing (pardmarsa). Syllogizing is the 
taking cognizance that the subject (paksha) possesses 

1 Sec this point explained more fully at p. 45 [2nd Edition) of the English 
version of the Tarka-sangraha. 



ON "LOGIC" AND "RHETORIC." 151 

what is constantly accompanied [by something which is 
thus seen to belong to the subject]. For example, — the 
taking cognizance that ' This hill has smoke — which is 
constantly accompanied [at the point where it origi- 
nates] by fire' — is [an instance of] syllogizing [i.e., of 
apprehending, in connection, an induction and an obser- 
vation]. The knowledge resulting therefrom, viz., that 
1 The hill has fire [somewhere about it],' is an inference. 
* The being constantly accompanied ' (vyapti) is such an 
invariableness of association as this — that wherever there 
is smoke there is fire. By the i subject's possession'' [of 
something that is constantly accompanied], we mean the 
fact that there exists — in a mountain, for instance, — that 
which is constantly accompanied [by something else]." 

REMARKS. 

In order that we may be enabled to trace the analogy 
which, disguised by differences arising from diversity in 
the point of view or in the form of expression adopted, 
must yet necessarily exist between any two expositions 
of the reasoning process, neither of which is unsound, 
let us examine the terms in the foregoing passage, 
which we have rendered, as nearly as we could, by 
equivalents borrowed from the logic of Europe. 

The first formal difference that requires to be noticed, 
is the fact that, whilst the European logic employs a 
phraseology founded on classification, the Nyctya goes to 
work with the terms on which the classification is based. 
The former infers that kings are mortal because they 
belong to the class of men. The latter arrives at the 
same inference by means of the consideration that mor- 



152 NOTE C. 

tality is present wherever there is the human nature, 
and the human nature wherever there is that of a king. 

In the argumentative expression, "This hill has 
invariably-fire-attended smoke," there are wrapt up, 
in one, the major premiss, " wherever there is smoke 
there is fire," and the minor premiss, " this hill is 
smoking." The reason for preferring to regard these 
as two constituent parts of a single statement appears 
to be this, that it is only when simultaneously present 
to the mind that the premises compel the inference. 
When they are stated separately, they are no other than 
the premises of an Aristotelian syllogism. 

The term which we have rendered " the being con- 
stantly accompanied," viz., vyapti, means, literally, "per- 
vadedness." In regard to the import of a proposition 
which the logic of Europe calls a universal affirmative, 
such as " all men are mortal," the Naiydyika would say 
that there is pervadedness (vydpti) of humanity by 
mortality ; — and he would state the proposition thus : 
" Where there is humanity there is mortality." In a 
universal affirmative, the predicate or major term con- 
notes the " pervader" (yydpaka), or constant accompanier 
of that, connoted by the subject or minor term, which is 
" pervaded" (vydpya), or constantly accompanied by it. 



ON "LOGIC* AND "RHETORIC." 153 

TRANSLATION. 

" An induction is of two kinds [inasmuch as it may- 
be employed], for one's-self and for another. That which 
is for one's-self is the cause of a private conclusion [in 
one's own mind]. For example, having repeatedly and 
personally observed, in the case of culinary hearths and 
the like, that where there is smoke there is fire, having 
gathered the invariable attendedness [of smoke by fire], 
having gone near a mountain, and being doubtful as to 
whether there is fire in it, having seen smoke on the 
mountain, a man recollects the invariable attendedness, 
viz., ' where there is smoke there is fire.' Thereupon 
the knowledge arises that c this mountain has smoke, 
which is constantly accompanied by fire.' This is called 
[by some] the ' pondering of a sign' (linga-paramctrsa). 
Thence results the knowledge that 'the mountain is 
fiery,' which is the conclusion (anumiti). This is the 
process of inference for one's-self." 



TRANSLATION. 

" But after having, for one's-self, inferred fire from 
smoke, when one makes use of the five-membered form 



154 NOTE C. 

of exposition, with a view to the information of another, 
then is the process one of c inference for the sake of an- 
other.' For example : (1) The mountain has fire in it ; 
(2) because it has smoke ; (3) whatever has smoke has 
fire, as a culinary hearth ; (4) and so this has ; (5) there- 
fore it is as aforesaid. By this [exposition], in conse- 
quence of the sign [or token] here brought to his notice, 
the other also arrives at the knowledge that there is fire." 

TRANSLATION. 

u The five members [of this exposition are severally 
named] : (1) the proposition (pratijna\ (2) the reason 
(hetu), (3) the example (uddharana), (4) the application 
(upanat/a), and (5) the conclusion (nigamana). ( The 
mountain is fiery/ is the proposition ; i because of its 
being smoky,' is the reason; c whatever is smoky is 
fiery,' is [the general proposition or principle founded 
on] the example [of culinary hearths and the like] ; ' and 
so this [mountain] is' is the [syllogistic] application; 
i therefore it [the mountain] is fiery,' is the conclusion." 

REMARKS. 

The five-membered argumentative exposition has been 
the object, sometimes of undeserved censure, and some- 
times of commendation equally undeserved. When it is 
commended, at the expense of the Aristotelian syllogism, 



ON " LOGIC" AND "RHETORIC." 155 

on the allegation (see a quotation in Sir G. C. Haughton's 
Prodromus, p. 215), "that it exhibits a more natural mode 
of reasoning than is compatible with the compressed limits 
of the syllogism, and that its conclusion is as convincing 
as that of the syllogism," the commendation is based 
simply on a misconception of the syllogism thus dis- 
paraged. On the other hand, when it is censured as 
" a rude form of the syllogism," the censure is mis- 
applied, because what corresponds to the syllogism is the 
two-membered expression, which, we have already seen, 
comprises neither more nor less than the syllogism does ; 
whereas the form now under consideration is proposed as 
the most convenient for communicating our convictions 
to others. Being a matter of exposition, it is therefore 
a question of rhetoric whether the form be, or be not, the 
most convenient in which to arrange our proposition, our 
proofs, and our illustrations. The five-membered expres- 
sion, so far as its arrangement is concerned, is a summary 
of Kanadah views in regard to rhetoric, " an offshoot from 
logic," (see Whately's Elements of Rhetoric, p. 6), and to 
which, after "the ascertainment of the truth by investi- 
gation," belongs " the establishment of it to the satisfac- 
tion of another." Disregarding what is called rhetorical 
artifice, which, in his system, would have been out of 
place, as it would have been out of place in Euclid's 
Elements of Geometry, Kanada directs his rhetorician to 
commence, as Euclid does, by stating the proposition to 
be proved. The reason is next to be alleged, and then 
instances are to be cited in order to show that the reason 
is sufficient to establish the fact in regard to all cases of 
a certain given character. The auditor is then to be 

13 



156 NOTE C. 

reminded that there is no dispute that the case in ques- 
tion is of the given character, and the oration winds up 
with the re-introduction of the original proposition, in 
the new character of an established conclusion, just as 
Euclid's argument winds up by re-introducing the tri- 
umphant proposition with a flourish of trumpets in the 
shape of a " Quod erat demonstrandum.' ' 

Thus, rhetorically considered, the five-membered ex- 
pression is a very suitable framework for a straight-for- 
ward argumentative speech, making no appeal to the 
passions, and not hesitating to table, without exordium, 
the proposition which it proceeds to establish. 

Logically considered, the five-membered expression 
is a combination of the inductive with the deductive 
syllogism. 1 The instances which led the speaker to an 
inductive generalization, are cited [in the shape of some 
one or other example, followed or not by a suggestive 
" etc."] for the satisfaction of the auditor, in the third 
division of the rhetorical address; from which circum- 
stance it has happened that those who suppose the in- 
tended function of the model oration and of the Aris- 
totelic syllogism to be identical, have come, either to 
regard the oration as an illogical monstrosity, or else to 
fancy that it is a great improvement upon the syllogism. 
The former misconception is that of those who, like 
Bitter [History of Ancient Philosophy, vol. iv., p. 365), 
were familiarly conversant with the logic of the schools. 
The other misconception was to be looked for in the 
case of those whose notions of the logic of the schools 
were derived from Locke's Essay and Campbell's Ehetoric. 

1 [As well as of the Epicurean and the Aristotelian syllogism. See ante, p. 147.] 



ON "LOGIC" AND "RHETORIC." 157 

Thus it is quite unfair to say, with Hitter (History 
of Philosophy, vol. iy., p. 365), that two of the five 
members of Kanada's argument " are manifestly super- 
fluous, while, by the introduction of an example in the 
third, the universality of the conclusion is vitiated :" — 
for, as we have shown, the citation of the example 
serves, as a matter of rhetorical convenience, to bring 
to the recollection of the hearer instances, in regard to 
which all parties are unanimous, and which are such as 
should constrain him to admit the universality of the 
principle from which the conclusion follows. 

TRANSLATION. 

"The instrument [in the making] of an inference 
(anumiti), whether for one's-self or for another, is simply 
the consideration of a ' sign' (ling a) ; therefore an induc- 
tion (ami man a) [which was previously stated to be the 
instrument of an inference], is (just) this consideration 
of a sign." 

fir: i *re 3fFTTf% ?T^ W?T $fa ^Tf% WT tt^t^; Tft 



158 NOTE C. 

TRANSLATION. 

" A sign [or characteristic token] (ling a) is of three 
sorts : 1, that which is [a token in virtue of its being 
constantly] accompanied [by what it betokens], and ab- 
sent [when what it would betoken is absent] (anwaya- 
vyatireki) ; 2, that which is [a token in virtue of its 
being constantly] accompanied only [and never absent 
through the absence of what it should betoken, the 
thing betokened being in this case one everywhere pre- 
sent] (Jcevaldnwayi) ; and, 3, that which is [a token in 
virtue of its being invariably] absent only [in the case 
of everything that could be cited in addition to the 
subject of the proposition itself] (JcevalavyatireM). [To 
illustrate these three in order], — that which is accom- 
panied and absent (anwayavyatirehi) is that which is 
pervaded by [or, in other words, of which there is in- 
variably predicable] accompaniment (anwaya) [on the 
part of what it betokens], and absence (vyatireka) [on 
its own part, when what it might betoken is absent], as 
the possession of smoke, when fire is what is to be esta- 
blished. [For example], ' Where there is smoke there 
is fire, as on the culinary hearth [where the fire is 
assumed never to be extinguished] : ' — here there is 
4 pervadedness by attendance' (anwayavyapti) [i.e., it 
is predicable of the token, smoke, that it is attended 



ON "LOGIC" AND "RHETORIC." 159 

by fire which it betokens]. ' Where fire is not, there 
smoke is not, as in a great lake [where it is taken for 
granted that fire cannot be] : ' — here there is i pervaded- 
ness by absence' (vyatirelcavydpti) [i.e., it is predicable of 
smoke, as a token, that it will be absent where what it 
would have betokened is absent]. [In the second place], 
that [sign] which is accompanied only (kevaldnwayi) is 
that which is ' pervaded by [or, in other words, of which 
there is invariably predicable] accompaniment only' [on 
the part of what it betokens]. For example : l A jar is 
nameable because it is cognizable, as a web is : ' — here 
there is no [case of] l pervadedness by absence,' in 
cognizability and nameableness, because everything [that 
we can be conversant about] is both cognizable and 
nameable. [Thirdly, and lastly], that [sign] which is 
absent only (Jcevalavyatireki) is that which is i pervaded 
by [or, in other words, of which there is invariably pre- 
dicable] absence only,' [on its part, in the case of what- 
ever could be cited, as an example, in addition to the 
subject of the proposition itself]. For example : — 

(1) ' Earth is different from these others [of the 
elements] : 
. (2) Because it is odorous: — 

(3) What is not different from these others is not 

odorous, — as water, [for example, is in- 
odorous] : 

(4) But this [earth] is not so [i. e., is not in- 

odorous] : 

(5) Therefore it is not such [as the other elements, 

but different from these others].' 
Here [we are obliged to employ, in the third mem- 



160 NOTE C— ON "LOGIC" AND "RHETORIC." 

ber, a universal negative, because] there is no analogous 
example [to cite in confirmation], in the case of [the 
universal affirmative] 'What possesses odor is different 
from the others,' seeing that earth alone [according 
to the Nyaya~\ can be the subject [of a proposition in 
which odor is affirmatively predicated]." 

TRANSLATION. 

" That, whose possession of what is to be established 
is doubted, is called the subject (paksha) ; as the moun- 
tain, when the fact of its smoking is [adduced as] the 
reason [for inferring the presence of fire]. That which 
certainly possesses the property in question is called an 
instance on the same side (sapalcsha) ; as the culinary 
hearth, in the same example. That which is certainly 
devoid of the property in question, is called an instance 
on the opposite side (vipaksha) ; as the great lake, in the 
same example." 

REMARKS. 

The sapalcsha corresponds to Bacon's instantice con- 
venientes " quse in eadem natura conveniunt, per materias 
licet dissimilimas." The vipaksha corresponds to the 
instantiaB "quae natura data privantur," — Novum Orga- 
num, Lib. 2, Aph. XI. and XII. 



161 



NOTE D. 

ON THE "VEDAS." 

[If the Indian missionary be staggered by the con- 
templation of the bnlky published volumes (Sanskrit 
and English) of the Veda, the following remarks, penned 
in 1851, on receipt of the first volume in Benares, may 
possibly either satisfy or excite his curiosity.] 

(From the Benares Magazine, for June, 1851). 

Professor Wilson's version of the Rig- Veda is a book 
to be received with thanks. The Friend of India — no 
friend to the Sanskrit — with grumbling acknowledgment 
admits this. The Friend's opinion, further, that the book 
is dryish reading as it stands, appears to be the opinion 
of the periodical press generally. Beflecting upon these 
facts, it occurs to us that there may be readers who would 
thank us for something like a bit of the kernel of the 
volume, — being content to read it as the Lord of Session 
read the Waverley Novels, which he used to buy for his 
wife, as they came out, with the understanding that she 
was to tell him the story. 

In his " Introduction," filled with matter interesting 
to the philosophical inquirer, Professor Wilson comes to 
the conclusion that the Yedas are very old, though it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to say how old they are. Por 
our own part we believe the determination of their age to 



162 NOTE D. 

be a point so little likely to be settled between this and 
the end of the world, that we should almost be tempted, 
if hard pressed, to profess doggedly the Hindu belief in 
their existence from all eternity, rather than pledge our- 
selves to the discussion of the question until we should 
have found out how much younger than eternity the 
books really are. The materials for forming an opinion 
as to the positive date of the books, are, if possible, more 
scanty than those which served the antiquary and the 
knight for common battle-ground, when they disputed 
as to the Teutonic or the classical origin of the Pictish 
language, the only extant word of which was, if we re- 
member rightly, pen-vall — which the one declared to be 
" caput valli," and consequently Latin, while the other 
— admitting the interpretation — insisted that it was 
"head of the wall," and consequently Saxon. To 
" breathe the thin air of the mountain-top " — where 
there is such a lung-trying lack of respirable matter, is 
what we ourselves — un-condor-like — have no sort of 
relish for. Presuming that the reader to whom we 
address ourselves has as little, if not less, we leave this 
question, — satisfied that the Vedas are very old, and 
that, like an old maid who happens to be, like Junius, 
the " sole depositary of her own secret," they are not 
very likely to give up the secret of their age with- 
out being put to a degree of torture which we nowise 
feel called upon to apply in the face of the admission on 
all hands that they are " certainly aged." 

The hymns of the Rig- Veda are in verse. Professor 
Wilson, pledging himself to a literal version of them, 
writes of course in prose. Almost all verse is heavy 



ON THE "VEDAS." 163 

when turned into prose. We shall take the liberty of 
turning some of the hymns into metre, not copying the 
measure of the original but employing what form of 
English verse seems to us to suit the subject. The first 
hymn of the Rig- Veda is addressed to Agni, the god of 
fire, the favourite character of the book. According to 
Professor Wilson, with whom we are disposed to agree, 
the " author" of this hymn is Madhuchhandas, the son 
of Viswamitra. At all events, if Madhuchhandas is not 
the author — (and his name, signifying, as it does, "the 
man whose verse is sweet," has somewhat of an imper- 
sonal air about it) — we are not prepared to mention a 
likelier claimant of the authorship. When we spoke of 
this the other day to a learned Hindu friend, he exhibited 
very marked dissatisfaction and distress, begging us to 
write and tell Professor Wilson that the hymn had no 
author — that it had existed from everlasting — and that 
Madhuchhandas was only the fortunate seer to whom, 
on the last occasion of its revelation, it had been revealed. 
In the meantime, till Professor Wilson's retractation of 
the obnoxious epithet could be obtained, he begged us to 
draw our pencil through the word " author," or to allow 
him to do it himself. We assured him that it was useless, 
and that we knew enough of Professor Wilson to make 
us certain that he would not alter the word for anything 
that we could, with a good conscience, urge against the 
use of it. The Brahman mournfully acquiesced in our 
proposal, that the matter should be left as it stood — only 
with the pencilled protest in the margin; — and here 
follows the hymn versified, without rhyme, licentiously, 
but with a tolerably close adherence to the letter. 



164 NOTE D. 

Hymn to the God of Fire. 

I. 

" Glory to Agni the high priest, 
The ministrant divine, who bears aloft, 
And offers to the gods the sacrifice, — 
"Wealth- saturated Fire ! 

II. 

May He, the radiant, by the seers of eld 
And later sages sung, 
Invite for us the presence of the gods. 

III. 
'Tis all to fire we owe our wealth, 
Kindred and fame ; 
Through Him descends each blessing from the skies. 

IY. 

Borne up to heaven, 
Safe in thy flaming arms, the sacrifice 
How sure to reach the gods ! 

V. 

And when the gods attend well pleased, 
May He, renowned, the true, divinely bright, 
Be with us to present the offering. 

VI. 

Bless thou the giver of the sacrifice 
With all thy blessings, for the well-placed gifts 
Shall sure revert to thee. 

VII. 

At morn and even, 
"With reverential homage in our hearts, 
To thee, bright deity, we turn ; — 

VIII. 

To thee the guardian of the sacrifice, 

Illustrious, 
Expanding in thy glory, as thou tak'st 
The offering to thy keeping. 






ON THE "VEDAS." 165 

IX. 

Be ever present with us for our good ; — 
And as the father to the son he loves 

Is easy of access, 

So be to us, Fire ! " » 

The second hymn is addressed to the god of the 
winds, Vayu by name. Our version of this hymn has 
a sprinkling of rhyme, which militates somewhat against 
fidelity ; but we have been as faithful as we could con- 
trive to be under the circumstances. 

Hymn to the God op the Winds. 
I. 

" Yayu, pleasant to behold, 

Approach : — for thee this offering, 
Juice of the moon-plant, is prepared ; — 

Drink whilst we thy praises sing. 

ii. 

Holy praises sing we now 

To the Air-god ; — 'tis the hour 
We have chosen for our hymn, 

When Vayu cometh in his power. 

1 We annex the prose version of this hymn, as given by Professor Wilson : — 
" 1. I glorify Agni, the high-priest of the sacrifice, the divine, the ministrant, 
who presents the oblation (to the gods), and is the possessor of great wealth. 

2. May that Agni who is to be celebrated by both ancient and modern sages 
conduct the gods hither. 

3. Through Agni the worshipper obtains that affluence which increases day by 
day, which is the source of fame and the multiplier of mankind. 

4. Agni, the unobstructed sacrifice of which thou art on every side the protector, 
assuredly reaches the gods. 

5. May Agni, the presenter of oblations, the attainer of knowledge, he who is 
true, renowned, and divine, come hither with the gods. 

6. Whatever good thou mayest, Agni, bestow upon the giver (of the oblation), 
that verily, Angiras, shall revert to thee. 

7. We approach thee, Agni, with reverential homage in our thoughts, daily, 
both morning and evening. 

8. Thee, the radiant, the protector of sacrifices, the constant illuminator of truth, 
increasing in thine own dwelling. 

9. Agni, be unto us easy of access, as is a father to his son ; be ever present with 
us for our good." 



166 NOTE D. 

III. 

Ha ! thy soft approving speech 

Greets mine ear, — I know thy voice ; 

Thou com'st to drink the soma-juice — 
We see it vanish, — we rejoice. 

IV. 

Another rich libation pour, 

Now the Thunderer summon we ; 

Indra come ! — with Yayu come ! 
Partake the juice prepared for thee. 

V. 

Conversant with every rite 

Of sacrifice — full well ye know 

These libations are prepared 

For you, — on us then favour show. 

VI. 

Lord of skies and Lord of air, 
Indra come and Vayu too, 

Manful gods both, — we shall soon 
Gain all we wish, if helped by you. 

VII. 

Now call the regent of the sun, 
Mitra, lustrous in his powers, 

And ocean's ruler, Varuna, 

The joint bestowers of the showers. 

VIII. 

Ye that treasure up the floods, — 
Lords of the sun and of the seas ! — 

To be dispensed in grateful showers, 
Requite our present services. 

IX. 

Sun and Ocean, for the sake 
Of many were ye born, — most wise, 

Most kind to multitudes, are ye, — 
Frosper this our sacrifice." 



ON THE "VEDAS." 167 

There are some noticeable points in tins hymn. In 
the first place, the author — (begging our friend the 
Brahman's pardon for the phraseology) — speaks of the 
wind as " pleasant to behold." Pigs, as we all know, 
are proverbially said to see the wind ; but here the 
poet would seem to claim participation in the privilege. 
Professor Wilson here remarks — " Vdyu is invoked in a 
visible form as the deity presiding over the wind ; it is 
doubtful if the expressions, which in this and similar 
instances intimate personality, are to be understood as 
indicating actual figures or idols : the personification is 
probably only poetical." We incline to the opinion that 
the personification is only poetical, for two reasons — 
first, because we never saw any Hindu idol that could 
be conscionably spoken of as " pleasant to behold" — 
(except those of Hanuman, the monkey- chief, which our 
friend the archaeologist assures us are long posterior to 
the date of the Yedas), — and, secondly, because we find 
a remark of Professor Wilson's in another page which 
seems to throw a different light upon the matter. The 
remark to which we allude occurs in the 24th page of 
the Introduction, where Professor Wilson observes that, 
in these hymns, " the power, the vastness, the generosity, 
the goodness, and even the personal beauty of the deity 
addressed, are described in highly laudatory strains." 
Now what could be more highly — more implicitly — 
laudatory than for the poet to laud the visible loveliness 
of the wind which he had never set eyes on in the whole 
course of his life ? 

The next point noticeable is the sacrificer's as- 
surance that the wind has drunk up the exhilarating 



168 NOTE D. 

juice of the moon-plant, when the juice has evaporated. 
Here we have chemistry itself adumbrated in poetical 
mythology. 

Then we have the poet, at a loss for anything beyond 
it as a climax of commendation, patting the wind and 
the firmament on the back, with the protestation that they 
are men — stout fellows both of them. There is something 
hearty in this ; — he is evidently in earnest. 

Lastly, the description of the sun and of the ocean as 
the joint bestowers of the showers that refresh the earth, 
is, to our mind, as beautiful as it is philosophical. 
" Aurum latet in hoc," as Leibnitz said of the writings 
of the Schoolmen. "We may turn the Vedas to account, 
if we but eschew the lazy blunder of a lazy scorn. It is 
a glorious point gained when you can find any truth 
enwrapped in language which the man that you have to 
deal with has sucked in as with his mother's milk. 

We may further remark — (in conclusion, after the 
" lastly") — that their thankfulness for showers of rain 
goes far to prove that the Hindus (as Professor Wilson 
observes at page 41 of his Introduction), were an agri- 
cultural people at the time when this hymn was com- 
posed, and not a nomadic, as has been by some contended. 
Nomads, though not independent of rain, are usually less 
anxious about it than agriculturists. 

The third hymn introduces us to the Hindu Castor 
and Pollux — the As wins — " the two sons of the Sun, 
begotten during his metamorphosis as a horse (a'swa), 
endowed with perpetual youth and beauty, and phy- 
sicians of the gods." The invocation of the hymn is not 
confined to these, — Indra, the thunderer, with his u tawny 



ON THE "VEDAS." 169 

coursers," certain miscellaneous deities, and the goddess 
of eloquence, being also invoked. 

Hymn to the twin-born of the Sun, and others. 
I. 
Twin-sons of heaven's bright orb, 
Friends of the pious, — whose far-reaching arms 
Avail to guard your worshippers, accept 
The sacrificial viands. Ye whose acts, 
Mighty and manifold, declare your power, 
Ye that direct the hearts of the devout, 
With favouring ear attend our hymn of praise. 
Faithful and true, destroyers of the foe, 
First in the van of heroes, As' wins, come ! 
Come to the mixed libations that we pour 
On the lopped sacred grass. 

II. 

Now on Indra we call, on the wondrously bright ; 

See — we press from the moon-plant the juice of delight, 

The juice, ever pure as enchanting, that longs 1 

To be quaffed by thy lips ; — come and list to our songs. 

The wise understand Thee — 'tis only the wise 

That the knowledge of Indra full rightly can prize ; 

Approach and accept then the prayers of thy priest, 

Let thy fleet tawny steeds bear thee swift to the feast. 

III. 

Next the throng divine invite 

Of deities that guard the right, 

Ever watching o'er us all, — 

Call them to our festival. 
Come, ye swift-moving spirits, ye spirits that run 
Through the universe — swift as the rays of the sun — 
That preside o'er the rain- showers, accept of our cheer, 
Nor despise the libation we pour for you here. 

1 In the prose version — "these libations, ever pure, expressed by the fingers (of 
the priests) are desirous of thee," p. 9. 



170 NOTE D. 

Omniscient immortals, whose might is for aye, 

In the youth of its vigour exempt from decay, 

In whose souls void of malice all kindly thoughts spring, 

Deign to look on the gifts that your worshippers bring. 

IV. 

Now to Saraswatl address the song, 
Saraswatl to whom all gifts belong, 
The recompenser of the worshipper 
With food and wealth, — our hymn be now to her. 
Joy ! — for Saraswatl, whose inspiration 

Is theirs alone that in the truth delight, 
Accept our sacrifice ; — pour the libation 

To her, the guide of all whose hearts are right. 
Behold the present deity ! — the stream, 1 

The mighty stream named hers, — behold it roll, 
Bearing on its fair bosom such a gleam 
Of light as she alone can stream upon the soul." 

Some of the most graceful of the hymns are addressed 
to the goddess of the morning — Ushas — the Aurora of 
Hindu mythology. Here is a portion of one, — for the 
entire hymn would be rather long. 

Hymn to Aukoba. 
I. 
Daughter of heaven, — Aurora, dawn on us ; 
Diffusing light, and bringing wealth with thee, 
Bountiful goddess, dawn. 

II. 

Housing the flocks and waking up the birds, 
Nourishing all, yet onward to decay 
Conducting all her transitory charge, 
Even as a matron to her household cares, 
Daily the dawn comes forth. 

1 As Professor Wilson observes, Saraswatl, the divinity of speech, "is here iden- 
tified with the river so named," p. 10. The river, we believe, is now nowhere to be 
met with, — ominous, one might think, that the genius of India had run itself out, 
for the time at least. 



ON THE "VEDAS." 171 

III. 

Shedder of dews, delay she knows not. See 
How her approach inspires the diligent ; 
The client early seeks his patron's gate, 
The soaring birds suspend their flight no more, 
Up- springing with the dawn. 

IV. 

All living things invoke her, and adore ; 
Bringer of good, she lighteth up the world, 
While the malevolent that love the dark 
Flee at her blest approach. 

These may suffice as a sample of the hymns, in which 
there is much sameness of character both as to style and 
subject. From the remaining hymns we shall now glean 
a few noticeable passages. 

In the 3rd verse of the 9th hymn, Indra is addressed 
as "thou, who art to be reverenced by all mankind." 
In a note on this passage, Professor Wilson says that the 
epithet viswa-charshane is literally " oh ! thou who art 
all men," or, as the commentator explains it, "who art 
joined with all men," — which is further qualified as 
"to be worshipped by all institutors of sacrifices." Pro- 
fessor Wilson adds — " It may be doubted if this be all 
that is intended." It strikes us that what is intended 
may be that now familiar conception of the chief ener- 
gising deity — iswara, "the lord" — as being not other 
than the aggregate of all embodied souls, " as a forest 
is not other than the trees that compose it," — a concep- 
tion which may be seen elaborated in any work on the 
Vedanta, such as the Vedanta-sdra. Dr. Eosen's render- 
ing of the epithet as "omnium hominum domine" is not 
opposed to this view. It is curious to trace, in these the 

14 



172 NOTE D. 

most ancient portions of the Veda, anything like the 
dawning of those conceptions which, gradually elaborated 
through the subsequent portions entitled the Upanishads, 
took at length the form which they now hold in the 
Yedanta philosophy. In the 3rd verse of the 6th hymn 
there is another passage, which appears to have puzzled 
the commentator, and which has to our eye a Yedantic 
aspect. The verse runs thus — " Mortals, you owe your 
(daily) birth (to such an Indra), who with the rays of the 
morning gives sense to the senseless, and to the formless 
form." Indra, according to Professor "Wilson, is here 
" identified with the sun, whose morning rays may be 
said to re-animate those who have been dead in sleep 
through the night." This is the obvious explanation, 
and probably the correct one ; but there is something 
strange in the construction, — the word for " mortals " 
being plural, whilst the verb is in the singular. The 
commentator u is of opinion that the want of concord is 
a Vaidik license." This it possibly is ; but the assumed 
indifference between the singular and the plural reminds 
us not only of the Yedantic tenet of the indifference 
between the collective and the distributive aggregate of 
humanity,— " as between the forest and its constituent 
trees," — but also of another tenet, viz., that, during pro- 
found sleep, the world actually as well as apparently 
ceases to exist for the sleeper, whose disembodied spirit, 
at that time merging in the Infinite Spirit, re-assumes, 
in the processes of awakening, a body with its senses and 
its outward form. 

But whether there be or not in these ancient hymns 
faint indications of the philosophy which was gradually 



ON THE "VEDAS." 173 

elaborated in the Vedanta, the indications are abundantly 
plentiful of those myths which have supplied topics for 
the poets. The combats of Indra, the thunderer, espe- 
cially with the demons of drought, remind us of the 
fights of the Scandinavian Thor with the Jotuns. 

In the 7th verse of the 11th hymn we read : — "Thou 
slewest, Indra, by stratagems, the wily Sushna : the wise 
have known of this thy (greatness) ; bestow upon them 
(abundant) food." On this Professor Wilson remarks, 
that Sushna is described as a demon slain by Indra, but 
that "this is evidently a metaphorical murder. Sushna 
means dryer up, exsiccator .... heat or drought ; which 
Indra, as the rain, would put an end to." The greatest 
of Indra's foes is Vritra, who ought by rights to be the 
father of Sushna, or the drought, seeing that he repre- 
sents the retentive power of the clouds whereby they 
withhold from the earth the waters that they contain, 
until Indra, "with his thunderbolt or electrical influence, 
divides the aggregated mass, and vent is given to the 
rain, which then descends upon the earth." 

Dr. Miiller's edition of the Sanskrit text of these 
hymns is a monument both of his own diligence and 
of the liberality of the Honourable Court, without whose 
patronage the publication could not have been ventured 
upon. The volume is a handsome quarto of nine hun- 
dred and ninety pages. The bulk of these is occupied 
by the commentary, which is a very ample one. The 
text of the hymns, in its translated form, does not 
occupy much more than the half of some three hun- 
dred octavo pages, the other half being devoted to 
the notes of the translator. Sayanacharya, the com- 



174 NOTE D. 

mentator, makes something like an apology for the 
amplitude of his exegesis. 

This edition of the Rig-veda, Dr. Muller remarks, 
"is not intended for the general scholar, but only for 
those who make Sanskrit their special study/' etc. To 
such students this massive tome presents a supply of 
pabulum, such as a helluo librorum may well be ex- 
pected to lick his lips at. And then, to think of the 
other volumes that are to come, this first instalment, 
with its thousand pages, being but the one-eighth part 
of one Yeda out of the four ! But the other volumes 
are not likely to be so big; for, as the commentator 
Sayana remarks of his work, in some introductory 
verses, — "The first section of this, deduced as it is 
from traditional doctrine, is to be listened to. An 
intelligent person, perfect in thus much, can under- 
stand the whole." He then proceeds to explain why 
the Eig-veda, rather than any one of the others, is taken 
for commentatorial illustration first in order. To justify 
the selection, he brings forward various arguments, — 
among others, the fact that when the separate Yedas 
are enumerated in the Yeda itself, the Eig-veda stands 
first in the enumeration. The objector then, acquiescing 
in the proposed order, falls back upon the more perilous 
doubt whether there is any such thing as the Yeda 
at all! "The short and the long of it is," he insists, 
" there is no Yeda: how, then, can there be a ii^-veda, 
— an integrant portion thereof? For there is no sign 
whereby one can recognise anything as being the Yeda, 
nor is there any proof of it; and nothing can be esta- 
blished when there is neither the one nor the other 



ON THE "VEDAS." 175 

of these. For those that understand logic, hold that 
a thing is established by characteristic signs and by 
proofs." And so the hardy objector goes on, while 
Sayana, calm in the consciousness of strength, abides 
his time. "When the objector has finished, the other 
disposes of the objection ; whereupon our objector, con- 
ceding — for the sake of argument — that there may be 
"a certain thing called the Yeda," demurs to there 
being any occasion for making a commentary on it. 
The Yeda, he argues, is no authority, some of its texts 
being downright nonsense. Such charges, it may be 
presumed, Sayana did not deck out in all the pomp 
of regular disputation, without feeling tolerably sure 
of his own power to dispose of them satisfactorily. He 
allows to both sides of the question ample elbow-room, 
and it is not till after three-and-forty of Dr. Miiller's 
broad quarto pages that we come to the first line of 
the first hymn of the Eig-veda. Four pages of com- 
ment on this hemistich bring us to the second line, 
and so the work goes on. 

The exegetical part of Sayana's commentary is quite 
exhaustive. For example : — on the first verse, begin- 
ning " I laud Fire, the priest," etc., he remarks — " I 
laud Fire, i.e., the deity so named; laud, i.e., praise, 
the verb here being id, l to praise,' the letter d in which 
is changed to I by Yaidik license," and so on. 

We may mention to our Hindu friends that this 
edition is intended not only for Sanskrit scholars, but 
also Dr. Miiller tells, " for those among the natives 
of India who are still able to read their own Sacred 
Books in the language of the original." The price of 



176 NOTE E. 

the volume is a trifle compared with that of a good 
manuscript ; and no manuscript in the market can vie 
with it in point of accuracy. The copyists of the Yeda 
admit their liability to error ; and, in the verses which 
they are in the habit of appending to a completed 
transcript, they frequently complain of the hardships 
and difficulties of their task. One of the most touch- 
ing of these penmen's plaints is the following, which 
Dr. Miiller instances : — 

" My back, my hips, and my neck are broken ; my 
sight is stiff in looking down : keep this book with 
care, which has been written with pain." 



NOTE E. 

THE ETERNITY OE SOUND; A DOGMA OE THE MlMANSA. 

[This dogma being of vital importance to the Veda, 
he who argues against the Veda ought to understand 
what the dogma means. "We reprint the following re- 
marks of ours on it from the Benares Magazine, August, 
1852.] 

At page 305, vol. i. of Mr. Colebrooke's Collected 
Essays, where he is treating of Jaimini's system of 
philosophy, the Mimansa, we read as follows : — " In 
the first chapter of the lecture occurs the noted dis- 
quisition of the Mimansa on the original and perpetual 
association of articulate sound with sense." What this 
dogma means, and why the question forced itself upon 



ON "THE ETERNITY OF SOUND." 177 

Jaimini at the opening of his work, we here propose 
to consider. 

. " The object of the Mimansa" to employ the words 
of Mr. Colebrooke, " is the interpretation of the Vedas." 
As he adds, "Its whole scope is the ascertainment of 
duty." This is declared in the opening aphorism, which, 
interspersing an explanatory comment, we may render 
as follows : — " Well, then [0 student, since thou hast 
read the Vedas while residing in the family of thy 
preceptor], therefore a desire to know duty [which know- 
ledge, without further aid, thou wilt scarcely gather 
from the texts with which thy memory is stored, ought 
now to be entertained by thee]." 1 But what do you 
mean by " duty ?" inquires the student. To expound 
the entire import of the term would be difficult, if not 
impossible, at the outset; so Jaimini, following the 
recognised method of laying down a "characteristic" 
(lakshana), by which the thing, though not fully des- 
cribed, may be securely recognised, declares as follows: 
— "A duty is a matter which may be recognised [as 
a duty] by the instigatory character [of the passage of 
Scripture in which it is mentioned]." 2 As Mr. Cole- 
brooke observes, " Here duty intends sacrifices and 
other acts of religion ordained by the Vedas. The same 
term (dharma) likewise signifies virtue, or moral merit ; 
and grammarians have distinguished its import accord- 
ing to the gender of the noun. In one (the masculine), 
it implies virtue ; in the other (neuter), it means an 
act of devotion. It is in the last-mentioned sense that 
the term is here employed." We may add, in expla- 
1 ^TTcft WfaWRT II q II 2 ^t^TT^rWt \rf: II ^ II 



178 NOTE E. 

nation of this, that the discussion of the gender of the 
word was provoked by Jaimini' s choosing to employ 
the masculine form (as may be observed in the original 
aphorism given in the note), instead of the neuter. To 
the query, why Jaimini was guilty of this grammatical 
solecism, one of his commentators coolly replies, "take 
[and be content with] as the reason thereof, the fact 
that he [Jaimini] is a great sanctified sage [and there- 
fore entitled to give the word what gender he pleases]." 
Arguments of this lofty Pope Hildebrand order, which 
were doubtless rolled out with unction, et ore rotundo, 
in the palmy days of Hinduism, the Brahmans now- 
a-days are most amusingly ashamed of; those of 
them, at least, who are not prepared to join cordially 
in a broad grin over the "bumptiousness" of the pre- 
tension. 

Whilst Jaimini contents himself with giving, in the 
first instance, a "characteristic" by which duty may be 
recognised, his commentator supplies an account of its 
nature (swarupa), i.e., what constitutes that a duty to 
which the characteristic in question belongs. According 
to him, what constitutes anything a duty is " the fact of 
its not producing more pain than pleasure [or, in other 
words, its being calculated to produce more pleasure 
than pain]." The agreement of this with the Ben- 
thamite definition of the Useful is noticeable. Another 
thing which we wish here to take an opportunity of 
noticing, is a correspondence, in point of terminology, 
between the systems of the East and of the West. That 
which constitutes anything what it is, was called by 
Plato its Idea. Aristotle disliked the term; and he 



ON "THE ETERNITY OF SOUND." 179 

sought to convey the same meaning by a term which the 
Schoolmen rendered Form. Bacon adopted the word 
Form in this sense, and the exactly corresponding San- 
skrit word, viz., swarupa, is the one here employed, 
and generally employed, to convey the notion of what 
is the abiding cause of a thing's being what it is. 
When a Hindu writer, at the opening of a treatise on 
anything, says " I shall declare the laJcshana and the 
swarupa of the thing in question," he means to say, that 
he will tell first, how we are to recognise the thing as 
the thing that we are talking about, and that he will 
next tell, all about it The laics hana is the mark on 
the sealed package, by which we recognise it among 
other packages ; the swarupa is the contents of the 
package. The reason why we think it worth while 
to advert to the import of the phraseology in question 
is this, that we ourselves once took a good deal of 
pains unprofitably to reconcile these two terms with 
the " genus" and the " specific difference" which to- 
gether make up the " definition," according to European 
logic. The one set of terms and the other, however, 
belong to different aspects of thought. 

To return to Jaimini: — Having intimated that the 
cause of our knowing anything to be a duty was simply 
an instigation, in the shape of a passage of Scripture 
holding out the promise of a reward for the perform- 
ance of a given act, he next thinks proper to show 
how nothing else could be the evidence for it. "An 
examination," he says, "of the cause of [our recog- 
nising] it [viz., a duty, is to be made];" 1 and he ex- 

II 3 II 



180 NOTE E. 

plains, as follows, how our organs of sense cannot supply 
the evidence of it. " When a man's organs of sense 
are rightly applied to something extant, that birth of 
knowledge [which then takes place] is perception — [and 
this perception is] not the cause [of our recognising a 
duty], because the apprehension [by the senses] is of 
what is [then and there] extant, [which an act of 
duty is nof\? n Since perception is not the evidence 
of a thing's being a duty, it follows, according to the 
commentator, that inference or analogy, or anything 
else, " which has its root in perception," cannot be 
the evidence ; and, consequently, precept — express or 
implied — is the only evidence of a thing's being a 
duty. 

But here the doubt presents itself, whether the 
evidence in favour of a thing's being a duty may not 
be as fallacious as is the evidence of the senses. Accord- 
ing to the objector, — " after words and meanings have 
presented themselves, since the connection between the 
two is one devised by man, — consisting, as it does, of 
the conventions which man has devised ; therefore, as 
sense-knowledge' wanders away from truth when it mis- 
takes mother-o' -pearl for silver, so language is liable 
to part company with veracity in matters of assertion, 
and consequently the instigatory nature of a passage 
which, being couched in words, is liable to be misun- 
derstood, cannot be the instrument of certain knowledge 
in respect of duty." Jaimini, in reply, denies that this 
doubt affects the evidence of Scripture. " But the 



ON "THE ETERNITY OF SOUND." 181 

natural [i.e., the eternal and not conventional] connec- 
tion of a word with its sense, is [the instrument of] 
the knowledge thereof, and the intimation [of Scripture 
which is] infallible, though given in respect of some- 
thing imperceptible. This, [according to our opinion, 
as well as that] of Badarayana, [the author of the 
Veddnta aphorisms], is the evidence [by means of which 
we recognise a duty], for it has no respect [to any 
other evidence, such as that of sense]." 1 Assertions 
in regard to ordinary things, such as the assertion that 
there is fire in this or that place, meet with credit, 
because people have opportunities of verifying such as- 
sertions by ocular inspection. This is not the case 
with regard to the assertion that this or that act is 
a duty; and therefore Jaimini — in the absence of the 
possibility of verification — rests the evidence of testi- 
mony, in the case of Scripture, on its infallibility. The 
mention of the name of Badarayana (who is the same 
as Vyasa), in this fifth aphorism, goes to prove that 
Jaimini' s work, the Purvva-mlmdnsd, was not antecedent 
in time to Vyasa' s Uttara-mimdnsa. Mr. Colebrooke's 
rendering of the terms purvva and uttara by " prior" 
and " later" (see Essays, vol. i., pp. 227 and 295), 
would seem to have led Dr. Eitter to suppose that 
Jaimini' s system was the earlier in order of publica- 
tion. Dr. Eitter says (at p. 376, vol. iv., of his History 
of Philosophy, Morrison's version) that, " according to 
Colebrooke, the adherents of this school may be divided 
into the earlier and the later;" and then he goes on 

1 ^rMprieh^j ^93fr*N *H«|«M«$Hgl ^R^^^lft 



182 NOTE E. 

to speak of " the older and genuine Veddnta:" but in 
fact the terms " prior" and " later" refer not to time, 
but to the divisions of the Veda which Jaimini and 
Vyasa respectively expound, the latter directing his 
attention to the Upanishads, or theological sections, 
which stand last in order. The word mimdnsd means 
" a seeking to understand," and the purvva-mimdnsa is 
"a seeking to understand the prior (or ritual portion 
of the Vedas)" while the uttara-mlmdnsd is a " seeking 
to understand the later (or theological portion of the 
Vedas)" These two compounds, in short, to speak 
grammatically, are not Karmadhdraya, but Shashthl-tat- 
purusha. 

Jaimini, we have just seen, denies that the connection 
of a word with its sense is dependent on human conven- 
tion. This he was obliged to do in order to remove the 
Vedas beyond the imputation of that fallibility which 
attaches to all that is devised by man. The eternal con- 
nection between a word and its sense, the commentator 
here remarks, "is dependent on the eternity of sound," 
— seeing that if sound were not eternal, then words 
which consist of sound could not be eternal, nor conse- 
quently could the relation of such to their significations 
be eternal. Being compelled, therefore, to demonstrate 
that sound is eternal, Jaimini, in pursuance of the esta- 
blished method of procedure, first grapples with the 
arguments which, prima facie, might seem to counten- 
ance an opposite view of the matter. The first objection 
to the eternity of sound is its being made by effort. 
Thus, according to Jaimini, " Some [viz., the followers 
of the Nyaya] say that it is a product, for, in the case 



ON "THE ETERNITY OF SOUND." 183 

of it, we see [the effort made for its production]." l 
Jaimini is far too secure in the strength of his own 
position, to be under any temptation to stop the mouths 
of objectors before they have said their say. Half a 
dozen objections he allows to be tabled against the 
eternity of sound, the second of them being, " Because 
of its transitoriness," 2 — because, " beyond a moment it 
is no longer perceived." Moreover, the Naiyayikas 
contend, in the third place, that sound is not eternal, 
because it is stamped as factitious by the usage of 
language, — " Because of [our employing, when we speak 
of sound] the expression * making?"* When you talk 
of making something, as a jar for instance, you talk of 
something that has a commencement, else where were 
the need of its being made? Fourthly, according to 
the Naiyayikas, the alleged eternity of sound is incom- 
patible with its undeniable multeity, and the fact that 
multeity does belong to it is inferred " From its being 
simultaneously in another person [occupying a different 
place from some first person whom it also affects]." 4 
According to the explanation of the scholiast, " The 
scope of the present objection is this, that an argument 
which establishes the eternity of any sound will equally 
establish its unity) and thus we should have to admit 
that a numerically single and eternal entity is simul- 
taneously present to the senses, both of those near and 
those far off — which is an inconsistency." And the 
Naiyayikas infer that sound is not eternal, because, 

1 ^Iff rR ^rm; h § 11 2 ^rtrt^ h ^ n 

3 <*Ofa*KK m * « 4 f^ Rimini II Q. II 



184 NOTE E. 

" Also, of the original and altered forms" l of words — 
a condition incompatible with the changelessness of 
eternity — and, finally, because, "Also, by a multitude 
of makers there is an augmentation of it." 2 A thousand 
lamps, rendering a jar manifest, do not make the jar 
seem larger than a single lamp does : yet a thousand 
persons uttering any sound in concert, make a propor- 
tionately greater sound than one person does; so this 
must be a case not of manifesting a previously extant 
sound, but of making one. 

Before stating the arguments in support of his own 
view, Jaimini addresses himself to the refutation of the 
foregoing objections ; and antecedently to this, also, he 
judiciously seeks to narrow the ground of contention by 
determining how far both parties agree. " But alike," 
he says, "is the perception thereof," 3 — according to both 
views, — both agreeing that the perception of sound is only 
for a moment, whatever difference of opinion there may be 
as to sound itself being momentary. But though acqui- 
escent so far as this point is concerned, Jaimini cannot 
allow that the sound which we perceive for the moment 
was produced at the moment. He explains : — " Of this 
[sound], while it really exists, the non-perception at 
another time [than that when the sound is perceived] is 
due to the non-application [of a manifester] to the object 
[the then unheard sound]." 4 In like manner, a jar, seen 
by a flash of lightning, is not then produced, nor does it 
cease to exist on its ceasing to be perceived. The same 

1 TrerfTTftwr^ ii qo ii 2 ^^ ^H^rra 11 <w 11 

4 *m: q^T^H f*mT*rR*rr^ II <^ II 



OX "THE ETERNITY OF SOUND." 185 

jar may be manifested for another moment by a subsequent 
flash. According to the commentator, " Sound is eternal 
[as we are constrained to admit], by force of the recognition 
that, ' This is that same letter K" [viz., the same 1 sound 
that I heard yesterday, or fifty years ago], and in virtue 
of the law of parcimony" — one of the fundamental laws 
of philosophising acknowledged by philosophers both of 
the East and of the West, and implying that we must 
never assume more causes of a given effect than are 
sufficient to account for it. Europeans hold that sound 
is due to vibration. Jaimini's commentator admits that 
it is not perceived when there is no vibration : but, with 
perverse ingenuity, he argues that the absence of vibra- 
tion, or the stillness of the air, is what prevents us 
from perceiving the sound, which never ceases to exist, 
whether perceived or not. " The conjunctions and dis- 
junctions [or undulations] of the air issuing from the 
mouth, remove the still air which was the obstacle to the 
perception of sound, and thence it becomes perceptible." 
Eeplying to the objection conveyed in Aph. S, 
Jaimini says, " This [expression ' making'] means em- 
ploying;" 2 — we talk of making a sound when we only 
make use of it. Then, as for the objection that a sound 
cannot be one, because its perception is present to many 
at a time, he replies, " The simultaneousness is as in the 
case of the sun:" 3 which is explained to mean, that, 

1 In opposition to the Miniansakas, the Naiyayikas contend that the form of 
expression, " This is that same letter K" is grounded merely on the fact that the 
things referred to are of the same kind, — just as is the case with the expression, " He 
has taken the same medicine that I did." See the Siddhanta Muktavali, p. 103 ; 
and compare the remarks of Whately (in the Appendix to his Logic) on the 
ambiguity of the word " Same." 



186 NOTE E. 

"As the sun, which is but one, is seen simultaneously 
by those stationed in different places, so, like the sun, 
a sound is a great object, not a minute one" — such as 
cannot come at once under the cognizance of persons at 
any distance from one another. Then, as for the objec- 
tion that a sound cannot be eternal, since it undergoes 
changes in the hands of the grammarian, he says, "This 
[e.g., the letter y coming in the room of i~] is another 
letter, not a modification" 1 — of that whose place it 
takes. As the commentator adds, "The y is not a 
modification of the i, as a mat is a modification of the 
straw. If it were so, then, as the maker of a mat is 
under the necessity of providing himself with straw to 
make it of, the man that employs the letter y would be 
under the necessity of taking the letter i to make it of." 
Finally, to the objection that a sound must be a product, 
because there is the more of it the more numerous are 
those employed in making it, he replies, "It is the 
increase of the noise that becomes great," 2 — and not of 
the sound. 

Here we begin to perceive that this notable dispute 
is somewhat of a verbal one, and that Jaimini does not 
mean by sound what his opponents mean by it. Sound, 
according to Jaimini, like the music spoken of in 
Othello, is of a kind "that may not be heard," 3 — a 
" silent thunder" in its way. But let us hear Jaimini, 
who, having disposed of the offered objections, proceeds 
1 ^TnT^rfw^ II <\% II 2 TT^ft: XTTT II W II 

3 Clown. — If you have any music that may not be heard, then to't again: hut, 
as they say, to hear music, the general doth not greatly care. 
Musician. — We have none such, sir. 

Clown. — Then put up your pipes 

Othello, Act iii, sc. 1. 



ON "THE ETERNITY OF SOUND." 187 

to defend his own theory. "But it must be eternal 
[this or that articulate sound], because its exhibition 
is for the sake of another;" 1 and the commentator 
adds, in explanation — " If it were not eternal, then, 
as it would not continue till the hearer had under- 
stood our meaning [the perception of the sound ceas- 
ing on the instant that it reaches the ear], the under- 
standing [of what was uttered] would not take place 
because of the absence of the cause ; — for, to explain 
further, the understanding of what is uttered must follow 
— at however short an interval — the perception of the 
sound uttered ; and if the sound perish on the hearing, 
as the noise does, then being no longer in existence, it 
cannot be the cause of anything." If, on the other hand, 
it continue to exist, for any period however short, after 
ceasing to be perceived, it is impossible to assign any 
other instant at which there is any evidence of the dis- 
continuance of its existence, — whence its eternity may 
be inferred. Moreover, as it is prospectively eternal, so 
was it antecedently, which he considers to be proved, 
" By there being everywhere simultaneousness " 2 in the 
recognition of it by ever so many hearers, who could not 
recognise it if it were a new production. For example, 
when the word cow is uttered, a hundred persons recognise 
the word alike ; and, the commentator adds, a " hundred 
persons do not simultaneously fall into an error," — this 
being as unlikely as it is that a hundred arrows discharged 
simultaneously by a hundred archers should all by mis- 
take hit the same object. Then, again, a sound is proved 

15 



188 NOTE E. 

to be eternal "By the absence of number;" 1 for, e.g., 
" When the word cow has been uttered ten times, we 
say ' The word cow has been uttered ten times,' but not 
1 ten words of the form cow have been uttered." Further, 
sound, as being indiscerptible, is proved to be eternal, 
"By there being no ground for anticipation" 2 of its 
destruction. " As, on the mere inspection of a web, one 
feels certain that i this web was produced by the conjunc- 
tion of threads, and it will be destroyed by the destruc- 
tion of the conjunction of the threads,' so, — from the ab- 
sence of the knowledge of any cause that should lead to 
the destruction of a sound, we conclude that it is eternal." 

But some one may contend that a sound is a mere 
modification of the air, and he may cite the Siksha — 
that appendage of the Yedas which treats of pronuncia- 
tion, which tells us that "air arrives at the state of 
being sound" after undergoing such and such treat- 
ment ; — so Jaimini anticipates and repels this, " Because 
[if it were so], there would not be perception [by the 
organ of hearing] of an object appropriate to it." 3 He 
means to say that " modifications of the air are not what 
the organ of hearing takes cognizance of, sound not being 
something tangible," as the air is held by the JSTaiyayikas 
to be, while sound, they hold, has an altogether diffe- 
rent substratum, viz., the ether. Here Jaimini, though 
he does not himself hold sound to be a quality of ether, 
does not however disdain to avail himself of the argu- 
mentum ad hominem. 

Finally, to put the seal upon the evidence of sound's 

1 wmiHMI Jt II *q II 
2 WhMK II RR U 3 TOT^TI iHl*!^ II ^ II 



ON "THE ETERNITY OF SOUND." 189 

eternity, he refers to the Hindu scriptures : — " And 
[each articulate sound is proved to be eternal] by our 
seeing a proof" 1 of this, in the text which the com- 
mentator supplies, viz., " By language, that alters not, 
eternal," etc. Here ends the topic of sound ; and as- 
suredly Jaimini does not make it very clear what he 
means by the term. Let us therefore turn to a fuller 
exposition of the dogma in question, and this may be 
found in the Mahdbhashya and its commentaries. 

Patanjali commences the Mahabhashya, or " Great 2 
Commentary," on the Grammatical Aphorisms of Panini, 
by saying ''Now, the teaching of sounds : ''— " Of what 
sounds?" he asks; — and he replies, " Of those secular 
and those sacred." Kaiyata remarks on this as follows : 
" Since the word ' sound ' signifies sound in general, 
having reflected that — since, but for the question in 
hand, etc., there would have been nothing to determine 
the species, — the teaching also of the sounds of fiddle- 
strings, and of the cries of crows, etc., might have sug- 
gested itself, he asks, ' Of what] etc." Then, "having 
further reflected, that since Grammar is an appendage of 
the Veda, from the sense of the terms the species [of 
sounds with which Grammar is concerned] may be in- 
ferred, he says [in order to give a useful reply to his 
own question], ' Of secular] etc." After several pages 
of such disquisition, which provoke twice as many more 

1 faiK^HN II Rtf 11 

2 Its " greatness," — though the commentator Kaiyata, with allusion to its bulk, 
styles it an "ocean of a commentary," — is explained by his commentator, again, 
Nages'a Bhatta, to consist in its being, unlike ordinary commentaries, a supple- 
mentary authority, and not a mere exegesis. — See vol. i. of the Benares College 
edition of the Mahabhashya, p. 1 of translation. 



190 NOTE E. 

from Nagesa Bhatta, Patanjali is allowed to go on again. 
"Of these, the secular, in the first place, are such as 
cow, horse, man, elephant, bird, deer, brahman. The scrip- 
tural are verily indeed such as sauna devlrabhishtaye 
(' may the goddess be propitious to my prayers,')" etc. 
He goes on to say — " Well — l cow' 1 — here which is the 
word ? That which is in the shape of a thing with dew- 
lap, tail, hump, hoofs, and horns, — pray, is that the 
word ? Nay, replies he, that is verily a thing. Then 
the hints, gestures, and winking, — is that the word? 
Nay, he replies, that verily is action. Then the white, 
the blue, the tawny, the spotted, — is that the word ? 
Nay, he replies, that verily is quality. Then, that which 
in [many] different is [one and] not different, — and which 
is not destroyed in things which [by disintegration] are 
destroyed, — that which is the common nature, — is that 
the word ? Nay, he replies, that verily is the form — 
[implying the genus, or Platonic ' idea' — the h hsi 
noKhcov]. What then is the word ? l The word [' cow'] 
is that through which, when uttered, there is the cog- 
nition of things with dewlap, tail, hump, hoofs, and 
horns." We must not at present indulge in a rechauffe- 
ment of all the drolly sagacious things that Kaiyata and 
Nagesa take occasion to propound with reference to these 
remarks of his Snakeship 2 Patanjali. We must confine 
ourselves to the question of what is eternal, or held to be 
eternal, in the matter of sound. 

Everybody allows that the constituent letters of a word 

1 The inquirer is supposed to ask this after having run through all the categories, 
which the grammarians reckon to he four, — the four above-mentioned. 

2 Whilst the author of the Mahabhashya (and of the Yoga Aphorisms) honoured 
the world with his presence, he is understood to have been a serpent. 



ON "THE ETERNITY OF SOUND." 191 

are non-significant ; because, says Kaiyata, " if letters 
severally were significant, the pronunciation of the 
second, or of any subsequent [letter in any word] would 
be purposeless. But, assuming that they are severally 
non-significant, then, on the theory that they arise, since 
they cannot arise simultaneously ; and [then again] on the 
theory that they are manifested, since, from their being 
manifested successively, there is no [stable] aggregate, — 
if those that are impressed on a single [page of] memory 
were what express [the meaning connected with these 
letters so recorded], then we should find no difference 
between the sense gathered in the case of sara, 'an 
arrow,' and rasa, i a taste,' [the letters of which are the 
same]. In the Vakyapadiya [of Bhartrihari] it is diffusely 
established, that what denotes [the thing denoted] is [so 
to speak] a ' disclosure' (sphota), other than these [letters, 
and, at the same time], revealed by utterance." What 
is here called sphota — a 'disclosure' — is what Jaimini 
meant by the term sound {sabda), though he chose, for 
prudential reasons of his own, not to point out to his 
opponents — what they ought to have had perspicacity 
enough to discern for themselves — that he was " palter- 
ing with them in a double sense." Possibly, again, the 
case may have been an exemplification of the Hudibrastic 
principle, that 

Sure the pleasure is as great 
Of being cheated, as to cheat. 

The Naiyayikas had no interest in really clearing 
up a confusion of ideas which allowed Jaimini to settle 
the eternity of the Veda, on which all the six schools 
repose, while at the same time it loft a world of cloud- 



192 NOTE E. 

land available for endless and luxurious logomachy. 
The Naiyayikas were humbugs when they did not come 
down upon Jaimim with the sledge-hammer of Gau- 
tama's 52nd aphorism. They knew that he was " palter- 
ing in a double sense," — but then their philosophical 
virtue was not of the termagant order, but rather of 
the kind that coyly resists with sheathed claws. Pay- 
ing no further attention to the Naiyayikas, let us attend 
to the conception which the grammarians, in accord- 
ance with the Mimansakas, denominate sphota. 

At page 305 of the first volume of his Essays, Mr. 
Colebrooke says, " Grammarians assume a special cate- 
gory, denominated sfhdta, for the object of mental per- 
ception, which ensues upon the hearing of an articulate 
sound, and which they consider to be distinct from the 
elements or component letters of the word. Logicians 
disallow that as a needless assumption." Of this sphota, 
which the grammarians — as being Yedantins — assume 
to be the only real entity in the universe, Nagesa 
Bhatta speaks as follows : " The cognition, ' This is one 
word,' c This is one sentence,' is proof of there being such 
a thing as sphota, and of its unity [it being held to 
be one with knowledge, or one with God] ; because, 
too, there is no solid evidence of the fact that memory 
is exactly according to the order of apprehension [so 
that sara and rasa might come to suggest each the 
same idea] since we see things that were apprehended 
in one order, recollected even in the inverse order. 
But, in my opinion, as there becomes gradually, in 
a web, a tincture of various hues deposited by various 
dye-stuffs, so in that [sphota] which is perfectly single, 



ON "THE ETERNITY OF SOUND." 193 

by the course of utterance does there take place a quite 
gradual tincture in the shape of each letter; and this 
is permanent, and it is this that the mind apprehends." 
He adds, that this sphota — this substratum of unqua- 
lified, but diversely qualifiable, knowledge — is one thing, 
though " common to the [particular] denominations of 
jars, webs, etc. ; " and he mentions, that, in another 
work of his, the Manjushd, he has shown how " the 
apprehension of the difference is reflectional," — as when 
the pellucid crystal 1 assumes successively the hue of 
the red, blue, or yellow flower beside it. 

This illustration of the web, to which a succession 
of tints may be communicated, reminds us of the con- 
trivance of an editor in the backwoods of America, 
where printing materials were scarce. Each of his sub- 
scribers was provided with a towel, on which the cur- 
rent number of the journal was stamped, not with ink, 
but with the black mud from the neighbouring swamp. 
When this had been duly perused by the family, the 
towel was washed and sent back to receive the next 
day's impression. The towel of the subscriber^ like 
the sphota of the grammarian, remained one and the 
same towel throughout, whether serving as the sub- 
stratum of a democratic harangue, a defence of repu- 
diation, or an advertisement of wooden nutmegs. 

We observed that, by the Yedantin grammarians, 
the sphota is regarded as the sole entity : — with them 
th "word" (sabda) is " God" [Brahma). This remark- 

1 Cf. Sankhya Aphorism, Bk. I., § 19, c. The word sphota is derived from 
sphut, " to open as a bud or flower," being that by means of which each particular 
meaning is opened out and revealed. It means meaning in general, the foundation 
of all particular meaning. 



194 NOTE E.— ON "THE ETERNITY OF SOUND." 

able expression would require to be carefully considered, 
when the question has reference whether to the adop- 
tion or the avoidance of such and such terms in con- 
veying the doctrines of Christianity. 1 The pandits fur- 
nish a striking exemplification of Bacon's remark, that, 
by men in general, " those things which are new in them- 
selves will still be understood according to the analogy of 
the old." Employ a term that holds a definite place in 
any of the current systems, and the whole of the pan- 
dit's thoughts will immediately run in the mould of 
that system, to which he will strive to accommodate 
what he hears, rejecting whatever refuses to be so ac- 
commodated. A pandit remarked to us one day, 2 for 
example, that the opening verses of the Bible contained 
a palpable contradiction. "It is stated here," said he, 
pointing to the first verse of the Sanskrit version of 
Genesis by the Baptist Missionaries, "that God, in the 
beginning, created Earth (prithivl) and Ether (dJcdsa); 
and then it is added that the Spirit of God moved upon 
the face of the Water, — an element, the creation of 
which is nowhere mentioned in the chapter, the next 
verse going on to speak of the creation of Light. If 
Water and Air did not require to be created, why 
did the other three ?" Here the unfortunate employ- 
ment of the terms prithivl and aM'sa had marshalled 
his thoughts at once under the categories of the Nyaya. 
Our explanation, that the one term was intended to 
denote all the matter of this globe, and the other 
term all that is material, external to this globe, satis- 
fied him that the contradiction did not exist which he 

1 [See Preface, p. iv.] 2 [As already observed in the Preface, p. v.] 



NOTE F.— ON " TRANSLATION INTO THE LANGUAGES OF INDIA." 195 

had supposed; but he felt sure that the words would 
raise precisely the same notions in the mind of every 
Naiyayika that they had raised in his own. The 
terms bhumi and diva, not being technically . appropri- 
ated, would be free from the objection. 



NOTE F, 
ON "TRANSLATION INTO THE LANGUAGES OF INDIA." 

[The dispatch of the Honourable Court of Directors, 
of the 19th of July, 1854, ordaining a great extension 
of the means for the education of India, gave a fresh 
interest to the question how the books to be employed 
in carrying out the work of enlightenment and civil- 
ization ought to be constructed. From a Discourse 
addressed to the Government of the North-west Pro- 
vinces, and printed by the Government at the time, 
extracts are subjoined]. 

As regards our educational proceedings, what the 

° . X O 7 Talue of na _ 

the importance of native learning in India S^iTS 
is not to be measured by the value — real or 
supposed — of the amount of information contained in the 
Arabic and in the Sanskrit. The disparagers of the one 
or the other literature will scarcely be found among 
those who really possess any knowledge of either. The 
best judges have long ere this decided that the Arabic 
and the Sanskrit languages are noble disciplinal studies, 
and that they are fountain-languages, from which the 
vernaculars can be indefinitely supplied with fresh forces, 
But, in order that the fresh additions may become 



196 NOTE F. 

naturalised, it is indispensable, first, that the additions 
should be made by persons thoroughly qualified to 
make them rightly ; and, secondly, that the learners 
should have access to complete information respecting 
the reasons why each particular addition was made 
exactly as it was. In other words, a permanently vital 
system of education in modern science, through the 
medium of un-barbarized Urdu, implies the possibility 
of reference at all times to learned and well-informed 
Maulavis ; and, analogously, in the case of Hindi 
dialects, to learned and well-informed Pandits ; just as 
a scientific English education implies the possibility of 
reference to reliable sources of information relative to 
the classical languages from which the terms of science 
are taken in Europe. Where this access to the foun- 
tains is not open, or not made use of, the terms will be 
found to degenerate rapidly into a gibberish — such as 
we find in the dig art of our law-courts, for a " decree," 
the tdrpin-kd-iel of our laboratories, for " turpentine," 
or the mdmlet of our kitchens, for an " omelette." 

Through If these views are just, then the first ques- 

r g ency ra iiJdJi tion which requires to be distinctly settled, and 

is to be edu- ■* *t * 

cated. no {. thereafter to be perpetually opened up again, 

or to be kept hovering vaguely as a mirage before the 
eyes of the speculator, is the question — whether we are 
going to undertake the education of the Indian millions 
through an English agency or through a native agency ? 
The idea of its being possible to employ a direct English 
agency in the tuition of all India, is perhaps explicitly 
entertained by no one ; but the legitimate consequences 
of the impossibilty are constantly and most mischievously 



ON "TRANSLATION INTO THE LANGUAGES OF INDIA." 197 

overlooked. The labour and difficulty of reproducing 
— really, and not merely in fallacious appearance, — 
European terms of science in the languages of ■ 
the East, originate that " indolent impatience" ^SeJtSe 
which seeks to cut the Gordian knot by de- 
ciding that the English language ought to be the lan- 
guage of science for all the world, — a decision which, 
it is further sought to recommend by the plausible 
plea that a cosmopolitan language of science offers ob- 
vious advantages. My reply rests on the fact, which 
I have asserted and illustrated, that scientific terms, 
cut off from the possibility of reference to their sources, 
tend headlong towards degeneracy. Under an English 
agency employed in the tuition of all India, this natural 
and experienced result might be partially staved off; 
but with the agency which, as already agreed, we must 
go to work witli — if the work is to be done extensively 
at all — the English names will rapidly alter to such 
a degree, that no one who has not watched the pro- 
gress of their degeneracy will be able to recognise them ; 
and thus the fancied advantages of a cosmo- 

u Chimerical 

politan terminology vanish into smoke. The m^oiitaS S£- 
degenerated English terms of our law courts, 
our laboratories, and our kitchens, are just as unintel- 
ligible to the English new comer as if they were native 
terms which he had never before met with. A shout 
of laughter usually accompanies the discovery of what 
the transmogrified vocable was intended for; but the 
word is no help towards mutual understanding. The 
same would be eventually the fate of an English scien- 
tific terminology in the hands of the only agency which. 



198 NOTE F. 

by the hypothesis, is at our disposal for the education 
of the millions. 

Having set forth reasons for holding that an ex- 
tended vernacular terminology, to have any chance of 
becoming profitably naturalized, must be fed from the 
sources of the Arabic or of the Sanskrit; and having 
declared my conviction that neither of these can be 
made — except in most delusive semblance — to supply 
the place of both, I should now proceed to exemplify 
the application of an Eastern fountain-language, the 
Sanskrit, to the production of new terms of science;, 
but, before entering upon the terminology of the sciences, 
I must state my reasons for taking them in the order 
in which I take them. 
Neither the In designing an educational course, if we 

end nor the m 

StemptSedu! are to go to work methodically, systematically, 
aniniouSy ^r and profitably, then regard must be had to the 

clearly deter- •*•<■• 

mined. en( j an( } to the means. Where no distinct end, 

or not the same end, is kept in view by those who take 
part in a discussion, agreement as to the means is pretty 
well out of the question. And how can we hope, as 
Bacon says, to achieve the course if we have not first 
distinctly fixed the goal ? It may be said, indeed, that 
there are more goals than one, inasmuch as we do not 
expect all our pupils to go as far as the one who goes the 
furthest. Be it so; but let us first settle the goal for 
that one, and then the various stages which the others 
may content themselves with reaching, will all lie along 
that more extended course. 

Shall our absolutely ultimate end, then, be the pro- 
duction of a first-rate engineer, or of a valuable revenue 



ON "TRANSLATION INTO THE LANGUAGES OF INDIA." 199 

officer, or of an accomplished native magistrate ? With 

this I am not prepared to be satisfied. My proposed 

end is the making of each educated Hindu a The end, ac- 
cording to my 

Christian, on principle and conviction. This own Yiew - 
end, as I propose here to indicate, implies every thing 
that the amplest course of education can comprise. Let 
us trace this assertion backward, — as thus. That a 
Hindu should, on principle and conviction, embrace a 
religion which, like Christianity, bases its claims on 
historical evidence, presupposes not merely an acquaint- 
ance with historical assertions, but a cultivation of the 
critical faculty, so as that the force of the historical 
evidence may be intelligently felt. The immediate pre- 
paration for a critically intelligent study of history is 
the study of Physical Geography. A history, all of 
whose assertions are found quite consistent with the 
multifarious information supplied by Physical Geography, 
must be felt to present very different claims on our re- 
spect from those of a Purana, with its nowhere discover- 
able oceans of treacle, cane-juice, and butter-milk. But, 
to apprehend with full intelligence what is presented of 
Physical Geography, a knowledge of Zoology, Botany, 
and Geology are required. The full appreciation of these, 
again, presupposes Chemistry, in all its extensive bear- 
ings on Meteorology, climate, etc. The study of Che- 
mistry must be preceded by that of Physics. Physics 
demands an anterior acquaintance with the sciences of 
Number and Magnitude, — sciences which present the 
most elementary exemplification of applied Logic. Such 
is a rapid enumeration of the great steps in the intel- 
lectual course. How the moral course combines with 



200 NOTE F. 

this, we shall see, when, returning on our steps synthe- 
tically, we enquire what apparatus of educational mate- 
rials the course above indicated will require. 
science the Now, it may be objected as follows : — 

only solid foun- ^ ° 

dationofart. "You call this an intellectual course, — it is 
all science, — mere knowledge ; but are we to have no 
applied science? — are we not to teach the arts?" I 
reply, — assuredly you have got to teach these ; and if 
you wish to teach them effectually, you will take care 
that your exposition of each of them shall emanate from 
a previously well-digested exposition of the sciences from 
which the arts draw their life-blood. Your instructions 
in Surveying will bear reference to your scientific ex- 
position of Geometry and Arithmetic, and will be given 
in the accurately determined language of those scientific 
expositions. Your Pharmacy will be founded on your 
scientific exposition of Chemistry, and will avail itself of 
chemical language and chemical principles. You will 
not — it is to be hoped — when penning practical instruc- 
tions for the miner, ignore the scientific views and terms 
of your Geology. In short, all treatises on the arts 
ought to bear reference to the parent sciences, and should 
be constructed in such exact accordance with the ex- 
position of the parent sciences, that the artist may have 
nothing to unlearn, or to confuse him, when he turns to 
the expositions of the parent sciences for fresh sugges- 
tions in the prosecution of his art. Hence, in a syste- 
matic preparation of a literature, we must, except in 
cases of urgency, attend to science first ; and, even in 
the exceptional cases, you must regard your first rude 
manuals of art as merety provisional, and as awaiting the 



ON "TRANSLATION INTO THE LANGUAGES OF INDIA." 20 L 

rectification which a thorough exposition of the parent 
sciences will subsequently render possible. 

A second probable objection is this, that the The relative 

■*■ *> ' order of the 

course indicated above presents the sciences in oSK which 
an order which is not adapted to practical to study. 
education. That you should begin with Logic, — then 
proceed to- Mathematics (including all its branches), — go 
next to Physics, and so proceed through the whole series 
of the sciences, before reading a page of history, or a 
chapter of Zoology, is not feasible. True, — nor do I 
intend that anything of the kind should be attempted. 
A boy may with great advantage store his mind with 
passages of history before he is at all qualified to decide 
on the historian's claims to respect ; and he may, not 
unprofitably, become acquainted with the chemical cha- 
racters of the gases, though he may not have studied 
Physics so as thoroughly to understand the physical 
principles on which the manipulation of the gases de- 
pends ; — and he may profitably become familiar with the 
mechanical powers, even when his mathematical acquire- 
ments are but slender ; — and he may advisably prosecute 
his mathematical studies pretty far, before he turns his 
attention to the general laws of reasoning, — to that 
abstract science, of which all other sciences are the con- 
crete embodiments. But still, the books which he reads 
ought all to be constructed in prospective contemplation 
of his eventually coming to recognise the chain of evi- 
dence in all its strength and in the logical order of its 
links. This cannot be expected, if no attention, in the 
preparation of the course, be paid to the order of the 
links. 



202 NOTE F. 

independent A third objection may be this, that so syste- 



translational la- 



of wast a efuTex- matic a course as that proposed could not be 
the result of the independent working of the 
numerous persons who would be required to work upon 
it. This I most readily allow ; and therefore it is that I 
grieve over the comparative waste of a great quantity of 
independent working, which has hitherto produced loads 
upon loads of books, and yet, by general admission, no 
educational course. Look at the voluminous catalogue 
of the [Benares] Centralizing Book Society, and see what 
sort of a course could be culled out of it ; — what course 
such as could train a man's mind, and lead his convic- 
tions, with any sort of certainty, in the direction which 
I have indicated as desirable. 
now co-ope- How co-operation, as contra-distinguished 

ration, with , . 

saving of much f r0 m a mass of simultaneous but irrespective 

useless labour, . a 

Seediel ^S- labour, might be secured, I must not here 

pense, might 

he effected, allow myself the space which would be ne- 
cessary for discussing. Suffice it to say that my views 
in regard to the desirableness of a college of translators, 
coincide with those set forth by Mr. B. H. Hodgson in 
his published letters on The Pre-eminence of the Ver- 
naculars. 
no wish to Let me now enumerate the sciences, and 

drag valuable . 

English teach- show how I think each ought to be dealt 

ers into ver- O 

w a h c e u re arstu the e y with, in presenting it to India through those 

have no turn , 

for these. f the vernaculars which hang upon the Sans- 
krit. Let it be remembered that I am not proposing 
any substitute for English education, where English 
education is available ; and that I am not proposing 
that English teachers who have neither taste nor turn 



ON "TRANSLATION INTO THE LANGUAGES OF INDIA." 203 

for vernacular teaching, should trouble themselves for 
one moment by attempting it. My suggestions have 
reference to that purely native agency, which I con- 
tend we must employ, if the millions are to be really 
educated ; and in the hands of which agency I would 
seek to place an educational literature containing nothing 
that is insoluble, in the absence of the power of refer- 
ence to that European erudition which, by the hypo- 
thesis, is not available. The native erudition, compe- 
tent to the solution of all the terminology which I 
advocate, is available, and would remain available if 
the English, by any strange chance, should have been 
driven from India into the sea. 1 It is scarcely worth 
while to remark, parenthetically, that to those who, 
in such event, care not what might become of India, 
I am not now addressing myself. 

All science, or knowledge, rests on its ap- The order of 

' ° ' x the sciences. 

propriate evidence, direct or indirect. Sense 
and consciousness are direct evidence. Inference and 
testimony are indirect or mediate. In a synopsis of 
the sciences, these topics come properly at the outset ; 
though they are not, I repeat, the topics which first 
demand the attention of a learner. In our Sanskrit 
synopsis, designed to furnish the terminology for ver- 
sions in the Hindi, Bengali, Mahratta, Telugu, etc., 
we treat these topics in the order of (1) the senses 
and the mind, (2) inductive investigation, (3) deduc- 
tion, (4) demonstrative exposition, i.e. rhetoric, and 
(5) formal logic. The philosophical writings of the 

1 [This was first published in 1855. The contemplated possibility did not then 
appear at all so near as it did to us at Benares on the 4th of May, 1857]. 

1G 



204 NOTE F. 

Hindus furnish a tolerably ample terminology for the 
satisfactory treatment of the first four of these topics; 
but, to be wielded with any effect at all, this ter- 
minology requires to be carefully and critically sought 
Translators, out, and estimated, in situ, not to be taken 
of iitt c ie 10 ava5; on trust from the pages of a dictionary. More- 

cxcept to spoil a <_> «/ 

paper. over, where an appropriated term exists, if 

we fail to discover it, and if we invent a different term 
of our own, the established and appropriated term will 
be almost sure to prevent the new term from being 
understood ; because the hearer naturally supposes that 
you must mean something else than what is meant by 
the appropriated term, else why not have made use of 
it? For example, — Archbishop Whately explains in- 
duction to mean the " bringing in" of instances suffi- 
cient to support a general conclusion. Dr. Whewell, 
again, holds that the word properly means the " super- 
inducing" of a general conception upon the observed 
facts. Now any attempt to translate the word accord- 
ing to either of these views, would only mystify a 
Pandit, who really has already the required idea in 
his mind, but a very different term — and, in my opinion, 
a much better one — to express it by. The term is 
vydpti-graha — literally, " the cognizance of pervaded- 
ness," — i.e. the cognizing that some given nature or 
property, e.g. " human nature," is invariably attended 
by some given nature or property, e.g., " mortality." 
It may be objected that we have nothing to do with 
this, when dealing with the tabula rasa of a student's 
mind ; to which objection I give the reply — requiring 
with such sad frequency to be reiterated — that when 



ON "TRANSLATION INTO THE LANGUAGES OF INDIA." 20/5 

we have settled that a native agency must be employed 
in the education of the millions, and this agency one 
owing its value to the possession of a fountain-language, 
and a classic literature, we do ill to obtrude terms which 
tend to keep the learner from understanding the right 
views embodied in the time-honoured phraseology of 
his teacher. Why do we, in any case, obtrude our 
uglier term, when the finer one might be found, if 
dug for, like a diamond, in the proper mine ? It is 
because of that " indolent impatience," which has so 
long cankered all translational efforts in India, and 
made the hasty and ill-concocted results so compara- 
tively valueless. 

But, without dwelling farther on the ad- construction 

' ° of necessarily 

visableness of learning what the Hindus know, new terms - 
before we undertake to teach them, let us advert to the 
construction of new terms, where established terms are 
avowedly not available. Formal logic, a subject ne- 
glected or overlooked by the Hindus, demands a con- 
struction of new terms. The nomenclature of the parts 
of the syllogism, adopted in concert with Pandit Yitthal 
Sastri, may here suffice for illustration. To explain 
how we- rendered " illative conversion," and why; or 
" conversion by negation," or " reduction to the first 
figure;" would take up too much space: and, besides, 
the information can be found, if wanted, in the pub- 
lished synopsis. As regards the syllogism, taken as 
a sample of our treatment of the science, equivalents 
were required for proposition, term, major premiss, minor 
premiss, conclusion, subject, predicate, major term, minor 
term, and middle term. 



206 NOTE F, 

Now, a proposition is " a sentence indicative;" and 
there is no one word in Sanskrit which distinguishes 
a proposition from other sentences (questions or com- 
mands), by implying its indicative character. The 
matter required, therefore, to be looked at from a dif- 
ferent point of view, as thus : — a syllogism, or argu- 
ment in regular form, is called nyaya ; and each of 
its three members (avayava) is called a nydyavayava. 
As each of these is necessarily a proposition, it follows 
that the term ny ay avayava, though it does not etymo- 
logieally signify " a sentence indicative," is yet, for 
the purposes of logic, its precise equipollent ; and as 
such we employ it. Next, there is no Sanskrit word 
for term. The terms of a proposition are the subject 
(uddesya) and predicate (yidheya)) and Hindu specu- 
lators, having a separate name for each of these, did 
not take the trouble of devising an expression which, 
like our word term, might refer the two to one com- 
mon genus. An equipollent expression being, however, 
wanted in our exposition, instead of seeking to obtrude 
the novel and infructuous conception of the two as being 
alike the boundaries (termini) of a proposition, we ac- 
commodate ourselves to the language already in use ; 
we dissolve the expression which will fit no Sanskrit 
mould, and we recast it in a shape which dispenses with 
the necessity of any accompanying explanation, as " that 
which expresses a subject or a predicate" (uddesya- 
vidheya-lodhaka). It may be objected that an expres- 
sion like this is cumbrous ; but even cumbrous instru- 
ments are not unmanageable in powerful hands, — and 
the Pandits of Benares are no children. 



ON " TRANSLATION INTO THE LANGUAGES OF INDIA." 207 

Just as we dealt with the word term, making our 
expression denote explicitly the subject and predicate 
which we found already provided with separate names, 
so have we dealt with the word premiss. There is no 
Sanskrit word for premiss ; but there is a word for what 
we denominate the major premiss, and another for what 
we denominate the minor premiss (udaharana and upa- 
nay a). The aggregative compound of the two — udaharano- 
payanau — is equipollent to " the premises." For the 
other words above-mentioned, there were available terms 
already in use. 

We pass now to those sciences in which Mathematics. 
logic, the most abstract of the sciences, the science 
of the forms of thought, first becomes concrete, by 
applying itself to those object matters of the widest 
generality, — space, time, and number. For Arithmetic, 
Algebra, and Geometry, an exact and tolerably exten- 
sive terminology exists in the mathematical books of 
the Hindus. In devising additional terms — as is neces- 
sary, for example, in the case of the differential and 
integral calculus — regard should be had to the analogy 
of the existing terms, none of which ought to be rashly 
set aside and replaced by new names. New names 
will almost certainly prove (it could easily be shown 
that they have proved) inferior to the established ones ; 
and, further, they have a tendency to prevent the native 
mathematician from seeing, so clearly as he otherwise 
might do, that our higher Mathematics are the legiti- 
mate development of his own science. The only kind 
of man, therefore, to be trusted with the formation of 
new mathematical terms for the Hindi vernaculars, is 



208 NOTE F. 

one who unites to the most familiar conversancy with 
Hindu mathematics, an accurate and extensive know- 
ledge of the modern European methods. Such a man 
we possess in the accomplished Bapu Deva Sastri, to 
whose care and superintendence I could wish that the 
preparation of the whole of our Hindi vernacular course 
of Mathematics were confided ; and to whom, in the 
matter of mathematical terminology, I have not the 
presumption to fancy that I could offer any needful 
suggestion. 

Formal Astro- ^ ne ^ Y ^ subject — in the order of simplicity 
nomy. — ^ o ^jjj^ ^ e Mathematics are applicable, is 

motion ; and a science of pure motion is found in formal 
astronomy. Here again I have nothing to suggest, but 
that this department also may be safely confided to the 
superintendence of Bapu Deva, whose published Euclid, 
Arithmetic, Algebra, and Trigonometry, are models of what 
educational works ought to be. 

physics. Force, the cause of motion, is the next ele- 

ment, the conception of which introduces the matter of a 
new science, — the so-called " Physics." The modern 
application of this term ought, consistently, to relegate 
chemistry and physiology to the region of metaphysics or 
of ethics. But there is no use, at this moment, in 
quarrelling with English terms. Let us endeavour that 
our Indian term shall not be open to the same reproach. 
To ensure this, we must guard against being led away by 
the etymology of the name, and we must take an un- 
biassed view of the nature of the thing. On examining 
the sciences which are clubbed under the name of 
" Physics," we find that, while in common they treat of 



ON " TRANSLATION INTO THE LANGUAGES OF INDIA." 209 

force, they differ from the subsequent sciences of Che- 
mistry and Physiology, in this, that the forces considered 
in the sciences called physical, produce, motion or rest, 
but no permanent and essential change of property. The 
aggregate, therefore, constitutes the science of the causes 
and conditions of motion and rest, gati-sthiti-Mrana-vidyd, 
or, in the vernacular Hindi, gati aur sthiti Ice karanoh Jci 
vidyd. Under this aggregative heading we find the 
mechanics of the solid, of the fluid, of the aeriform, and 
of the imponderable. It might seem at first sight as if 
our designation were inappropriate in the cases where, as 
in acoustics and optics, we take cognizance of sounds and 
colours, which are not modes of motion or rest. Strictly, 
however, the sounds and the colours are phenomena of 
physiology, and not of the physical science, to whose pro- 
vince belong only the motions on which the physiological 
phenomena depend. There seems no use, however, in 
our attempting here to disjoin these physiological develop- 
ments of the physical sciences from the physical sciences 
to which they are related. Our general term, then, being 
equivalent to " Statics and Dynamics,'' the four sub-divi- 
sions readily accept the names of ghana-padartha-gati- 
sthiti-vidyd, the statics and dynamics of solids ; drava-pa- 
ddrtha-gati-sthiti-vidyd, those of fluids ; vdyava-pad'drtha- 
gati-sthiti-vidyd, those of airs; andguriitzva-rahita-paddrtha- 
gati'Sthiii-vidyd, those of the imponderables. To a mere 
English eye, these names may appear terribly ge ^ mes ££* 
long ; but to a Hindu, familiar with the sense Sr^^'SIK 
of each several member in the compound, they are not 
long at all. And as they carry their own meaning with 
them, their employment puts an end to those prevalent 



210 NOTE F. 

confusions of memory, under which a school-boy blurts 
out confidently, in reply to his examiner, that the radia- 
tion of heat belongs to the science of Stereostatics, or that 
the pressure of fluids is a phenomenon of Optics. Where 
the memory loses its hold upon the sense of terms in- 
soluble as are these Greek ones to the Hindu, it possesses 
no resources in itself for regaining it. This I have re- 
peated very often. I wish I could believe that I have 
repeated it sufficiently often. 

Terms in 0^ ^he terms employed in the exposition of 

mechanics. ^ e physical sciences, in our Synopsis of Science 
— and which can be found there if wanted — I shall here 
cite only two, in illustration of two principles. The 

The lever, lever we name uttolana danda, " the lifting- 
rod." Now, it may possibly seem to some that the word 
"rod" implies a solidity which does not belong to the 
"lever" of rational mechanics; — but the word "lever" 
originally meant a solid lifting-rod ; and if the English 
mathematician, after his training in mechanics, has come 
to associate with the name the notion of an absolutely 
rigid line devoid of weight, the notion is due to that 
training, and not to any inherently suggestive power in 
the word, which it could carry with any profit into a 
Hindi treatise. "Whatever rationalization of the originally 
solid " lever" can be effected by the explanations of the 
science, can be effected precisely in like manner with 
the uttolana danda of our Synopsis. The other term on 

impenetra- which I would offer a remark is " impenetra- 
bility." This term must have proved a source 
of much misery to successive generations of lecturers on 
physics ; for no sooner has the lecturer announced that 



ON "TRANSLATION INTO THE LANGUAGES OF INDIA." 21 L 

matter is "impenetrable," than he must breathlessly fol- 
low np the announcement with the explanatory assurance 
that he does not at all mean what he seems to mean ; for 
he is perfectly willing to admit that a deal board is pene- 
trable by a nail or by a pistol-bullet. To render the 
term " impenetrability" by abhedyata, " incapability of 
being cleft," — as I have seen it rendered, — is needlessly 
to multiply the terminological inconvenience just referred 
to. What is it, then, that physicists actually do mean 
when they speak of matter as " impenetrable ?" It is 
not that it cannot be pierced, — not that it cannot be 
divided, — not that it cannot be compressed into smaller 
space, — the degree of smallness being limited apparently 
only by the limit of the compressing force available ;— 
but what they mean to deny is, that matter can be so 
compressed as to occupy no space. It may be inde- 
finitely but it is not infinitely compressible. This im- 
portant philosophical conception, — much more obscured 
than illustrated by the term "impenetrability," — we 
convey, in our Synopsis, by the self-explanatory term 
parimandtyantatydgdsambhava, "the incapability of en- 
tirely resigning bulk." It may be asked, — what Hindu 
will gain the conception by the mere enunciation of this 
term ? I reply, — what human being, Hindu or European, 
will gain the conception by the enunciation of the word 
"impenetrability?" Both terms — like other technical 
terms — require explanation at the outset ; and the Indian 
term has the merit of being to the purpose, which the 
English term has not. It may be worth while to notice 
the fact that, when such a term as "impenetrability" has 
been once explained by a writer, the conception is taken 



212 NOTE F. 

for granted throughout the remainder of his treatise, and 
the term itself scarcely ever recurs, if it recur at all. 
Such being the case, the apparent cumbrousness of the 
term by which we communicate the conception intelli- 
gibly at the outset is of very little moment. But our 
term is not really cumbrous. " Civil- disabilities-removal- 
bill," is a term not at all cumbrous for an Englishman, 
though it would sorely tax the memory of the foreigner 
who should be required to remember it as one sound 
simply denotative of a document upon a particular shelf. 
chemistry. The next conception, the introduction of 

which marks out the object-matter of a new science, is 
that of essential change of character. That the yellow 
substance sulphur, and the silvery fluid mercury, should 
combine to form the brilliant red vermilion, compels us 
to think of some other force than that which results 
merely in motion or rest. This special force is termed 
" chemical." Chemistry being nothing else than purified 
alchemy, we reclaim to our own use the rasayana of the 
Hindus; designing to show, under that familiar title, 
what the true science is. Ancillary to chemistry is the 
section of natural history called mineralogy, khanija- 
paddrtha-vidyd, "the knowledge of things produced in 
mines," which we treat as an any a, or " appendage," of 
the science. 

Mr. Mack, in the preface to his treatise on Chemistry, 
published in Bengali and English at Serampore, in 1834, 
tells us that he was advised to discard all European terms 
in his Bengali version, but that he could not persuade 
himself to adopt the advice. He retained therefore many 
of the European names, and adapted Sanskrit terminations 



ON « TRANSLATION INTO THE LANGUAGES OF INDIA." 213 

to them. European names I entirely discard. As an 
educational instrument, — and it is in this capacity that 
we at present seek to employ it, — the science of che- 
mistry loses more than half its value when its compound 
terms do not tell their own meaning ; and it is impossible 
that they should rightly tell their own meaning to one 
who is not familiar with the language from which they 
are derived. To an Englishman, unacquainted with the 
classical languages, the study of a work on chemistry is 
very far from being such a mental exercise as it is to a 
classical scholar. The long compound names which 
exercise the reflection and excite the admiration, or pro- 
voke the criticism of the latter, more frequently torture 
the memory and bewilder the understanding of the 
former. How entirely is the scientific beauty of the 
nomenclature thrown away upon the man who must 
look out hydro-chlorate and sesquioxide in his glossary 
in order to make sure which is which ! It is all very 
well to teach long chemical names by rote to a youth 
who is to be employed as an apprentice in The teaching 

x ■* x ■*■ of a trade is not 

wielding a pestle. Him you perhaps do not education - 
seek to educate ; you merely make a convenience of 
him; and if he does not practically mistake corrosive 
sublimate for coloquintida in making up a prescription, 
why all is well. The case is otherwise where the aim 
is to educate and to instruct. Where chemistry is to be 
efficiently employed for such a purpose, the learner must 
be conversant with Latin and Greek, or else the language 
of the science must be rendered into the language of the 
learner, as has been in a great measure done by the 
Germans for themselves. 



214 NOTE F. 

indi&cnation Acting as if under the impression of this 

of chemical ° ■*■ 

tKc^ans^ truth, that the educational value of terms lies 
in their connotation and not in their mere 
denotation, the Germans have indigenated for them- 
selves the language of chemistry ; so that the study 
is far more profitable, as a mental exercise, for the 
German villager who knows no language besides his 
own, than it is for the English villager who does not 
know Greek and Latin. I wish the Hindu to enjoy 
in this respect the same advantage as the German. Of 
course the German who inclines to go deeply into 
chemistry will not rest until he learns also the Grseco- 
Latin terminology of Europe in general. He can then 
talk of hi-tartrate of potassa, which does not tell its 
own tale to a plain German ear as his Doppeltweinstein- 
saures Kali does, and of sulphuretted hydrogen, which, 
to the plain German ear, would be but a baldly deno- 
tative and sense-eviscerated substitute for his own in- 
structively connotative schwefelwasserstoffgas. As with 
the German, so with the Hindu. Let the study of 
foreign languages be encouraged to the utmost ; but 
do not spoil the education offered to the millions, by 
using sense-evacuated foreign terms with a view to 
the imaginary convenience of the possibly exceptional 
few. Let the exceptional genius be sent up to College, 
and be set to study the sciences in English. His acqui- 
sition of the foreign terminology (just like the German's 
acquisition of it at the University) will be very far 
indeed from being impeded by his previous acquaint- 
ance with a kindred, though as yet less fully elaborated, 
vernacular phraseology; and, further, he will, by that 



ON "TRANSLATION INTO THE LANGUAGES OF INDIA" 215 

previous training, be the better able to teach to his 
countrymen those new matters which he might else 
have found himself destitute of indigenous terms for 
teaching at all. Ask Liebig or Berzelius whether his 
own previous knowledge of wasserstoff and schwefelsaure 
stood in the way either of his learning about hydrogen 
and sulphuric acid, or of his explaining anything about 
these to a plain German (a dyer, for example) who 
knew them only by the names which, to his ear, carried 
a meaning in their component parts. I might, with 
tolerable security, peril the issue on a reference to 
Liebig or Berzelius or Humboldt, and acquiesce in the 
adoption (so congenial to mental indolence) of " trans- 
literation" in the room of translation, if any one of 
these philosophers should consent to discountenance the 
principle on which the indigenous German terminology 
of chemistry is based. At all events, I wish that the 
discountenancers of veritable translation would clear up 
their ideas by trying to convert the Germans, before deal- 
ing with the scientific education of the Hindu millions 
as if the Germans were unquestionably in the wrong. 

Having given examples from the German, let me 
illustrate the matter further from the language in hand, 
— say the Hindi. 

Suppose an Englishman unacquainted with any 
Oriental language, and a Hindu unacquainted with any 
European language. Exactly as is the difficulty to such 
Englishman of recollecting and distinguishing between 
jwdntakik and gandhakik, is, conversely, the difficulty 
to the Hindu of recollecting and distinguishing between 
nitric and sulphuric. The supposed Englishman, again, 



216 NOTE F. 

though constantly liable to confound gdndhakik with 
jivdntakik, cannot, by any lapse of memory, fall into 
a doubt whether sulphuric be the one related to sulphur ; 
nor, conversely, can the Hindu fall into a doubt whether 
gdndhakik be the one related to gandhak. If, therefore, 
it would be unadvisable to make that Englishman who 
is never going to study Hindi, employ Hindi terms 
which would leave him unceasingly upon a sea of doubt, 
it is scarely advisable to make that Hindu who (typify- 
ing millions on millions of our contemplated village 
pupils) is never going to study English, employ English 
chemical terms which would leave him unceasingly upon 
a sea of doubt. Now to proceed. 

The first question, in settling a chemical 

Indian no- x ' 

the nc s5npie for nomenclature, regards the naming of the 
simple bodies. The common metals, as well 
as sulphur and carbon, have names in most languages 
which there is no occasion for changing. All the other 
simple bodies require to have names devised for them. 
First, there are the four simple gases. The name of 
oxygen, " the generator of acids," might readily be 
rendered by a corresponding Sanskrit compound; but 
this (as Mr. Mack has remarked) would only tend to 
preserve the exploded theory that there is no generator 
of acids besides oxygen. Its old name of vital air con- 
notes one of its most important characters, and there- 
fore we name it prdnaprada, or prdnaprada-vayu, " the 
air that emphatically gives us breath." Nitrogen (or 
azote) we call jivdntaka, "that which would put an 
end to life." Hydrogen isjalakara, u the water-former;" 
and chlorine harita, "the greenish-coloured." 



ON "TRANSLATION INTO THE LANGUAGES OF INDIA." 217 

Of the nine simple non-metallic bodies that are 
not gaseous, two, viz., sulphur (gandhaka) and carbon 
(angara), have Sanskrit names. Boron, as it is the basis 
of borax (tanka\ we therefore call tanka-janaka ; Silicon 
is the generator of flint — agniprasthara-janaka ; Selenium 
— so named after the moon — we have likewise named 
after the moon — chdndra, — it being a matter of moon- 
shine what so rare and unimportant a substance be de- 
nominated. Phosphorus is prakdsada, " the giver of 
light;" bromine is pitta, " the fetid;" iodine is aruna, 
the name, like the Greek one, referring to the violet 
colour of its vapour ; and fluorine is kdchaghna-janaka, 
"the generator of that (fluoric acid) which corrodes 
glass." 

Of those metals which have no names in Sanskrit, 
platinum, the " heaviest" of metals, is, with allusion to 
its weightiness, named gurutama ; and potassium, the 
" lightest," laghutama. Sodium is " the basis of culinary 
salt" — lavana-kara ; and calcium, " the basis of nodular 
limestone" — sarkard-kara. Zinc, the Urdu name of 
which is dastd, we have named dasta, in allusion to 
the way in which its oxide, the " philosophical wool," 
is " tossed about" in the air. 

Taking such, then, as the names that we of binary 

*-" ' compounds. 

have to deal with in forming the names of 
compounds, we come first to binary compounds. Com- 
pounds must have names suggestive of the fact that 
they are acid or otherwise. The termination ic belongs 
to the Sanskrit as well as to the Latin, so that sulphur 
and sulphuric acid can be satisfactorily rendered gand- 
haka and gdndhakikdmla. To the acids in ous, another 



218 NOTE F. 

termination (ya) has been appropriated. To the non- 
acid binary compounds, without attempting at present 
to fix separate terminations for the several varieties, 
the general termination ja, meaning " produced from," 
has been assigned. Thus an oxide is prdnaprada-ja ; 
a chloride, harita-ja ; and so on. The alkalis, potassa 
and soda, take feminine names, according to the analogy 
of the Latin, from those of their metallic bases ; thus 
— laghutamd and lavana-kard. The oxide of calcium 
may be termed cMrna, analogously to the English 
" lime." 
compounds Coming to the compounds of compounds, 

of compounds. &g ^ ^.^ ^^ ^ ^angeg fo a fe ^ ^ e name 

of the resulting salt, the Sanskrit ika is replaced by 
ayita. Thus, as the sulphuric acid gives a sulphate, 
the gdndhakikdmla gives a gandhakdyita. It should be 
unnecessary to remark, that the suitableness of these 
names is not to be estimated on the principle which 
led the British sailor to set down the Spaniards as a 
nation of fools, because they call a hat a sombrero. To 
the British sailor the word hat sounds much more 
natural than sombrero; and, for like reasons, sulphate 
of soda may seem to sound much more natural than 
lavana-kardyd gandhakdyitam. But as "hat" is not 
good Spanish, so " sulphate of soda" is not good Sanskrit ; 
and this leads us to forestall another criticism of kindred 
calibre. Is the sombrero-like expression, lavana-kardyd 
gandhakdyitam, good Sanskrit ? The question is not to 
be resolved by submitting the term to a Sanskrit gram- 
marian ignorant of physical science, to whom, without 
an attentive", serious, ingenuous, and uncavilling study 



OX "TRANSLATION INTO THE LANGUAGES OF INDIA." 219 

of the tract in which it appears, the term has a right 
to be as obscure as the term binoxalate of potassa to 
the grandfathers of Lindley Murray. 

Having shown, by the publication of our objections to 

° J J i. the translation 

Chemical section in the Sanskrit Synopsis of ?enni™iogy fic 
Science, that the nomenclature of chemistry 
can be reproduced in an Indian language ; and, find- 
ing that my Pandits now take a lively interest in the 
science, which formerly they regarded with indifference, 
looking as they did upon our ciksijen and haidrajen as 
things of no more concern to Indian life than toma- 
hawks and wampum are to ours ; I think it worth 
while to dissect the following remarks (those of a gen- 
tleman highly and deservedly esteemed 1 ), which appear 
in a recent fasciculus of Selections from the Records of 
Government, N. W. P. The remarks are these. " I 
cannot imagine any one proposing to translate Futile oVec 
all the nomenclature and terminology of the tionsstated ; 
arts and sciences : even were it easy of performance, 
it would in many cases be useless ; in chemistry, for 
instance, it would establish the misnomer oxygen (I may 
add hydrogen) and the indefinite names, chlorine, bro- 
mine, ammonia, etc. Were hydriodate of potash trans- 
lated into Arabic or Sanskrit, a Maulavee or Pundit 
would perceive that the name was composed of words 
meaning water, purple, a saucepan, and ashes ; but 
he would never be able to select that substance from 
several placed before him, for it is a dry, white, cubical, 
crystallized solid." 

Now it has been already seen that I expressly reject 

1 Mr. Vincent Tregear, massacred in the mutinies of 1857- 

17 



220 NOTE F. 

The objector the sense suggested by the term "oxygen," 

conjectures °° J J ° 7 

I™, "instead and ground my denomination of the element 
in g to observe on that characteristic feature, its being the 

what has been ' 

done. "vital air," which no revolution in chemical 

theory is likely to deprive it of. So much for the 
reverence shown in the Benares College for the sup- 
posed obligation to perpetuate misnomers in transla- 
tion. 

Now look at the rest of the passage. The 

The logical , x ° 

jection c s y » of ex- writer says we should also have to perpetuate 
pas p S age ed un^r "indefinite names" such as chlorine. And, 

review. 

pray, do we escape the indefiniteness by adopt- 
ing the indefinite name itself, and writing it Marin 
gess ? If the indefiniteness is productive of no evil 
in Europe, where the name reminds us at least of the 
characteristic " greenness" of the gas, why should a 
like indefiniteness in the Indian term be dreaded here ? 
To reject a self-explanatory name (our harita vayu, — 
green air), which is precisely as definite or as indefinite 
as the European one, in favour of a name which here 
suggests nothing at all, seems to me most strange. The 
besetting delusion in the passage under review is what 
may be found admirably described in Whately's Logic, 
under the denomination of the " Fallacy of Objections." 
Suppose two ferry boats. Our friend objects to one of 
them that it is cumbrous ; and having thus condemned 
it on the strength of the objection, he steps unhesitat- 
ingly (as the necessary alternative) into the other, 
which, rotten and leaky, will sink under him before 
he has got a third of the way across. 

At a risk of being tedious, since the case of the 



ON "TRANSLATION INTO THE LANGUAGES OF INDIA." 221 

oxygen suffices to dispose of the principle in Further, and 

" ^ x x a perhaps supe- 

question, I cannot refrain from remarking on JSS^'S 
the treatment of hydriodate of potash in the 
passage under review. The writer alleges that the 
term hydriodate of potash, if translated into Arabic or 
Sanskrit, would be seen by a Maulavi or a Pandit, " to 
be composed of words meaning water, purple, a sauce- 
pan, and ashes ; but he would never be able to select 
that substance from among several" placed before him, 
for it is a dry, white, cubical, crystallized solid." The 
reasoning here is unsatisfactory. The sense of the San- 
skrit translation would never enable the Pandit to recog- 
nise "a dry, white, cubical, crystallized solid;" but 
does the writer conceive that in the term hydriodate 
of potash, formed of Greek and English, the sense of 
the same linguistic elements is of itself qualified to 
suggest " a dry, white, cubical, crystallized solid ?" He 
will reply, that the name will suggest the thing, when 
the thing has been shown and the applicability of the 
name has been explained : but precisely so will it be 
in the case of the properly constructed Sanskrit term ; 
so where is the relevancy of the objection? To have 
the shadow of a leg to stand upon, it must borrow the 
principle of the British sailor already cited, who held 
that the word "hat" was naturally significant, and that 
the Spaniards were fools for calling it a sombrero. " Why 
can't they call it a hat, when they must know it is 
one?" And, analogously, "why can't they call it 
hydriodate of potash, when they must know it is hydri- 
odate of potash?" 

Let me show how little, in the Benares College, 



222 NOTE F. 

practical re- we find ourselves encumbered with the fan- 

futation of the 

qSlon n ta ciedly inevitable " saucepan" and " ashes," 
when reproducing the term hydriodate of pot- 
ash in a form suited to furnish matter for the judgment 
and not merely for the memory ; in a form, that is to 
say, educationally valuable and not educationally value- 
less. "Well, then, knowing that the more strict desig- 
nation is iodide of potassium (just as chloride of sodium 
is scientifically preferable to muriate of soda), we look, 
in our list of elements, for potassium, and we find it 
designated not with reference to the "ashes" of the 
" saucepan," but with reference to its being the "light- 
est" metal (laghutama). Iodine, again {aruna\ is named 
after the colour of its vapour, just as in the European 
nomenclature. Our term, therefore, is laghutamasyaru- 
najam, or, vernacularised, laghutam Jca arunaj] — " the 
iodine-product of potassium." ISTow, to one who has 
been instructed regarding the elements, and the prin- 
ciples of nomenclature in designating compounds, this 
is self-explanatory. If any doubt or dispute arise re- 
garding its sense, a reference to the account of the 
elements determines the question ; and, again, the ety- 
mological sense of the names assigned to the elements 
can, in case of doubt, be ascertained by consulting a 
Pandit. There is no occasion for a reference to an 
educated Englishman. By such and similar means, and 
by such only, shall we ever succeed in naturalizing our 
knowledge among the Hindus. The lazy barbarous plan 
of talking (to those who are not intended to learn Eng- 
lish) about Mar in gess, and haidraiyadet of patdss, is, 
frankly, a wretched accommodation to the mental in- 



ON "TRANSLATION INTO THE LANGUAGES OF INDIA." 223 

dolenee of English teachers and of incompetent trans- 
lators. 

Many of the names which I have proposed must 
necessarily, as I have already said, appear very long 
ones to the mere English reader, to whom the elements 
of the names convey no sense; just as "tithes-commu- 
tation-amendment-bill" must appear a very long name 
to a person ignorant of English. But if it would be 
cruelly unprofitable to attempt to impose on the mere 
English reader the employment of a terminology, to 
him key-less and non-significant, so cumbrous as our 
Sanskrit terminology would necessarily prove to him, 
is it less cruelly unprofitable to attempt to impose on 
the teachers and pupils of the purely native schools, 
the employment of a terminology to them key -less and 
non-significant, and just as cumbrous ? It is not for 
English teachers that the vernacular terminology is re- 
quired, but for the hundreds of native teachers whom 
I hope to see trained ; and for the trainers of those 
teachers, in the normal classes which I hope to see 
ere long rapidly filling up. 

We have seen it urged that the Arabic Greek words 

° in the Arabic 

has not disdained to borrow from the Greek. wS" 36 ? f 
True; and its borrowings are blots upon the 
language. What, for example, is gained by styling an 
introduction to logic isa ghojl ; because, forsooth, the 
Greek term is eisagoge ? Nothing but mystification and 
pedantry is advanced by the sanctioning of cabalistical 
gibberish like this. Had the Arabs kept up a knowledge 
of the Greek language, as has been done in Europe, then 
the case would have stood very differently. 



224 NOTE F. 

worthless- To make this point sufficiently clear, I shall 

ness of Greek r J 

tTSSmis. avail myself of some observations on language 
by the Eev. Chenevix Trench. Quoting " a 
great writer not very long departed from us," Mr. Trench 
(at p. 4 of his delightful little volume, On the Study of 
Words, says — " There are few modes of instruction more 
useful or more amusing than that of accustoming young 
people to seek for the etymology or primary meaning of 
the words they use. There are cases in which more 
knowledge of more value may be conveyed by the 
history of a word than by the history of a campaign." 
Let us test this principle by the case of a Greek word 
borrowed by the English and by the Arabic : let us take 
the word philosophos. The English teacher, learned in 
Greek, or having access to the learning of those who are, 
can explain to his pupil how the "philosopher" was he 
who modestly disclaimed the proud title of sophos, or 
"wise," and professed himself merely a " lover of wis- 
dom." How much of this teaching can the modern 
Maulavi extract from the exanimate sound failsuf? 
Ignorant of Greek, and without access to those who 
know it, the Arabs can boast of a very poor linguistic 
acquisition indeed, when they point to the defunct failsuf 
of their lexicon. 
The worse Further, Mr. Trench (at p. 182 of his Enqlish. 

than useless- v x «/ 7 

contrifut?ons ek Past an ^ Present), says — " One of the most 
t?ated. lc frequent causes of alteration in the spelling of 
a word is a wrongly assumed derivation. It is then 
sought to bring the word into harmony with, and to 
make it by its spelling suggest, this derivation, which 
has been erroneously thrust upon it." He continues (at 



ON "TRANSLATION INTO THE LANGUAGES OF INDIA." 225 

p. 188), "It is foreign words, or words adopted from 
foreign languages, as might beforehand be expected, 
which are especially subjected to such transformations as 
these. The soul which the word once had in its own 
language having departed from it, for as many as do not 
know that language, or not being now any more to be 
recognised by those who employ the word, these are not 
satisfied till they have put another soul into it, and thus 
it becomes alive to them again. Thus— to take first one 
or two familiar instances, but which serve as well as any 
other to illustrate my position — the Bellerophon becomes 
for our sailors the ' Billy Euffian,' for what can they know 
of the Greek mythology, or of the slayer of chhnaera?" 
Now, may we not discern something of this process in 
the isd ghoji above referred to ? The word, when the 
Arabs left off studying Greek, became exanimate; and 
may we not trace a " Billy-Human "-like attempt to 
reanimate it by splitting the eisagoge in two, and 
spelling the first half like a proper name? The word 
isa means " Jesus.'' "Jesus ghoji" might perhaps (to 
the Arab analogues of the sailors of the " Billy Euf- 
fian") adumbrate some supposed author or patron of 
the work. 

If such, and such-like, are the gains which The ar gu - 

7 . ment fouridcd 

Arabic has made by borrowing from the Greek, ^S%S^- 

does the example hold out encouragement to "wooleS 

° more deeply 

the lazy plan of deluging the Indian verna- JJliSSSS 
culars with our Greek scientific terminology ; 
or does it not rather hold out a caution and a warning ? 
We may smile at the successful resurrection of " Belle- 
rophon" in the shape of "Billy Euffian," and shrug our 



226 NOTE F. 

shoulders at the barely half re-animation of the Greek 
eisagoge as isa ghoji, where the ghoji means nothing and 
so remains dead ; but what ingenuity of Hindu thought 
is to re-animate, and in what vampire-shape, the hai- 
draiyadet dfpatdss, after it shall have been reposited as a 
mummy in the catacombs of the sham-vernacular ? 
The hinge of That a Graeco-Latin terminology of science 

the cosmopoh- 0,/ 

tan analogy. - g cosmopolitan throughout Europe, is the na- 
tural and appropriate consequence of the fact that every 
nation in Europe has retained its hold upon the Greek 
and upon the Latin. This is the one sole cardinal ele- 
ment in the analogy, — the hinge on which it hinges if it 
is to hinge at all. This, the one solely and cardinally 
important element in the analogy, is non-existent in the 
case of the Indian vernaculars, just as I have shown it to 
be absent in the case of the Arabic. To the logical 
reader what need I say more? To others, what is the 
use of anything that could be said ? 
Rootless The difference between a scientific termi- 

branches do v ■ 

not nourish, nology backed up by the means of access to its 
radicles, and the same dissevered from such means of 
access, suggests the illustration of the electro-magnet in 
its two widely different conditions. A mass of soft iron 
acts as a magnet — a most potent magnet — so long, but 
only so long, as it remains in connection with the galvanic 
battery. Break the connection, and your magnet sub- 
sides into an inert mass of soft iron. The off-hand plan 
of transplanting into the vernacular a terminology dis- 
severed from its roots is but an imitation of the child 
who with impatient eagerness extemporises a garden by 
sticking in the ground flowers plucked from his father's 



ON "TRANSLATION INTO THE LANGUAGES OF INDIA." 227 

bushes. Such floriculture may look imposing at the 
moment, but only to children. 

Some advocate of the easily constructed and , Afutuechai- 

■» lengc antici- 

useless sham- vernacular — where " translitera- pated - 
tion" claims the honours of " translation" — will pro- 
bably exclaim, in indignation at my uncompromising 
exposure of its rootlessness — "Well then — you, who pre- 
tend that everything both can, and ought to, be honestly 
translated, as you call it, — tell me — right off — on the 
moment — and without a moment's pause or reflection — 
how will you translate this, and this, and this, and that, 
and ten hundred thousand other things?" I reply, that 
my recorded and standing protest against the indolent 
impatience which I so much deprecate, suggests, of itself, 
the reason for my answering no one of these questions 
until I shall have given it such patient, careful, and 
studious consideration as may perhaps enable me to 
answer it worthily. 

We have seen that the writer on whom imagination 

no legitimate 

I have been animadverting says, "I cannot SS^SJri- 
imagine any one proposing to translate all the 
nomenclature and terminology of the arts and sciences." 
But why, in this way, trust everything to imagination ? 
If the man who proposes to undertake the task brings 
forward a fair sample of that task already executed, then 
a candid examination of the work done might peradven- 
ture help the lagging "imagination." If, on the other 
hand, it can be shown that the work is not worthily 
executed — that may furnish reason for frowning on the 
undertaking — but not so the objector's lack of imagina- 
tion. This is just another and a very noticeable phasis 



228 NOTE F. 

of that " indolent impatience" of which I complain, and 
which Lord Bacon has limned with such keen master- 
strokes at the opening of the 88th aphorism of the 
Novum Organum. " At ionge majora a pusillanimitate, 
et pensorum, quae humana industria sibi proposuit, par- 
vitate et tenuitate, detrimenta in scientias invecta sunt. 
Et tamen (quod pessimum est) pusillanimitas ista non 
sine arrogantia et fastidio se offert." Which we may 
English thus : — " But far greater detriments have been 
brought upon the sciences through pusillanimity, and the 
littleness and slenderness of the tasks which human in- 
dustry has proposed to itself. And yet (what is the 
worst of it) this same [ista] pusillanimity presents itself 
not without arrogance and disdain." 

Our objector urges as an objection to under- 

Difflculty J ° J 

sMr£g°a sa- taking the task of translating the language of 
European science into the Indian dialects, that 
it is not an "easy" one. But it is not in the hope of 
finding it an easy task that any man, competent to judge 
of the case at all, is likely to devote himself to the 
solution of such a problem, or to meddle with the solu- 
tion at all. From this long controversial digression, let 
us revert to the handmaid of chemistry, viz., mineralogy. 
Mineralogy. Eor the exposition of mineralogy, we find a 
good number of terms ready to our hand ; but there are 
many more which we must ourselves devise. Where 
two different minerals, e.g, talc and mica, are confounded 
under one name, abhraJca, we distinguish them by specify- 
ing their most characteristic or most obvious difference. 
Seeing that mica is elastic, and talc not, wc designate 
them as sthitisthdpaJca-visishta and sthitisth a paka-rahita. 



OX "TRANSLATION INTO THE LANGUAGES OF INDIA." 229 

severally. Where the European name alludes to the 
structure — as in the case of granite — we preserve the 
allusion, as in our term kanochchaya-prastara, " the rock 
which is an agglomeration of grains." Of course the 
explanatory "prastara" can be dropped when the pupil 
is familiar with the term, just as the word "rock" in 
" trap-rock," is habitually dropped in English. Names 
that convey no sense — names simply denotative — as 
" basalt," we render by some obvious character of the 
thing denoted. " Basalt,'' we render krishna-prastara, 
" black-rock." It may be objected that many rocks 
(Obsidian in particular), are black, no less than basalt is. 
I reply, that European mineralogists and geologists name 
a certain rock " Greenstone,''' (karita-prastara), without 
regard to the fact that many other stones are green. 
Greenstone is the most important of the rocks that are 
green, and basalt of those that are black. Why should 
we here be required to attain a precision of nomenclature 
which has not been attained in Europe, and which, on 
principles of philosophical necessity, is not attainable at 
all? In conclusion, as regards naming the minerals, 
where there is . no native name, and nothing suggestive 
in the European name, and no very marked characteristic 
property, as is the case with "gypsum," we may de- 
signate the mineral by reference to its chemical com- 
position. Thus "gypsum" is chiirna-gandliakayitatmaka- 
prastara, "the rock which consists of sulphate of 
lime." 

The additional conception of life gives occa- vegetable 

x ° physiology ami 

sion for the next in the order of the sciences, botan - "• 
viz., vegetable physiology, with its ancillary section of 



230 NOTE F. 

natural history, named botany. Here we find some terms 
ready to our hand. For example, cryptogamic plants are 
classed under the head of vanaspati, while the phanero- 
gamic are termed vanaspati. The Hindus, however, have 
fallen into the error of ranging the fig among the crypto- 
gamic. The " stamens" and " pistils,' 7 not discriminated 
from each other apparently by Hindu physiologists, we 
distinguish into paurusha-kesara, "the male filaments," 
and straina-kesara, " the female filaments." 
Animal phy- The next of the sciences is marked off by 

siology and ^ 

zoology. ^ ne introduction of the additional conception of 
sensation. Here we have animal physiology, with its 
ancillary section of natural history, termed zoology. For 
the more obvious parts of the body we of course find 
names ready to our hand. For the more minute parts, 
names will have to be adapted. Where the Hindus, for 
example, have not discriminated the nerves from the 
veins, we must designate the former by some such term 
as mastishka-tantu, li thread of cerebral matter." " Chyme" 
and " chyle" are not discriminated by the Hindus. They 
can be easily distinguished in our terminology by prefix- 
ing to the established name for both, viz., dhdtupa, the 
specification of its being the " prior," or "the latter," 
piirva or uttara. 
zoological I n dividing the animal kingdom into its 

four provinces, we call the "vertebrata" 
prishthavansa-visishta^ those "distinguished by a back- 
bone;" the "mollusca," komala-sarlra-vmshta, "dis- 
tinguished by a soft body;" the " articulata," kdnda- 
visishta, "distinguished by their sections;'' and the 
" radiata," samdmvayavdvritta-ndbhi-visislita, " distin- 



ON "TRANSLATION INTO THE LANGUAGES OF INDIA." 231 

guished by a centre with similar members disposed 
around it." 

All the sciences which we have thus hastily Geology. 
run through, are put in requisition by geology. As for 
the terms to be employed in the exposition of geology, 
the mineralogical ones have been already discussed. Of 
things organic, belonging specially to geology, I shall 
cite only two examples, each to illustrate a principle. 
The " mammoth," whose name is to us simply denota- 
tive, or non- significant, I speak of as the prachinakaliJca 
has tin , " the elephant of the old world." The " Ichthyo- 
saurus," on the other hand, whose name is connotative, 
I render in accordance with the connotation, and deno- 
minate the matsga-makara, the " fish-lizard." 

Furnished with the knowledge supplied by Physical 
the sciences which we have reviewed, the 
inquirer will next ask, what, in consequence of all these 
entities and agencies, is the actual aspect of the globe on 
which we dwell ? He desires instruction in physical 
geography. When we have once thoroughly secured 
right terms in all the sciences which we have been con- 
sidering, the question of terminology for the exposition 
of physical geography presents few difficulties. While 
we endeavour to give an accurate general conception of 
the contour of the land and water of the globe, we must 
take care to proportion the minuteness of detail to the 
historical importance of the several regions. We must 
not waste upon Tierra del Fuego or Nootka Sound the 
fulness of detail which may be due to the plateau of 
Central Asia, or the valleys of the Euphrates and the 
Nile. Physical geography is the legitimate introduction 



232 NOTE F. 

to civil history, and our teaching of it ought to be re- 
gulated by the consideration of what we intend to teach 
of civil history. 

cMi History. Since, in the department of Civil History, 
I have nothing which I wish at this moment to sug- 
gest in the matter of terminology, I shall here content 
myself with remarking that our first exposition ought 
to be rigidly bare of ornament and flourish. The his- 
torical series, let me add, must be so constructed that 
no allusion shall anywhere occur which the perusal of 
what went before does not qualify the attentive reader 
to understand. This obvious precaution has hitherto 
been much neglected. 

political eco- From history we advance to one of the 
nomy ' considerations which the perusal of history 

should naturally suggest to the thoughtful reader. Cer- 
tain courses of conduct appear to have enriched a nation, 
— other courses to have kept a nation poor, or to have 
reduced it to poverty. What are those courses sever- 
ally ? Adam Smith's reply to the question was given 
under a title which I should have no objection to adopt, 
giving the science the name of desa-dhana-vriddhihrdsa- 
kdrana vidyd, — i.e., "The Science of the Causes of the 
Increase and the Decrease of the "Wealth of Nations." 
Whether a name moulded on this view of the question 
be adopted, or a name moulded on Whately's stricter 
view of the science as "The Theory of Exchanges " — 
ddana-pratiddna-vidyd — let us at all events sink the 
hideous pdlUikal i/cdnami, with which the hybrid trea- 
tises have hitherto puzzled India. 

Following the thread of connection among Ethics. 



ON "TRANSLATION INTO THE LANGUAGES OF INDIA." 233 

the sciences, we find that a fresh consideration inevit- 
ably meets us. The wealth of a nation, as of an in- 
dividual, may be increased by practices against which 
political economy offers no remonstrance, but yet against 
which there is something in the human soul that revolts. 
For example, the wonderful and beneficial results of 
the division of labour are among the most attractive 
of the subjects offered to our contemplation at our en- 
trance upon the study of political economy ; but when 
we find this division and subdivision carried out to 
such an extent, that a human being becomes a mere 
machine for the sole and life-long performance of some 
such labour as the pointing of a pin, a mournful feel- 
ing comes over us, and we cannot help asking, " ought 
this to be exactly as it is ?" The word " ought" em- 
bodies a new conception, — the essential conception on 
which is based the science of ethics. But how 

Peculiar dif- 

are we to translate the word ? I confess that S| d£i 
I find here very much more difficulty than in 
the physical sciences. The superficial observer may 
flatter himself that there is no difficulty in the case ; but 
that is because he has not looked far enough beneath the 
surface to discern the difficulty. " Conscience," " duty," 
" moral obligation," — where are the words to convey 
(except in most delusive semblance) what we really 
understand by those terms ? The difficulty, however, 
is not purely philological. Let us hear Mr. Trench 
again {On the Study of Words, p. 8). " Nothing, I 
think, would more strongly bring before us what a 
new power Christianity was in the world, than to com- 
pare the meaning which so many words possessed before 



234 NOTE F. 

its rise, and the deeper meaning which they obtained, 
so soon as they were assnmed by it as the vehicles 
of its life, the new thought and feeling enlarging, puri- 
fying, and ennobling the very words which they em- 
ployed." Apparently we must abide in hope that such 
influence will eventually raise dharmika, for example, 
to a real as well as an etymological equivalence with 
"moral;" for which, at present, it is but a sorry sub- 
stitute. At all events, I presume it is not likely that 
here the system of make-believe translation will ven- 
ture on a suicidal "reductio ad absurdum" by attempt- 
ing to press Imnshinss and the maral sinss into the ser- 
vice of the sham- vernacular. 

Natural The- ^^ an °ther consideration arises out of the 
oiogy. moral one last adverted to. Why do we 

feel this obligation in regard to right and wrong ? Be 
the answer what it may, all experience shows that the 
human mind turns instinctively towards a Kuler,~ to 
whom we feel ourselves under the obligation that we 
do always what is right, and abstain from what is 
wrong. Again the consideration of the external world 
points to the fact of there being One Almighty Governor, 
But the question is not to be taken for granted. The 
decision, to a thoughtful mind, would be much more 
satisfactory if supported by evidence. The evidence 
lies abundantly around us, — the evidence of the being 
of a God, — the evidence which, in recent times, has 
appropriated the name of Natural Theology. 

Revelation. Natural Theology closes the series of our 

secular teaching, leading onward to those more solemn 
subjects, for which the secular curriculum may be re- 



ON "TRANSLATION INTO THE LANGUAGES OF INDIA." 235 

garded, in its highest aspect, as being preparatory. The 
conclusion reached by Natural Theology compels the 
thinking mind to ask the question, " Has the God of 
nature anywhere, except in nature, revealed himself to 
man?" The answer to this question we offer to the 
Hindu in our Scriptures. But his compatriots, he re- 
plies, have scriptures of their own. True, we rejoin ; 
but scriptures resting their claims only on the futile 
ground of self-assertion. Of our own, we tender him 
the evidences, historical and internal. But the mis- 
sionary will exclaim — " It is the peculiarity of the 
Gospel that it is preached to the poor ; — and must 
every poor villager go through all this course of train- 
ing before he can reasonably become a Christian?" I 
reply, that such is not at all my meaning. The question 
on the lip of the uneducated masses is always, "Have 
any of the chief priests or rulers believed on him ?" 
When those who are educated shall come to be won 
over, the uneducated masses will follow. The baptism 
of a Clovis entails that of armies and of crowds. " But 
are we not to follow the example of our Lord?" Let 
us see what is the example here meant. It is that con- 
veyed, we presume, in the reply to the interrogatory of 
the Baptist — "The blind receive their sight, and the 
lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, and the deaf hear, 
the dead are raised up, and the poor have the Gospel 
preached to them." If this were designed as our example, 
why confine ourselves to the last in the list of marvellous 
works? Is it because, out of the signs of the Divine 
mission here co-ordinately enumerated, — out of the six 
instances of work accomplished in suspension of the 

is 



236 NOTE F.— ON "TRANSLATION INTO THE LANGUAGES OF INDIA." 

ordinary laws of nature, — the last only, t when we have 
no power to suspend the laws of nature, can be imitated 
without risk of obvious and glaring failure ? When our 
missionaries can raise the dead, or give sight to the 
blind, then they may hopefully attempt the conversion 
of a nation by the non-natural process of leavening the 
lowest first. This much-misunderstood matter has been 
handled in the clearest and fullest manner by the Bev. 
John Penrose, in his Bampton Lecture of the year 1803, 
a book quoted from in our Introduction, and which every 
missionary would do well to read and ponder. Far be it 
from me to wish that the poor should receive one atom 
less of attention than they receive at present ; but it is 
not from this quarter — as the enormous aggregate of 
avowed missionary failure might suggest — that any 
infectious extension of the faith will emanate, in an age 
when miracles have ceased and ought not to be counted 
on. 



THE END. 



STEPHEN AUSTIN, POINTER, HERTFORD 



JAMES MADDEN, 



ETC., ETC., ETC. 



3-, Leadenhall Street, London. 
June, 1859. 

JAMES MADDEN BEGS LEAVE TO ANNOUNCE TO GENTLEMEN INTEEESTED 
IN THE EAST, THAT HE ESPECIALLY DEVOTES HIS ATTENTION TO THE 
PUBLICATION AND SALE OE WORKS CONNECTED WITH THE MEDITERRANEAN, 
AECHIPELAGO, TURKEY, EGYPT, PERSIA, INDIA, ETC. 

AUTHORS DESIROUS OF PUBLISHING WORKS REFERRING TO THE ABOVE- 
NAMED COUNTRIES, OR TO THE EAST IN GENERAL, WILL FIND JAMES 
MADDEN AT ALL TIMES READY TO ENTER INTO ARRANGEMENTS FOR EFFEC- 
TIVE PUBLICATION. 

MISCELLANEOUS ORDERS EXECUTED WITH PUNCTUALITY AND DESPATCH. 



WORKS BY 

DR. JAMES R. I5ALLANTYNE, 



PRINCIPAL OF BENARES COLLEGE. 



Hindustani Grammar. 

Royal 8vo. 6s. 



Hindustani Selections. 

Third Edition. Royal 8vo. 6s. 



Pocket Guide to Hindustani Conversation; 

Containing Grammatical Principles, Familiar Phrases, and a Vocabulary, English 

and Hindustani. 

New Edition in the Press. 



Persian Caligraphy. 

Second Edition. Lithographed. 4to. 5s, 



Elements of Hindi and Braj Bhakha. 

Prepared for the use of the East India College, Haileybury. 4to. 6s. 



Mahratta Grammar. 

Lithographed. 4to. 6*. 



The Practical Oriental Interpreter; 

OR, 

HINTS ON THE ART OF TRANSLATING READILY FROM ENGLISH 
INTO HINDUSTANI AND PERSIAN. 

Royal 8vo. 5s. 



A Catechism of Sanskrit Grammar. 

24mo. Is. 



A Catechism of Persian Grammar. 

24mo. Is. 



riJI3LlSHED BY JAMES MADDEN, 3, LEADENHALL STREET. 



JAMES MADDEN' S PUBLICATIONS, 

Just Published, in foolscap, price 2s. 6d. 

An Easy Method for acquiring Hindustani 
in its Original Character. 

By Hyder Jung Bahadoor. 



The Fifth Edition, in 10 vols., post Svo., price £2 16s., 

MILL'S HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA. 

Edited and continued by Professor H. H. Wilson, F.R.S. 
" The only -works to which the Statesman and Philosopher can refer, and will hand down to 
posterity an imperishable monument of the historian's impartiality, sagacity, and truthfulness, 
combined with great power of reflection and unbiassed judgment."— Athenaeum, on Mill and 
Wilson. 

ARIANA ANTIGUA; 

A Descriptive Account of the Antiquities and Coins of Afghanistan. 

By Professor H. H. Wilson. 

With a Memoir of the Buildings called Topes. 

There are only a few copies of this work remaining — it will never he reprinted, as 

the Plates are destroyed. 

Royal ±to., many Engravings and Maps, £3 3s. 



The Second Edition, with much new matter on Russia, in two volumes, 8vo., 
price £1 Is., 

Narrative of a Journey from Heraut to Khiva, 
Moscow, and St. Petersburgh, 

During the late Bussian Invasion of Khiva, with some Account of the Court of 

Khiva and the Kingdom of Khaurism. 

By Major James Abbott, Bengal Artillery. 

" It has seldom fallen to our lot to read a more interesting narrative of personal adventure. 

Rarely, indeed, do we find an atithor whose constant presence, through almost the whole of two 

large volumes, is not onlv tolerable but welcome." — Economist. 

" We have said enough, and quoted enough, to induce our readers to seek these highly enter- 
taining volumes." — Xonconform ist. 

In two volumes, post 8vo., with Portrait of the Author, price 10s. 6d., 

Syria and the Syrians, 

By Gregory M. "SVortabet, of Bayroot, Syria. 

" These volumes contain a delightful narrative of a tour through the [most interesting portion 
of the Turkish dominions. We scarcely know a book more worthy of being placed in the hands 
of youth, as a guide and companion in* acquiring a deep knowledge of the scenes recorded in 
Scripture. While his well-written description of the antiquities and beauties of Syria, — and we 
may here especially mention his notice of Damascus and its neighbourhood, — will delight the 
reader by the vivid pictures they give him of the attractiveness of the country." — Morning 
Advertiser. 



With. Illustrations, in one volume, crown Svo., 

Ismeer ; or, Smyrna and its British Hospital in 1855. 

By a Lady. 

" Decidedly one of the best books which the war has called forth— a lively picturesque nar- 
rative of what she saw and what she did ; all the more pleasant and welcome because it is per- 
fectly natural, and not disfigured by the tricks of the book-maker's art. One of the few features 
of the disgraceful and ill-managed war that can be looked back upon with satisfaction, was 
the part played by the lady nurses ; ami so universal is the appreciation of their noble conduct, 
that wc are sure a good book, like the present* written by one of them, will be welcomed in every 
family, and needs only to be pointed out to be widely read." — Atlas. 



JAMES MADDEN'S PUBLICATIONS. 



ANCIENT EGYPT; 

Her Monuments, Hieroglyphics, History, and Archseology, and other subjects 

connected with Hieroglyphical Literature. 

By George Gliddon, late U.S. Consul at Cairo. 

Nearly 20,000 copies of this work have been sold in America. 

Small folio, containing as much matter as an ordinary-sized 8vo. vol., with nearly 

100 Woodcuts. 2s. 



THE LATE RUSSIAN WAR. 

In one thick volume, 8vo., price 6s. 

THE WAR -WHO'S TO BLAME? 

Being a complete Analysis of the whole Diplomatic Correspondence regarding the 
Eastern Question, and showing from these and other authentic sources the causes 
which produced the late "War. By James Macqtjeen, Esq., F.R.G.S., Author of 
" Geography of Africa," etc. 

Crania Americana; 

Or, a Comparative View of the Skulls of various Aboriginal Nations of North -and 

South America. 

By Samuel George Morton, M.D. 

In one volume, folio, illustrated by Seventy-eight Plates and a Coloured Map, 

price £5 5s. 






One handsome volume, 8vo., 18s.; on large paper, 24s. 

Makamat ; 

Or, Conversational Anecdotes of Abou'l Kasem al Hariri of Basra. During Seven 

Centuries acknowledged in the East as the Model of Rhythmical Elegance. 

Translated into English Verse and Prose, and Illustrated with Annotations. 

By Theodore Preston, M.A. etc., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. 



The Third Edition greatly improved, in one volume, Ylmo., price 3s. 

Initia Latina: a Guide to Latin for Beginners. 

By the Rev. J. Edwards, King's College, and W. Cross, 
Queen's College, Cambridge. 

" A clear, simple, and efficient introduction to the study of Latin." — Atlas. 
" Notwithstanding the many other ' Collectanea? Sententise' and ' Delectuses' used at schools, 
we consider this the most serviceable that has as yet issued from the press. — Mirror. 



In two volumes, Ylmo., price 3s. 6d. 

Oral Exercises for Beginners in Latin Composition; 

"With a Hand-Book to ditto. 

By the Author of, and intended as a Companion to, the " Initia Latina." 

"We do not know that, in all our experience, we ever saw lessons better calculated to effect 
these objects, with ease both to the pupil and to the master. Were we to commence our educa- 
tion again, they are just the books we should select for our instruction."— Britannia. 



12mo. } price is. 

Key to Oral Exercises 



Publications for the use of the Benaees College, obtainable from the 
Government Curator of Schoolboohs, Agra. 

RS. AS. 

Lectures on the Nyaya Philosophy, embracing the Text of the Tarka San- 

graha, with Translation. 2nd Edition 10 

Lectures on the Sankhya Philosophy, embracing the Text of the Tattwa 

Samasa 7 

Lectures on the Vedanta Philosophy, embracing the Text of the Vedanta Sara 8 
Aphorisms of the Nyaya, with Illustrative Extracts from the Commentaries, 

in Sanskrit and English. (The first four out of the five Books.) 2 13 

Aphorisms of the Vaiseshika (Part I.) 7 

Aphorisms of the Sankhya (complete) 2 

Aphorisms of the Yoga (Books I. and II. of the four) 1 

Aphorisms of the Vedanta (Part I.) 7 

Aphorisms of the MJmansa (Part I.) 7 

The Bhasha Parichchheda, with its Commentary, the Muktavali (a Text- 
book of the Nyaya). Sanskrit and English. (Parti.) 7 

The Laghu Kaumudl, the School-book of the Sanskrit Grammar, on the 
system of Panini, with an English Translation, and Notes and Refer- 
ences, to render the student independent of the aid of a teacher 1 8 

The same, with the English rendered into Hindi by Pandit Mathura Natha 2 

First Lessons in Sanskrit Grammar (after the manner of Ollen dorf ) 4 

The Mahabhashya, or " Great Commentary," on the Grammatical Aphorisms 
of Panini, with its Commentary, the Bhashya PradJpa, and the Com- 
mentary thereon, the Bhashya Pradipoddyota, — Vol. I. containing the 
Navahnika (folio, pp. 808), with an English version of the opening 

portion (pp. 40) 10 

The Latin, with a new Translation into English, of Bacon's Novum Organum, 
Book I., with a Commentary embracing Extracts from Herschel, 

Whewell, Mill, etc 1 14 

The same in Sanskrit 3 1 

A Synopsis of Science, in Sanskrit and English, reconciled with the truths 

to be found in the Nyaya Philosophy. 2nd Edition 3 8 

[The following Table of Contents of the Synopsis indicates the concatenation of 
the subjects : — 

Advertisement to the edition of 1852, giving a sketch of five years' operations in the Benares 

College. 
Translation of the Sanskrit Address to the Pandits. 

A Discussion of the Principles of Translation, in respect of scientific terms. 
Book I. — The Nyaya Arrangement of the Hindu Philosophers, examined, and its relations 

to the European distribution of science indicated. 
Book II.— Of Evidence, or the Means of Knowledge, viz., the Senses and Induction, leading 

to the treatment of Deduction, Rhetoric, Formal Logic, Testimony, and Grammar. 
Book III. — The conceptions of Space, Time, and Motion introduced, leading to Mathematics 

and Descriptive Astronomy. 



PUBLICATIONS FOR THE USE OF THE BENARES COLLEGE. 

Book IV.— The conception of Force, the cause of Motion, superadded, giving rise to the 
Physics of the Solid, the Liquid, the Aeriform, and the Imponderable. 

Book V. — The further conception of Essential Change superadded, introducing Chemistry, 
with its ancillary branch of Natural History, viz., Mineralogy ; and, on the superadd'i- 
tion of the conception of Life, Vegetable Physiology, with its ancillary — Botany, and 
Animal Physiology, with its ancillary — Zoology. 

Book VI.— The Causes of the existing arrangement of the materials of the Globe, giving 
occasion for Geology ; and the consequent Aspect of the Earth, giving occasion for the 
contemplations of Physical Geography. 

Book VII. — The Conduct of Nations, as necessarily influenced by considerations of Physical 
Geography, giving occasion for Civil History, with its corollary respecting the more 
palpable causes of material prosperity, viz., Political Economy ; and, on the superaddi- 
tion of the conceptions of Duty and Responsibility, Ethics (including Law), and Natural 
Theology, pointing to Revelation. 

N.B. — The Essay on " Christianity contrasted with Hindu Philosophy," is the 
sequel of the " Synopsis of Science."] 

BS. AS. 

The Nyaya KaumudJ, a Hindi version of the " Synopsis of Science." Part I. 8 
Part II 1 

English " Reprints for the Pandits" viz.: — 

Harris's "Dialogue on Art" (with a Summary in Sanskrit, by Pandit Vitthal 

Sastri), 2nd Edition 4 

Chapters on " Physics," adapted from the works of Dr. Arnott 1 8 

Chapters on "Political Economy," adapted from the works of Whately and 

De Quincey 10 

Berkeley's "Inquiry into the Principles of Human Knowledge," with an 
Explanatory Commentary, indicating the relations between Berkeley's 
speculations and the Hindu Philosophy ; preceded by a Summary of 
Locke's doctrines, in the form of Aphorisms, and followed by a similar 
Aphoristic Summary of the doctrines of Hume 1 

An Abstract of Mr. Dugald Stewart's work on Intellectual Philosophy (form- 
ing a sequel to the preceding reprint) 2 

Chapters on " Induction," adapted from the works of Mr. J. S. Mill and 
Dr. Whewell, with disquisitions on the relation between the views of 
these writers and those of the Hindus 1 8 

Outlines of " Metaphysics," " Logic," and " Moral Philosophy" 8 

Chapters on " Physical Geography," chiefly adapted from the work of Mrs. 

Somerville 1 

Chapters on " Chemistry," adapted from Griffiths's " Chemistry of the Four 
Ancient Elements," and Faraday's " Chemistry of the Non-metallic 
Elements" 1 8 

Shakspere's play of " Macbeth," with an Explanatory Paraphrase (preceded 

by Charles Lamb's story of Macbeth). 2nd Edition 1 

The Elements of English Grammar, explained in Sanskrit 12 



A 



